Structural power and the political sources of central bank policy in developing countries by Dafe, Florence
   
 
A University of Sussex DPhil thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Structural Power and the Political Sources of Central Bank Policy in Developing 
Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Florence Dafe 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Development Studies 
 
Institute of Development Studies 
University of Sussex 
September 2014 
  
3 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
FLORENCE DAFE  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
STRUCTURAL POWER AND THE POLITICAL SOURCES OF CENTRAL 
BANK POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
SUMMARY 
 
There is a wide variation in central bank policy stances across developing countries: 
Some central banks emphasise stability, in both prices and the financial system; some 
emphasise financial deepening; and some place equal emphasis on both goals. This 
thesis explores the argument that those who control the sources of finance on which 
countries rely for investment shape central bank policy stances. The argument has its 
roots in the theory of the structural power of capital; a theory which has remained 
under-explored for developing countries. This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature 
on structural power by further developing and probing the structuralist theory in the 
context of developing countries, notably those dependent on aid and natural resource 
rents. Combining insights from the literature on structural power and on the economic 
and political correlates of aid and natural resource dependence, I explore whether and 
how those who control the sources of finance on which countries rely for investment 
shape central bank policy stances. To explore these questions the thesis employs a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. First, I use case studies from 
Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda to shed light on the mechanisms through which variations 
in a country’s major sources of investible funds induce changes in the stance of central 
bank policy. Second, I explore the relationship between dependence on aid and on 
natural resources and the stance of central bank policy econometrically, using cross-
national statistical analysis. The statistical analysis contributes to theory-building by 
developing quantitative measures of key theoretical concepts and probes structuralist 
theory by examining the generalisability of the findings of the case studies. 
Collectively, the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that power rooted in the 
control of capital helps to account for central bank policy stances. The results of my 
research contribute to extending the theory of the structural power of capital to finance 
in developing countries and to the debate about the costs and benefits of different 
economic development strategies.  
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1 Structural Power and the Politics of Central Bank Policy 
The global financial crisis re-launched the debate about the appropriate role of central 
banks in governing financial markets and the wider economy. Countries as diverse as 
Argentina, the United States (US) and India are currently considering the breadth of 
their central banks’ mandates.1 For much of the past three decades, there has been wide 
agreement among policymakers and scholars that central banks should focus on fighting 
inflation whereas other potential goals should play a secondary role.2 While the view 
that safeguarding financial system stability is an additional key element of central 
banks’ mandates has gained ground, the reignited debate over the extent to which, if at 
all, central banks should broaden their mandates and promote economic growth 
continues to rage.3   
For developing countries, which need to increase growth and reduce poverty, this is an 
important debate. In general, their central banks are, compared to other public 
institutions, relatively well staffed and have expertise in the governance of financial 
markets. With the tools they already have, their central banks could promote both 
stability and growth. With the rise of neoliberal economic thinking, however, the 
dominant policy paradigm had become that central banks in developing countries 
should use their powers primarily with a view to promoting stability in prices and the 
financial system and leave the promotion of growth to markets. By putting the role of 
governments in governing finance back on the negotiating table, the global financial 
crisis has thus opened a window of opportunity to rethink the role of central banks in 
promoting economic development in developing countries.  
                                               
1
 In the US, for instance, the central bank’s dual mandate of price stability and full employment has been 
a subject of intense debate since central bank policy became expansionary in order to raise employment in 
the wake of the global financial crisis. There has also been continual criticism that the mandate of the 
Central Bank of Argentina, which had focused on monetary stability, was broadened in 2012 to include 
the promotion of “jobs and economic growth with social fairness”. 
2
 This stylised fact does not fit all countries, but rather captures the convergence of a large number of 
central banks in both developed and developing countries towards a framework for central banking 
prioritising price stability over other objectives (Eichengreen et al., 2011). Some central banks in 
developing countries in particular have given similar emphasis to other objectives such as exchange rate 
stability.  
3
 In the vast majority of countries, central banks have been assigned, implicitly or explicitly, a financial 
stability mandate, although in some countries financial regulation and supervision has been delegated to 
institutions outside the central bank. Assigning central banks a financial stability mandate has been 
justified on the grounds that central banks tend to have more expertise in, and information on, macro-
economic and financial market developments than other public institutions through pursuing their 
mandate to promote price stability. In developing countries, the decision to assign central banks a 
financial stability mandate as opposed to creating a separate financial regulator and supervisor also 
reflects capacity and resource shortages.  
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The debate on central bank mandates in developing countries mainly concerns the 
question of what weight central banks should attach to pursuing the goals of price and 
financial stability on the one hand and financial deepening on the other. Following Beck 
(2013: 4), I define financial deepening broadly as an increase in the volume of financial 
transactions in an economy. The divergence of views on the relative importance 
stability and financial deepening should receive in central bank policy is reflected in the 
variation of central bank policy stances across developing countries. Some central banks 
emphasise stability, in terms of both prices and the financial system; some emphasise 
financial deepening; and some place equal emphasis on both goals.  
There is broad agreement and empirical evidence that both stability and financial 
deepening are important for economic development.4 Historically, central banks in 
developed countries have played important roles in promoting both stability and 
financial deepening. While there may be trade-offs between stability and financial 
deepening, there may also be some synergies.5 Why is it then that a wide variation in 
policy stances is observable and not all central banks in developing countries place 
                                               
4
 It is widely agreed that a reasonable degree of stability in prices and the financial system is a 
precondition for growth. The relationship between financial deepening and growth has however been 
subject to greater debate. While some economists identified a causal link from financial deepening to 
growth, for instance Beck et al. (2000) and Levine et al. (2000), others questioned the robustness of this 
link such as Arestis and Demetriades (1997), Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) and Andersen et al. (2012). 
On balance, the evidence suggests that the relationship between financial depth and growth is non-
monotonic  (Easterly et al., 2000; Arcand et al., 2012; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012). At low and 
intermediate levels of financial depth, the relationship between financial depth and growth is positive but 
at high levels of financial depth this relationship turns negative. The two main reasons seem to be that as 
financial systems deepen, economic volatility and the probability of economic crashes increase (Minsky, 
1974; Kindleberger, 1978) as does the risk of a misallocation of resources (Tobin, 1984).  
5 Trade-offs are likely to emerge where central banks attach different weights to different objectives. For 
instance, where a central bank places more emphasis on price and financial stability than on financial 
deepening, negative effects on the latter are likely. Everything else being equal, the tighter monetary 
policy and the more stringent prudential regulation become, the more costly credit grows, so that financial 
deepening becomes challenging. Similarly, where a central bank places more emphasis on financial 
deepening than on price and financial stability, stability is likely to suffer. Allowing a major and rapid 
expansion of credit to the private sector as part of the financial deepening process may raise inflation by 
creating excessive demand and pose risks for financial stability by increasing exposures to risk. While 
such trade-offs are often unavoidable to cope with challenges to the achievement of one particular goal in 
the short-term, these trade-offs may be addressed in the longer term by carefully choosing a combination 
of policies that reflects considerations of both stability and financial deepening. There may to some extent 
also be synergies between price and financial stability on the one hand and financial deepening on the 
other. A reasonable degree of price and financial stability is an important – though insufficient – 
precondition for financial deepening. Financial depth in turn may support guarding price stability by 
improving the functioning of the monetary transmission mechanism through which central banks seek to 
influence inflation. Deep financial markets may also help with guarding financial stability by providing 
alternative sources of funding during times of financial fragility. However, as the emphasis placed on 
stability increases, any synergies with financial deepening tend to decrease, and vice versa. 
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equal emphasis on both goals, stability and financial deepening? Answering this 
question lies at the heart of understanding diverse development paths. 
In the following chapters, I argue that variations in the sources of finance on which 
countries rely to finance investment help to account for variations in central bank policy 
stances. This argument, which I elaborate in Chapter 2, has its roots in what has been 
labelled the “theory of the structural power of capital”. This theory was originally 
developed mainly in the work of Block (1987: Chapter 3) and Lindblom (1977: Chapter 
13) and is the subject of a small sub-literature within the broad literature examining the 
relationship between state and capital. The scholarship on the structural power of capital 
shares the idea that states face strong incentives to implement policies which are in the 
general interest of the business community because states need to maintain a reasonable 
level of economic activity in order to be able to finance the state apparatus and maintain 
the popular support needed for staying in power. In a capitalist economy, the level of 
economic activity is largely determined by discretionary investment decisions of the 
business community, so that states face, the theory of structural power hypothesises, 
“structural imperatives” to create a business environment that reflects the policy 
preferences of business. Jeffrey Winters (1994) took these arguments one step further 
by developing a framework for analysing the potential power of different categories and 
sources of investible funds, which I shorthand refer to as “investment resources”. His 
framework suggests that differences in the sources of finance upon which countries rely 
for investment explain differences in the general orientation of their economic policies. 
I began to examine structuralist ideas when I was struggling to make sense of the 
political economy literature that intended to explain variations in central bank policy. A 
political economy approach seemed appropriate because it could take into account the 
complex interaction between economic structures and political incentives. Yet the two 
prevailing political economy explanations for central bank policy were not wholly 
convincing.  
One of these explanations, the political institutions approach, focuses on the role of 
political institutions such as electoral democracy in policymaking (Girma and 
Shortland, 2008; Haber et al., 2008; Huang, 2010). The central contention of this 
literature is that, without political institutions that limit government discretion, a 
government, relying on the financial system to provide it with funds, has “strong 
15 
 
incentives to govern the financial system so as to facilitate its own political survival at 
the expense of the development of a banking system that can finance the private 
economy” (Haber et al., 2008: 2). This approach has two major shortcomings. First, by 
taking political institutions as a given instead of recognising their endogeneity, this 
approach has difficulties in providing a satisfactory explanation for the variation in 
policy stances among countries with similar institutional environments.6 Second, by 
taking a predatory government as a starting point, this approach does not give due 
account to the possibility that power asymmetries between the state and the private 
sector might as well give rise to policies that support the general interests of business.   
In contrast, the societal interest approach seeks to explain monetary and financial policy 
as the outcome of struggles among societal interest groups such as sectors or classes.7 
Policy is conceived as an exchange where politicians provide favourable policies to 
those constituencies with the greatest economic strength. State interests are considered 
to be quite flexible in responding to societal preferences. The major shortcoming of the 
societal interest approach is that it treats the state as merely responding to private 
demands, denying states an independent role as actors who proactively seek support for 
their preferred policies.  
The approach focused on structural power, meanwhile, seemed more promising. It 
suggested hypotheses to explain variations in central bank policy stances in developing 
countries with similar institutional environments. It does that through recognizing that 
states have not only incentives for exploiting the private sector but also for being 
responsive to business in their own interest.  From a structuralist perspective, states are 
not merely responding to private demands. Rather, policies are considered the outcome 
of the strategic interaction of interdependent actors, whereby policymakers try to loosen 
constraints attached to the provision of investment resources and seek to enhance their 
policy space (Winters, 1994). Finally, the structuralist approach seemed promising 
because it can take into account domestic and international factors that shape economic 
policy by offering a framework in which the “nationality” and international mobility of 
the key sources of finance as drivers of economic policy may vary. This is more fruitful 
than explanations focusing entirely on either domestic or international factors. 
                                               
6
 Studies by Sylvia Maxfield (1990; 1997), for instance, suggest that there were significant differences in 
the orientation of central bank policy in Brazil and Mexico, even during periods when the quality of 
political institutions has been similar.  
7
 See for instance Frieden (1991), Pagano and Volpin (2001) and Rajan and Zingales (2003). 
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Despite their potential, the structuralist arguments have remained under-explored and 
underdeveloped in the context of developing countries. Few researchers have applied 
the structuralist propositions to developing countries, and fewer still have done so for 
finance in developing countries.8 Moreover, research on structural power has given 
much attention to explaining economic policy in countries where the structural power of 
business is strong because it provides a large share of investible resources. Many 
developing countries, however, rely to a significant extent on aid and natural resource 
revenues. In these countries, aid and resource revenues substitute for a considerable 
share of the resources usually provided by business, so that its structural power may be 
lower. Note that, throughout the thesis, I follow Winters (1996) and use the term 
“business” interchangeably with the phrase “private investors”.9 The variation across 
developing countries regarding the sources of finance on which they rely for investment 
and in the contribution of business to investment creates the kind of variation needed to 
further develop and probe the theory of the structural power of capital. It is surprising 
that few researchers have seized the opportunity to exploit this variation.  
I seek to begin to fill that gap in the literature by further developing and exploring the 
theory of the structural power of capital in the context of developing countries. 
Specifically, this thesis contributes to the structuralist literature by extending the 
argument to contexts of dependence for investible resources on aid and on natural 
resource rents. In these contexts, I draw inspiration from Winters’s argument that 
variations in countries’ major sources of investment finance imply variations in the 
pattern of control of these funds, which may in turn explain variations in the orientation 
of economic policy. Extending this argument to the area of central banking suggests that 
those who control the sources of investible funds on which a country relies for 
investment may influence the stance of central bank policy. 
In developing and probing this argument, I combine insights from the structuralist 
literature and literature on the economic and political correlates of aid and natural 
resource dependence. Based on this literature, I also develop two propositions. The first 
is that in developing countries which are more dependent on aid, the central bank policy 
                                               
8
 Studies focusing on the structural power of capital in developing countries include Jesudason (1989), 
Hidrobo (1992) and Winters (1996). Work in the area of finance includes Maxfield (1990), Woo (1991) 
and Maxfield (1997). Yet these studies all relate to middle-income countries. 
9
 Most works with an explicit commitment to the structuralist position also use the word “capital” to refer 
to private investors. However, the term “capital” may also refer to actual investment resources. I only use 
“capital” in the latter sense to avoid confusion. 
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stance is more likely to be stability-oriented. The second proposition is that in 
developing countries which are more dependent on natural resources, the central bank 
policy stance is more likely to be oriented towards financial deepening. Chapter 2, 
which presents the theoretical framework of this thesis, elaborates on these propositions 
and the mechanisms linking the sources of finance to a particular central bank policy 
stance. The chapter also outlines the lineage of the propositions, specifies the research 
questions and explains the methodology I applied in order to explore them. 
In Chapters 3 to 6, I probe the structural dimension of capital’s power, using country 
case studies and cross-country regression analysis. I selected Uganda, Nigeria and 
Kenya as country cases because these countries vary with respect to the sources of 
finance on which they rely for investment. The case studies, which are based on 
extensive field research, offer an interpretation of central bank policy trajectories in 
three developing countries in light of the theory of the structural power of capital. 
Moreover, as arguments linking aid and resource dependence to policy outcomes are 
often under-developed in a causal sense, I pay particular attention to revealing some of 
the mechanisms through which those who control countries’ major sources of investible 
funds shape central bank policy.  
The case studies of Uganda and Nigeria cover new ground, assessing the extent to 
which structural forces may shape policy in contexts where the structural power of 
business is constrained. Chapter 3 offers a case study of central banking in Uganda. It 
explores how donors, notably international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), may gain power over policy in a context of aid 
dependence and encourage a stability-oriented policy stance. Chapter 4, which contains 
a case study of central banking in Nigeria, explains how increases in the government’s 
access to and control of natural resource revenues may induce a central bank policy 
stance oriented towards financial deepening. The case study of Kenya, presented in 
Chapter 5, contributes to the structuralist literature by offering the first account of the 
structural power of private investors in an African country. I explain how reliance on 
private investors and donors as sources of investible funds may encourage a central 
bank policy stance which is oriented towards both stability and financial deepening.  
Chapter 6 expands the scope of this research by employing three sets of cross-national 
statistical analysis: a logistic regression analysis of financial deepening policies, 
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ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression analysis of prudential regulation 
and a pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis of monetary policy in 
developing countries. Regression analysis is an unusual approach to probe structuralist 
propositions as most research in this tradition has relied on country case studies. The 
statistical analysis contributes to building the theory of the structural power of capital by 
developing quantitative measures of key theoretical concepts, such as measures of 
policy stances, and to probing this theory by examining the generalisability of my 
propositions. While each of the three sets of statistical analysis has methodological 
limitations so that no one set is entirely convincing on its own, the three sets of analysis 
in combination provide some support for my propositions. Specifically, the results 
suggest that central banks in countries which are more reliant on support by IMF 
programmes are more likely to have a stability-oriented policy stance whereas central 
banks in countries which are more reliant on resource revenues are more likely to have a 
policy stance oriented towards financial deepening. However, the statistical data and 
tools at hand pose difficulties in establishing causality; thus any conclusions on the roles 
of countries’ major sources of finance in shaping central bank policy should be drawn 
by considering the evidence from both the case studies and the statistical analysis.   
The final chapter of the thesis, Chapter 7, correspondingly reviews the combined 
evidence from the statistical analysis and the case studies. The main conclusion is that, 
collectively, the evidence suggests that the power arising from the control over 
investible resources helps to account for variation in central bank policy stances. The 
chapter also offers a summary of the major contributions of the thesis and some of its 
limitations, pointing out scope for future research. The thesis concludes by highlighting 
some implications of the findings for the debate about the orientation of central bank 
policy in developing countries. In particular, the case studies suggest that a policy 
stance which emphasises one goal and neglects the other may be costly for developing 
countries and that it may be beneficial to pursue a stance which simultaneously 
promotes stability and financial deepening. If central banks pursue a balanced approach 
to both stability and financial deepening in countries where they have a mandate to 
promote both goals, then they could play the role of agents of economic development. 
The goal I have set for myself in this thesis is to work towards a better understanding of 
the political sources of central bank policy, which is an important step in enhancing the 
contribution of central banks to economic development. 
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2 Theoretical Framework 
This chapter begins the exercise of theory-building which will be continued throughout 
this thesis. In pursuit of this goal, the chapter outlines the theoretical lineage of my 
central argument, namely: those who control the sources of finance on which a country 
relies to finance investment influence central bank policy stances. The next section 
situates this research within the context of work on structural power. In the section that 
follows, I extend the theory to contexts where the structural power of private investors 
is more limited, namely with regard to aid and resource dependent countries. The final 
section ties everything together. It specifies the research question and testable 
propositions which combine insights from research on structural power, the politics of 
aid dependence and the politics of natural resource dependence. In addition, this section 
concludes by describing the methodological implications of my theoretical framework. 
2.1 The Theory of the Structural Power of Capital 
This thesis is rooted in the theory of the structural power of capital. Its original 
propositions, which were developed in the 1970s, mainly originate in the work of Fred 
Block, Charles Lindblom, Claus Offe and Albert Hirschman. These scholars come from 
different theoretical traditions but their research shares a concern for the structural 
power of business – power that derives from the capacity to deploy scarce investment 
resources. The theory is built on four interrelated propositions.  
First, in capitalist societies, states, which I define, following Weber, as the 
organisational structures within which binding collective choices are taken and 
implemented over a given territory, are structurally dependent on a reasonable level of 
economic activity. As Block (1987: 58) points out: “This is true for two reasons. First, 
the capacity of the state to finance itself through taxation or borrowing depends on the 
state of the economy (....). Second, public support for a regime will decline sharply if 
the regime presides over a serious drop in the level of economic activity". Given the 
financial and political complications resulting from a decline in economic activity due 
to falling investment, there is constant pressure on the state to maintain a continuous 
flow of new investment or, as Winters (1996: 9) puts it, to satisfy a country’s 
“investment imperative”.  
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Second, in capitalism, the level of economic activity is largely determined by the 
discretionary investment decisions of private investors (Block, 1987: 58). Governments, 
which I define as the actors (e.g. party politicians, military administrators, civilian 
administrators) who occupy dominant positions within the state, control political power. 
However, the discretionary power over resources on which citizens and their leaders 
depend are concentrated in the hands of an unelected, unaccountable few: Investors 
deploy capital based on individual profit calculations and governments can rarely 
command business to use their investment resources in ways that advance the interests 
of society or benefit the state. Thus, to satisfy the investment imperative, governments 
are left only with the option to induce business to invest (Lindblom, 1977: 173-175; 
Winters, 1996).  
The third proposition follows from the previous ones: Since the failure to meet a 
country’s investment needs brings complications in the economic and political realm 
and because investment can rarely be commanded but must be induced, governments 
have strong incentives to create a political and economic environment that investors find 
responsive. As Winters (1996: 11) explains, inducements “are none other than 
government policies responding to the interests and objectives of capital controllers.”10 
Where governments fail to be responsive to business the “ultimate political sanction is 
non-investment or the threat of it" (Offe, 1984: 244). 
The fourth proposition relates to the mechanisms through which the preferences of 
those with structural power translate into policy. One mechanism used by private 
investors to influence policy is direct political participation, for instance in the form of 
lobbying.11 Yet often this mechanism plays only a minor role in the exercise of 
investors’ power because the mere threat that investors could reduce investment is 
sufficient to induce governments to be responsive to the preferences of business. 
Investment decisions are taken individually, based on profit calculations which take into 
                                               
10
 In their focus on power associated with control over resources these claims bear similarity to those of 
fiscal sociologists and resource dependence theorists. Resource dependency theorists argue that the actors 
who gain discretionary control over resources that are critical to the smooth functioning and survival of 
systems shape organisational activities and outcomes (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The central contention 
of research in fiscal sociology is that the sources of finance on which a government has to rely influence 
the way a society is governed and organised (Goldsheid, 1958; Schumpeter, 1991[1918]; Musgrave, 
1992). While works rooted in fiscal sociology focus on how the sources of public finance shape policy, 
works rooted in the theory of the structural power of capital focus on how the sources of finance on which 
the state and society as a whole rely for investment shape policy. 
11
 Power rooted in direct political participation is also referred to as instrumental power. For a discussion 
of three facets of power – instrumental, structural and discursive power – see Fuchs and Lederer (2007). 
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account the policy environment. Therefore, investors do not need to consciously 
coordinate their actions to act in concert with one another. Governments in turn are 
aware of the link between dissatisfaction with the policy environment and investment 
rates. The mere anticipation of a downturn in investment following policies which are 
not in the interests of business may be sufficient to elicit responsive policies. Using 
Hirschman’s classic categories, investors exercise power usually through the capacity 
and threat of “exit”, an economic mechanism referring to disinvestment or relocation to 
other jurisdictions, rather than “voice”, the political mechanism of interest articulation 
(Hirschman, 1970). Thus, structural power, which is rooted in the control over resources 
on which countries rely for investment, refers to a particular way of exercising material 
power, namely to the capacity to shape the behaviour of other actors without the need to 
resort to open coercion, active leverage, political mobilization, or conscious 
coordination of actions.  
Based on the theory I have outlined so far, it is easy to imagine a structural relationship 
where the state responds automatically to the interests of the business community. This 
image is, however, too simplistic because the policy preferences of different groups are 
likely to diverge, hence the prevalence of conflict in responding to structural forces. 
Business, for instance, is a heterogeneous group. Its members share many policy 
concerns related to the investment climate but are not always homogenous in their 
demands thus governments may sometimes have to deal with conflicting demands 
(Winters, 1996). Similarly, policymakers within the state are not a unified group and 
there are struggles within the state about how best to satisfy the investment imperative. 
Moreover, the policy preferences of business and state may diverge because policies 
responding to business interests may not be in the general interest of society and there 
may be tensions between generating a favourable investment climate and patronage 
politics to support the political power base of governments. As Winters (1996) stresses, 
the many examples of states failing to satisfy the preferences of business and to 
circumvent the constraints business imposes on them suggest that the relationship 
between the control of investment resources and policymaking is far from mechanistic.  
Moreover, there are factors mediating the structural power of providers of investible 
resources and the ability of states to respond to the policy concerns of these providers. 
They include limitations in a government’s organisational coherence and access to 
resources which can replace those provided by business, which I will refer to as 
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“replacement resources”.12 Maxfield (1990), for instance, shows in a case study of 
Mexico how the state’s vulnerability to the preferences of domestic bankers with respect 
to central bank policy decreased when Mexico gained access to foreign bank loans, 
which were provided with limited conditions on its domestic economic policy. Woo 
(1991) describes and explains how the South Korean state managed to loosen conditions 
attached to resources supplied by donors like the US by exploiting South Korea’s 
geostrategic importance and then used these resources domestically to pursue statist 
economic policies. That said, structural forces rooted in the investment imperative do 
press themselves on policymakers in all capitalist systems and failures to respond result 
in penalties. As Lindblom (1977: 187) puts it: “Businessmen do not get everything they 
ask for. But they get a great deal. And when they do not get enough, recession or 
stagnation is a consequence.” 
At least two further insights from Winters’s research require elaboration to extend the 
theory of the structural power of capital to the analysis of central bank policy in 
developing countries. First, structural power operates not only in democracies but also 
in contexts without regular elections, many of which are developing countries. Most of 
the early works dealing with the structural power of capital have focused on the 
procedural democracies of rich countries and, as result, on the role of elections in 
translating the pressures arising from falling investment to policymakers. Yet, as 
Winters’s analysis of Indonesia for instance shows, falling investment may also 
destabilise authoritarian regimes and state leaders may then be replaced through means 
other than elections, for example military coups (Winters, 1996). 
Second, cross-national differences in the categories of finance on which countries rely 
for investment imply cross-national differences in the pattern of control of these funds, 
which may explain differences in the orientation of economic policy. This insight is 
rooted in a framework Winters (1994: 446-452) developed. It suggests that different 
categories of actors, not only business, have power rooted in the control of resources 
which may allow them to influence policy and that their potential power varies. Starting 
from the observation that there are different categories of finance that can be used to 
finance investment (private direct investment, interstate loans, state capital, etc.), 
Winters’s framework highlights three major points.  
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 For a discussion of factors which mediate structural power see Winters (1996: 35-41). 
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• The discretionary control of policymakers varies for each category of finance. 
Policymakers tend to have limited discretion over the use of funds deployed by 
private investors. Discretion over the use of interstate loans, including aid, however, 
may be somewhat greater, although the conditions attached to the provision of such 
funds vary greatly and depend, for instance, on the reasons for which they are 
supplied.13 Discretionary control over the use of funds is greatest in the case of state 
capital, raised for instance from state-owned enterprises.  
• Higher conditions attached to resources mean that, insofar as policymakers want or 
need these funds invested, policymakers will have to create a policy environment 
that those supplying the funds find favourable. The policy environment is thus likely 
to reflect the preferences of those providers of capital whose investible funds are 
needed to achieve a level of economic activity that is sufficient to finance the state 
apparatus and maintain the government’s popular support.  
• Correspondingly, weaker conditions attached to resources mean policymakers have 
more political space to pursue their own policy agendas. Thus, as the government’s 
control of funds with weaker policy constraints attached to them increases and as 
these funds constitute an increasing share of investible resources, the government’s 
policy space widens. In some instances, it may widen enough to even enable 
policies that impinge on the interests of private investors.  
In addition, Winters’s framework suggests that four main factors determine the power 
of the providers of a particular category of finance. First, the fraction of total investment 
finance the category constitutes and the degree to which it is invested in sectors and 
businesses that are important for economic prosperity, such as key earners of foreign 
exchange. Second, its ability to relocate to another jurisdiction, referred to as its 
mobility. Third, the extent to which resources with weaker policy constraints attached to 
them can replace that category of finance. Fourth, the discretionary control 
policymakers have over that particular category of finance. 
This review of the literature on structural power outlined how considerations of power 
deriving from control over major investible resources may help to explain economic 
policy. Figure 2.1 illustrates an application of these insights to the realm of central 
banking. It shows that the structural dependence on investors, which implies limited 
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 For example, aid conditionality is likely to be lower for countries which are geopolitically important. 
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access to replacement resources, may increase investors’ power to shape central bank 
policy through voice, exit or the threat of exit. This model provides a starting point for 
thinking about the relationship between structural power and central bank policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In exploring the political power arising from the control over crucial resources, my 
study falls squarely within the structuralist tradition. Few researchers have followed 
Winters and examined structuralist arguments in contexts where the structural power of 
private investors is constrained.14 I build on Winters’s work by exploring how structural 
forces shape the orientation of policy in contexts of dependence for investible resources 
on aid and on natural resource rents. Thus, I extend the theory of the structural power of 
capital in such a way that “capital” no longer refers to resources from business only but, 
rather, to the whole range of investible resources, including aid and resource revenues. 
Moreover, by combining elements from the structuralist theory with insights on the 
political economy of aid and natural resources, I develop a more predictive model than 
Winters, who argues that when “the structural leverage of investors is effectively 
blocked (…) one can account for the direction of policy changes only by looking at 
contextual factors that vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction” (Winters, 1996: 
141). The next section explains how, building on the literature on the political and 
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 On structural power in aid dependent countries see for instance Wood (1980) and Woo (1991). 
Figure 2.1: The Structural Power of Private Investors and Central Bank Policy 
Voice
(Threat of)
Exit
Central bank policy stance reflects policy preferences of private investors
Structural dependence on private investment
Structural power of private investors
Private business contributes significant share of investible resources
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economic correlates of aid and resource dependence, I seek to account for policy stances 
in contexts where the structural power of business is likely to be constrained.       
2.2 Structural Power in Contexts of Aid and Resource Dependence 
While it is not possible here to address in detail all the possible causal connections 
between aid or resource dependence on the one hand and the orientation of economic 
policy on the other, it is useful to consider three related questions to broaden ideas about 
structural power in contexts of aid and resource dependence and to develop propositions 
regarding the stance of central bank policy in such contexts. First, what are the 
implications of aid and resource dependence for the patterns of control of investible 
funds and for power over economic policy? Second, through which mechanisms can 
those who control aid or resource revenues influence policy? Third, what does the 
literature say about the economic policy preferences of those who control investment 
funds in aid and resource dependent countries? This section addresses these questions, 
looking first at contexts of aid dependence and then at contexts of resource dependence. 
The Link between Aid Dependence and the Orientation of Economic Policy 
Before exploring the link between aid dependence and economic policy, it is necessary 
to define what is meant by aid dependence. I define aid dependence as a situation where 
foreign donors provide a significant amount of the resources (i.e. funding and expertise) 
needed to maintain a level of economic activity sufficient to finance the state apparatus 
and maintain the government’s popular support.15 Very different types of actors fall into 
the category of foreign donors.16 My focus is on Western governments, which are 
members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and multilateral 
institutions, notably the World Bank and the IMF, as providers of assistance.17 The 
reason for focusing on these two groups of donors is that they tend to have a significant 
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 This definition is inspired by Bräutigam and Knack (2004: 157) who define aid dependence as “a 
situation in which a government is unable to perform many of the core functions of government (…) 
without foreign aid funding and expertise (provided in the form of technical assistance or projects).” My 
definition differs however in its focus on the reliance of the whole of society, and not only of the 
government, on aid because structural power derived from the control over resources is based not only on 
the ability to provide government finance but to provide investible funds for the economy as a whole.  
16
 Some of the typical distinctions are: bilateral and multilateral donors, private and public donors (the 
former includes philanthropists), traditional donors and “new donors”, whereby the latter refers to 
emerging countries engaging in South-South cooperation. 
17
 Strictly speaking, the IMF is not a donor, partly because it does not give grants. I include the IMF in the 
category of donors because it is a crucial player in the international donor community as it provides 
financial and technical assistance in areas of economic policy and many donors make aid conditional on 
adopting an IMF programme and countries receiving positive reviews of economic policy from the IMF.  
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interest in influencing the orientation of economic policy in the countries they assist and 
that classifications of countries as aid dependent are usually based on the amount of 
resources countries receive from these two groups of donors.  
But how can aid dependence be measured? One widely used indicator of aid 
dependence is net inflows of official development assistance (ODA) as a share of gross 
national income (GNI) and many studies apply a threshold of 10% to classify countries 
as aid dependent. This measure captures the degree of dependence by scaling aid to the 
size of an economy’s income and is thus indicative of the extent to which aid constitutes 
a source of a country’s investible resources and hence a source of power for donors. 
Another indicator of aid dependence is net aid inflows as a percentage of government 
expenditure. This measure captures the degree of dependence on donors by scaling aid 
to the size of government expenditure. The measure is thus indicative of the relative 
importance of foreign aid and government spending and hence the influence of donors.  
The important analytical point and major difference between countries which are not 
reliant on aid and those that are is that in aid dependent countries, donors’ resources 
may be large enough to replace a significant amount of private investment.18 Donors’ 
control and provision of investible resources in aid dependent countries may have two 
effects: 
First, as aid dependence increases, the structural power of private investors is likely to 
decrease.19 The underlying assumption is that as aid replaces an increasing share of the 
resources provided by private investors, dependence on the investment decisions of the 
private sector declines, as does the need to take policy decisions which are responsive to 
private investors. This assumption mirrors an argument that is often made in work on 
the relationship between the state’s revenues and governance and in critiques of aid, 
namely that governments in aid dependent countries easily obtain funds from donors 
and therefore do not need to make much effort to promote economic development 
(Bräutigam and Knack, 2004: 263-264; Moss et al., 2006: 7-8).20 From this perspective, 
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 The term “replace” conjures up the image that societies are free to choose among funds supplied by 
donors and by business. In fact, this is seldom true because donors base a country’s eligibility for aid on 
economic and political considerations. 
19
 Developing this argument for a broad range of replacement resources including aid in the form of inter-
state loans, Winters (1996: 36) writes: “The impact of investors’ structural leverage decreases as access to 
and control over investment resources that can replace those controlled privately increases.” 
20
 The underlying assumption is often that governments that are reliant on tax revenue as opposed to aid 
or natural resources have an interest in promoting the prosperity of the private sector as taxpayers in order 
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the effects of aid dependence are similar to the resource curse, as we will see below in 
the discussion of the correlates of resource dependence.   
However, the view that aid dependence automatically or generally discourages policies 
that stimulate private investment is too simplistic for two reasons. One reason is that the 
investible funds that could be provided by large-scale business and foreign investors are 
often too large for their policy interests to be ignored by governments in aid dependent 
countries. Another reason is that, while donors and business may have interests in 
different policies, several economic policies are of common concern to both groups of 
actors, such as policies to create a stable economic environment and encourage private 
investment (Wood, 1980; Winters, 1996; Wade, 2003). That said, the policy concerns of 
businesses which only have limited mobility and investment resources may differ from 
those of donors. As the structural power of these businesses tends to be low, their policy 
concerns may receive lower priority than those of donors in countries reliant on aid 
(Winters, 1996: 91-92).  
The second effect is that as aid dependence and thus the share of investible resources 
provided by donors increases, donors’ power to influence policy is likely to increase. 
The underlying assumption here is that insofar as governments want or need support 
from donors they will have to be responsive to the policy concerns of donors. Often, 
becoming responsive to the policy concerns of donors involves changing a country’s 
economic team because such a change permits signaling commitment to policy change 
to donors and placing personnel that is both committed and technically capable to 
implement responsive policies in key positions.21   
Although donors may have considerable material power in aid dependent countries due 
to their control of significant investible resources and their ability to provide knowledge 
resources, their ability to influence policy is likely to be contingent on a range of 
factors. One factor is policymakers’ discretion over the use of resources supplied by 
donors. While policymakers’ discretionary control over aid depends on the channels the 
resources pass through and donors’ motives for assistance, it is usually higher than the 
degree to which policymakers are able to control direct investment from private actors 
                                                                                                                                         
to maximise levels of tax revenue. Self-interest may thus lead tax-reliant governments to more actively 
seek to create conditions conducive to economic development (Bates, 2001: 69). 
21
 Scholarship that links economic crisis and the subsequent dependence on external support to a change 
in economic teams includes Winters (1996) and Haggard and Maxfield (1993: 316-322). 
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(Winters, 1994: 448). Most of the assistance under consideration here are transfers by 
donor countries or multilateral institutions to governments and, as such, they pass 
through institutions of the recipient state, which opens up opportunities for 
policymakers to attach new purposes to donor funds as they are budgeted and allocated. 
Donors certainly attempt to tie these funds as much as possible to their own objectives 
and try to monitor their use. Yet, as Winters’s study of Indonesia and Woo’s study of 
South Korea suggest, governments are likely to make every effort to increase their 
flexibility in the use of aid. Moreover, as Winters (1994: 448) points out, there are 
limits to how far donors can go in auditing the books of a sovereign state. Resources 
supplied by donors are thus internally and externally controlled.  
Donors’ power is also contingent on their ability to coordinate. Donors often have 
different and competing objectives for giving aid, even among the relatively 
homogenous group of DAC donors, the IMF and the World Bank. Thus, in contrast to 
private investors, whose policy concerns tend to be more homogenous, donors often 
need to coordinate their actions to act in concert. If donor coordination is weak, 
recipient governments may be able to keep assistance high even if the conditions of 
some donors remain unsatisfied.  
Through which mechanisms may donors influence economic policy? One mechanism is 
voice, often in the form of explicit policy conditionality, threatening to withdraw funds 
if there is no compliance with conditions. Explicit conditionality is, more than for other 
donors, central to the relationship between the Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF and 
the World Bank) and recipient countries (Paloni and Zanardi, 2006). IMF arrangements, 
for instance, link the disbursement of tranches to the fulfilment of ex ante stated 
conditionalities. Sometimes donors also use cross-conditionality, that is they make the 
acceptance by the recipient country of the conditionality of one donor (often the IMF) a 
precondition for their own assistance (Griffith-Jones, 1992; Killick, 2006: 261). The 
empirical evidence suggests that explicit conditionality has often been ineffective in 
inducing the adoption of particular policies demanded by donors and that the 
effectiveness of conditionality depends on various factors, notably donors’ willingness 
to withdraw funds if conditions are not met and domestic support for reform.22 
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 See for instance Mosley (1996), Collier et al. (1997), Killick et al. (1998), van de Walle (2005) , Collier 
(2006) and IEO (2007). Killick (2006) provides an overview of the literature questioning the effectiveness 
of IMF conditionality in shaping policy choices. Killick (2006: 256) also notes that in countries reliant on 
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While conditionality often seems to be ineffective, there is empirical support for the 
claim that donors have shaped the orientation of economic policy in developing 
countries (Boockmann and Dreher, 2003; Gómez-Mera, 2011). In particular, there is 
some evidence that donors have shaped policy by encouraging social learning (Kogut 
and Macpherson, 2008; Gómez-Mera, 2011). Social learning refers to the attempt to 
adjust policy in response to a new set of ideas. Hall (1993), who made a major 
contribution on the role of ideas in shaping economic policy, calls such sets of ideas 
“policy paradigms”, as they specify the goals of policy, the kinds of instruments that 
can be used to attain them, and the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing. A focus on social learning is thus inextricably linked to a focus on the role 
of ideas in shaping policy. There is evidence to suggest that new ideas are more likely to 
lead to a change in the orientation of policy when: a) there have been policy failures 
associated with the old policy paradigm, leading to a search for a solution in the form of 
a new paradigm; and b) they are promoted by actors with political power  (Hall, 1993; 
Gómez-Mera, 2011). In many aid dependent countries, donors are powerful actors 
owing to the resources they command and their resources may help them to promote 
solutions to economic problems based on their preferred policy paradigms.23 In contexts 
of aid dependence, donors’ power may thus help them to encourage social learning, in 
particular if there is an economic team whose policy interests parallel those of donors. 
But social learning and voice are probably not the only mechanisms through which 
donors may shape policy. A third mechanism may be the threat or possibility of exit as 
recipient governments may be aware that the failure to be responsive to donors’ policy 
concerns may lead to exit, which in this context refers to a suspension of aid 
disbursement, to re-directing aid to likeminded actors within or outside the state or to 
failing to provide additional loans. Recipient governments may feel pressure to be 
responsive to donor concerns because a withdrawal of aid would not only result in a loss 
of resources but may also send signals to other donors and eventually private investors 
that the policy environment is unsatisfactory.  
                                                                                                                                         
aid, macroeconomic policies have changed in directions reflected in the conditionality of the IMF and the 
World Bank but that it is unclear to what extent this is the effect of policy conditionality. 
23
 As Hall (1993) argues, “powering” and “puzzling” often go together. In line with this, Harrison (2007: 
200) observes for the African context that the IFIs have become increasingly strong intellectual actors in 
their endeavor to promote neoliberal reforms, generating data, producing research reports, and training 
civil servants. 
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That there may be situations in which certain donors influence policy without open 
coercion raises the question whether donors may, similar to private investors, exercise 
structural power. The answer is not deductively clear. Often donors exercise material 
power in a way that is non-structural, for instance by resorting to open coercion, using 
active leverage or making conscious efforts to coordinate their actions. There may 
however be circumstances in aid dependent countries where donors exercise material 
power in a structural manner, by shaping the behavior of other actors (the government 
or private investors) without the need to resort to open coercion, active leverage, or 
conscious efforts to mobilize and coordinate their actions.  
One might for instance argue that the IMF may exercise some structural power in 
relation to central bank policy as it plays the role of a gatekeeper: Other donors, notably 
the World Bank, usually make the provision of aid conditional upon whether a country 
successfully participates in an IMF programme.24 A country’s successful performance 
under an IMF programme is often a precondition for getting foreign debts rescheduled, 
new credit extended or debt relief. Moreover, private investors often attach significant 
weight to the IMF’s assessments of economic policy in deciding about investment in 
poor countries as information about their business environment is often difficult to 
obtain for investors. Thus, there is the possibility that a government pursues policies 
that are responsive to the concerns of the IMF in the belief that 1) the IMF reacts to 
policies deemed unfavorable by negatively assessing the performance of a program or 
suspending it and 2) that donors and private investors respond to the IMF’s reaction by 
reducing aid and/or private investment.25 The IMF would then pose powerful structural 
constraints on the range of policy options decisionmakers could safely consider.26 The 
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 The IMF is the agency where conditions most often need to be accepted to obtain financial resources 
from other donors (Griffith-Jones, 1992: 60). In particular between the IMF and the World Bank there 
often exists “informal cross-conditionality”: Without having a formal agreement in place,  each of these 
institutions often only provides assistance to a country if it performs successfully under a program of the 
other institution (Griffith-Jones, 1992: 61-62). 
25
 The empirical evidence that IMF programmes catalyse private capital inflows and lending by bilateral 
aid donors is at best mixed but this catalytic effect is widely believed to exist (Bird and Rowlands, 2002). 
To the extent that this effect is believed to exist, it will influence the behaviour of key actors such as 
donors and governments. 
26
 In relation to policy areas other than central bank policy, other multilateral economic organizations may 
limit the policy space for developing countries. Gallagher (2005) and Wade (2003), for instance, describe 
and explain how the World Trade Organization limits the policy space for developing countries in the 
area of trade and industrial policy. 
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bottom line is that it is not a priori clear whether or not donors exercise structural 
power; rather this is an empirical question.27  
That said, there is legitimate scope for disagreement, both theoretically and empirically, 
to what extent various kinds of donors might exercise structural power. For instance, 
there might be disagreement about the extent to which governments believe that other 
donors or private investors change their behaviour in response to the reactions of the 
IMF. There might also be disagreement about the extent to which an institution like the 
IMF encourages concerted action without conscious efforts to organise a response. 
Given this scope for disagreement it is thus not enough to simply assert that donors may 
have structural power. Rather it is important to examine how various donors exercise 
material power by being attentive to details of the interaction between donors and 
policymakers and to issues of perception and anticipation. 
If central bank policy is responsive to donors, which policy stance may we expect? 
Although donors are a diverse group of actors and different donors have interests in 
different economic policies, several policies, including policies to enhance stability in 
prices and the financial system, are of concern to most donors. In linking the 
dependence on donors and central bank policy stances I draw on three distinct sets of 
literature, each of which suggests that the World Bank and the IMF, as key donors in 
the areas of central bank policy, have a preference for a stability-oriented policy stance.  
The first set of literature comprises documents published by the IFIs to explain the 
objectives of their interventions. The second set of literature consists of work in 
economics and political science on the objectives of the IFIs in economic reform in 
developing countries. Both sets of literature conclude that the overarching goal of IMF 
lending and conditionality is the restoration of macroeconomic stability (Guitian, 1995; 
Collier et al., 1997; IEO, 2007; Abbott et al., 2010). To achieve this goal, the IMF 
considers the promotion of low and stable inflation to be essential (Epstein, 2006; 
Rodrik, 2006). Key goals of the IMF and the World Bank in financial policy have been 
the promotion of financial stability since the financial sector adjustment programmes in 
the 1980s and, until the global financial crisis, financial sector liberalisation, as reflected 
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 We may also expect that the ways in which donors exercise material power differ across aid dependent 
countries. Harrison (2001), for instance, shows for Africa that there is a growing differentiation between 
states in aid dependent countries with respect to the nature of donor involvement and that in some 
countries donor-state relations are becoming less defined by direct coercion. 
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in the Washington Consensus (Cull, 1999; Rodrik, 2006; Beck et al., 2009). Financial 
deepening, an important goal of assistance before the 1980s, has only gained 
prominence again since the 2000s. Both sets of literature suggest that the view of both 
the IMF and the World Bank is that central banks may play important roles in 
deepening financial sectors but that financial deepening is, in contrast to price and 
financial stability, not among central banks’ primary goals and should thus be afforded 
less importance (Honohan and Beck, 2007; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008).  
The third set of literature comprises work in political science on the sources of 
preferences of international organisations. This literature suggests that because the IMF 
tends to recruit staff trained and socialised in economics departments teaching 
neoliberal approaches, IMF policies tend to promote private sector-led development 
with a mainly supportive role for states, focused on ensuring a stable macroeconomic 
environment (Chwieroth, 2007). Moreover, the IMF and the World Bank are likely to 
pursue policies which reflect the interests of powerful member states as their major 
shareholders (Woods, 2006; Simmons et al., 2008; Mueller, 2011). Powerful states in 
turn are likely to have an interest in stable macroeconomic environments in developing 
countries, both to ensure the repayment of sovereign debt and to protect international 
investments in recipient countries.  
Figure 2.2 summarises the discussion thus far. It illustrates how the provision of 
significant replacement resources may enhance the political power of donors. Exit or the 
threat thereof, voice and encouraging social learning may then allow donors to influence 
the orientation of central bank policy according to their preferences. By examining 
which influences operate in contexts of aid dependence where the structural power of 
business is likely to be weakened, which donors pose major constraints on 
policymaking, how various donors exercise power and to what degree various donors 
are able to exercise structural power, we can improve our understanding of structural 
power and further develop the theory of the structural power of capital.  
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Link between Resource Dependence and the Orientation of Economic Policy 
The next important analytical concept covered in this thesis is natural resource 
dependence. I define resource dependence as a situation in which revenues from the sale 
– mainly export – of natural resources are important sources of funds needed to 
maintain a level of economic activity sufficient to finance the state apparatus and 
maintain the government’s popular support. My focus is on point-source non-renewable 
resources such as oil and minerals to which large rents (that is the proportion of the 
sales value of a product that remains after all production and marketing costs have been 
accounted for) are often attached.28 Studies on the economic and political correlates of 
resource dependence usually attribute the orientation of policy in resource dependent 
countries to the rents that can be generated from the exploitation of point-source natural 
resources.29  
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 Note that throughout the thesis I use the term “natural resources” to refer to point-source non-
renewable resources. 
29
 In the literature, natural resource dependent countries are often referred to as “rentier states” because 
rents are generated from the exploitation of natural resources, instead of resulting from production, 
investment, or the management of risk as in other countries (Ross, 2001; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004). 
Figure 2.2: Structural Power, Aid Dependence and Central Bank Policy 
Voice
(Threat of)
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Central bank policy stance reflects donors‘ preferences for stability
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Political power of donors
Donor resources substitute for significant share of resources from business
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There are various ways of measuring resource dependence, each capturing different 
aspects of the concept.30 Widely used indicators of resource dependence are the value of 
natural resource exports as a percentage of exports or gross domestic product (GDP), or 
resource rents as a percentage of GDP. These measures capture the degree of 
dependence by scaling resource revenues or rents to the size of the economic output and 
are thus indicative of the degree to which natural resource exploitation constitutes a key 
source of a country’s investible resources and hence a source of power. Another way to 
look at resource dependence is by expressing the measured quantity (e.g. the value of 
resource exports) as a share of government revenues. The respective indicators capture 
the degree of dependence by scaling the measured quantity to the size of a government’s 
resource base, being thus indicative of the degree to which natural resources constitute a 
key source of a government’s investible resources and to which a government relies on 
“unearned” income.31 Unfortunately, reliable data on the proportion of government 
revenues from the extractive sector is difficult to obtain for many resource dependent 
countries. I discuss indicators of resource dependence in more detail in Section 6.1.3, 
which presents the explanatory variables of the quantitative analysis.  
An important analytical point and difference between countries which are not reliant on 
natural resources and those that are relates to the pattern of capital control. In resource 
dependent countries, natural resource revenues may be large enough to replace a 
significant amount of private investment. In addition, governments tend to control a 
large portion of the revenues from the sale of point-source natural resources. In many 
countries, laws allocate the ownership of natural resources like petroleum to the state 
and governments may gain control of resource revenues through various ways such as 
revenues from a state-owned extractive sector or, if the extractive sector is in part or 
entirely private owned, through royalties, corporate taxes or concession fees.  
What are the consequences if countries increase their reliance on natural resources as a 
source of finance? There may be two major effects. First, as the access to and control of 
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 Ross (2014: 4) develops this point nicely, pointing out that most measures of resource dependence have 
three components: First, the type of resource, that is whether the focus is, for instance, on oil, minerals or 
both. Second, the salient quality of the resource, such as the rents generated by the production or the value 
of exports. Third, the method used to normalise these values – that is, whether to express the measured 
quantity as a fraction of GDP, total exports, government revenues, etc. These three components can be 
combined in multiple ways to generate alternative measures of resource dependence. 
31
 Following Moore (2001: 389), who introduced the terms “earned” and “unearned” income, resource 
revenues are unearned income because, in contrast to tax revenues, states do not have to put in 
organisational and political effort in working with citizens in order to get this money.  
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resource revenues by the state increases, the power of private investors and donors is 
likely to decrease. The underlying assumption is that as natural resources replace an 
increasing share of the resources provided by the private sector and donors, dependence 
on the funds they provide decreases, as does the need to take policy decisions which are 
responsive to the policy concerns of the private sector and donors.32 This assumption 
mirrors the argument of work on the relationship between state revenues and 
governance, which suggests that governments not reliant on tax revenues have less 
interest in promoting the prosperity of taxpayers in order to maximise levels of tax 
revenue.33  
Lower responsiveness to the private sector may be one reason for the resource curse, the 
paradox that greater abundance of natural resources tends to be associated with worse 
development outcomes. There are other reasons documented in the abundant literature 
on the pernicious effects of the exploitation of natural resources on development 
outcomes.34 Windfalls from natural resource exports can, for instance, increase the real 
exchange rate of a country’s currency and thus render most other exports non-
competitive. This process is called the ‘‘Dutch disease’’. Another reason for the 
resource curse is that the volatility of resource revenues arising from international price 
fluctuations may hinder economic development, in particular because volatility makes it 
virtually impossible to implement investment projects that require long-term financing. 
Finally, the enclave nature of the extractive sector combined with its capital intensity 
creates only weak linkages to other sectors of the economy and little additional 
employment. As a consequence, talents go either into the extractive sector or the 
services industry which develops around it rather than into productive sectors.  
What emerges from this discussion is that private sector development tends to face 
serious obstacles in resource dependent countries. As a result, relatively few private 
investors may have structural power, which derives from the control of a significant 
share of investible resources. The implication from a structural perspective is that as 
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 See for instance Winters (1996) who examines how the structural power of investors was blocked in 
Indonesia when the country experienced oil booms. 
33
 This argument is part of a wider literature arguing that governance tends to be better where the 
behaviour of the government is constrained by a need to bargain for their key financial resources with the 
actors who will be most affected by the consequences of the use of resources. Important scholarship in 
this area includes Chaudhry (1997), Ross (2001), Moore (2004) and Bräutigam et al. (2008). 
34
 For an overview on the economic and political dynamics harming development see Gelb (1988), Neary 
and Van Wijnbergen (1986), Ross (2001) and Karl (2004). 
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policymakers’ access to and control of resource revenues increases, voice and exit by 
the private sector pose weaker constraints on policymakers.  
That said, trans-nationals in resource extraction are likely to be an exception. While the 
investments of these transnationals tend to be rather sunken and relocation thus difficult, 
the ability of these transnationals to redirect money for research and development and to 
expand extractive capacity in countries which compete in terms of the exploration and 
production environment is a source of structural power (Winters, 1996: 23). Thus, even 
as the access to and control of resource revenues by the state increases and the power of 
the non-extractive private sector may become increasingly undermined, the power of 
transnationals in the oil sector may remain significant in countries where governments 
want to keep the oil moving but have only limited or no production capacity. These 
governments may therefore have strong incentives to be responsive to the policy 
concerns of the extractive sector.35 
The second, related effect is that as the access to and control of resource revenues by the 
state increases, the government’s policy space widens. In resource dependent countries, 
governments gain access to a significant amount of investible resources over which they 
have discretion.36 This pattern of capital control may allow governments to use 
resources in a way that reflects their views of how best to achieve the level of economic 
prosperity that ensures the popularity of the government and adequate state financing. 
What this amounts to is an inextricable link between economic and political power, 
which gives governments more policy space to pursue their own agenda.37 In the 
exercise of power, governments do not have to use mechanisms such as voice and exit – 
they simply implement. As Winters highlights (1996: 36), the only limits on the state in 
the use of resource revenues stem from characteristics of the state itself, such as state 
coherence and internal capacity to implement policies.  
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 The policy concerns of the extractive sector are likely to be quite specific due to the enclave nature of 
the sector and to include policies to raise returns on investment and to protect investment and the security 
of staff in the extractive sector (Winters, 1996: 23-24; Frynas, 1998)  
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 The amount of resource revenues to which governments get access to and control of depends on several 
factors, notably the price of oil in international markets and the share of resource revenues that is 
deducted for private (in poor countries usually transnational) firms in the extractive sector. This share 
may range from 0, in the case of an entirely publicly controlled extractive sector, to some significant 
percentage which depends on the royalties, corporate taxes, concession fees and profit splits agreed with 
private extractive companies). Thus, the higher the oil price and the higher the share of resource revenues 
that remains after deductions for the private extractive sector, the higher the government’s access to and 
control over resource revenues and thus its policy space, as Winters (1996) suggests. 
37
 Winters (1996) shows for Indonesia, where transnationals play a major role in resource extraction, how 
rising oil prices and thus resource revenues increased the policy space of the Indonesian government. 
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Work on the economic and political consequences of resource dependence suggests that 
resource dependence leads to policies, institutions and frameworks for decision-making 
oriented towards spending and economic expansion, often at the expense of stability 
(Auty, 1994; Karl, 1997). Extending these insights to the realm of central banking 
suggests that countries which are more reliant on natural resources are more likely to 
have a central bank policy stance oriented towards financial deepening, which I, 
following Beck (2013: 4), define as a policy stance oriented towards increasing the 
volume of financial transactions.38 This is because a central bank policy stance oriented 
towards financial deepening, which notably includes policies to increase the access to 
financial resources in an economy by lowering the costs of financing (for instance 
through loose monetary policy, lax financial regulation or central bank measures that 
subsidize the costs of credit), is in essence expansionary. 
However, why do countries dependent on oil and other point-source natural resources 
choose expansionary and statist economic development policies in the first place? As 
laid out in Figure 2.3, explanations for this phenomenon fall into two broad categories, 
each of which in turn encompasses multiple, related causal pathways linking resource 
dependence to an expansionary policy stance. While further causal pathways exist, I 
will focus on explaining those most prominent in the literature. 
The first category of explanations takes as its starting point that resource exploitation 
increases total government revenue. The literature suggests that there are two primary 
causal pathways linking increased government revenues to expansionary policy.  
• The first causal pathway encompasses arguments centred on the idea that increased 
government revenues allow greater public spending. These arguments are based on 
the notion of a distributive state, which uses the resource rents extracted globally for 
distributing them internally. It has been well documented in the literature that 
governments facing the choice between spending resource rents on transfers to the 
private sector or public investment, and saving the rents, have usually opted for 
spending (Gelb, 1988; Karl, 1997). The reasons why governments spend rather than 
                                               
38
 Note that my broad definition of financial deepening leaves open the purposes on which additional 
financing may be spend, reflecting the finding of the theoretical and empirical literature that financial 
deepening does not necessarily raise productive investment (Tobin, 1984; Easterly et al., 2000; Arcand et 
al., 2012; Beck et al., 2012; Griffith-Jones and Karwowski, 2013). Moreover, by choosing this broad 
definition of financial deepening I ensure that my definition encompasses the concepts of financial depth 
captured by various widely used measures such as the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP. 
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save rents are economic and political. From an economic perspective, it is a sensible 
strategy for capital-scarce countries to invest funds domestically rather than abroad 
where the marginal rate of return is likely to be lower (van Der Ploeg and Venables, 
2011). Politically, spending resource rents may be a sensible strategy to dispense 
patronage to political rivals and key constituencies (Ross, 2001; Morrison, 2009).  
• The second causal pathway linking increased government revenues to expansionary 
policies is based on the argument that the scale of government revenues available 
from natural resource extraction encourages a struggle for resources, for instance  in 
the form of rent-seeking or conflict (Karl, 1997; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). When 
income opportunities are limited due to weakly developed private sectors, this may 
further increase the struggle for rents. Thus, in resource dependent countries, not 
only are the opportunities to distribute rents greater but the struggle for rents also 
grows, which may encourage expansionary policies.  
The starting point of the second category of explanations for the prevalence of 
expansionary and statist economic development policies in resource dependent 
developing countries is the weakness of the private sector.  
• One causal pathway linking weak private sector development to expansionary 
policies in resource dependent countries centres on the argument that due to their 
lower structural power private investors are not in a position to effectively demand 
restraining – and hence stability-oriented – policies and institutions if their general 
concern for a reasonable level of economic stability is violated (Winters, 1996).  
• A second causal pathway linking weak private sector development to expansionary 
policies in resource dependent countries relates to the expansive role of the public 
sector. A corollary of the weakness of the private sector is that the state, 
strengthened by access to resource revenues, becomes considered the engine of 
economic development. As a result, the state may expand in new areas and new 
belief systems about the expansive role of the state may develop (Karl, 1997).   
• Finally, the very phenomenon of weak private sector development may provide 
incentives for expansionary economic policies (Karl, 1997). Countries heavily 
dependent on a limited range of resource exports are likely to suffer from large 
macroeconomic shocks, transmitted by wide fluctuations in resource prices. 
Moreover, there is a risk that resources like oil and minerals may be exhausted or 
that resource revenues fall in response to technology shocks enabling the 
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exploitation of natural resources in ever more countries. For these reasons, the 
underdevelopment of productive sectors in resource dependent countries may lead to 
intensified efforts to develop and diversify the private sector through growth-
oriented policies and improvements in access to finance for the productive sector.  
A noteworthy implication of the previous discussion is that expansionary policy in 
resource dependent countries may serve to dispense patronage rather than to benefit the 
broader population. Similarly, a central bank policy stance oriented towards financial 
deepening in resource dependent countries may serve to increase consumption or to 
dispense largesse and patronage rather than to increase productive investment. 
Figure 2.3 summarises the discussion of the relationship between resource dependence 
and the stance of central bank policy. It illustrates that access to significant replacement 
resources may reduce the structural power of the private sector and increase the policy 
space of the government to pursue a central bank policy oriented towards financial 
deepening. By examining how increasing access to resource revenues by the state may 
undermine the structural power of providers of investible funds such as business and 
certain donors and how it may widen policymakers’ policy space, we can bring into 
sharper focus the structurally based limitations that may exist when governments have 
limited access to resource revenues. As Winters (1996: 139) argues, “we can learn as 
much about structural power when that power is severely undermined as when it acts to 
present strong constraints on the options policymakers can safely consider.” 
 
Figure 2.3: Structural Power, Resource Dependence and Central Bank Policy 
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2.3 The Research Agenda: Research Questions, Structuralist Propositions and 
Methodological Implications 
The last two sections have hopefully conveyed how insights from three distinct fields of 
literature – work on structural power, the politics of aid and the politics of natural 
resources – can usefully be combined to examine the political sources of central bank 
policy. The structural forces shaping central bank policy in developing countries in 
general and in aid and resource dependent developing countries in particular have, 
however, been under-explored. 
To redress this gap, this research sets out to explore two questions: First, do those who 
control the sources of finance on which a country relies to finance investment shape 
central bank policy stances? In other words, is there evidence that the pattern of control 
of investment resources has shaped central bank policy stances? Second, how do those 
who control the sources of finance on which a country relies to finance investment 
shape central bank policy stances? Specifically, do those who control investible funds 
influence policy through the threat of exit, voice or encouraging social learning? While 
there are many potential causal mechanisms I cannot explore all of them due to the need 
to keep the research manageable. Therefore, I focus on exit, voice and social learning, 
which the existing scholarship on structural power and aid dependence suggests are the 
most plausible mechanisms at work.   
In addressing these research questions, I seek to achieve two goals, both related to 
theory-building. My first goal is to extend the structuralist theory to contexts of aid and 
resource dependence and probe the relevance of structuralist arguments for explaining 
policy in countries which vary with respect to the sources of finance on which they rely 
empirically. By examining power relations between the state and providers of investible 
funds in contexts of dependence on private investors, on donors and on natural 
resources, I exploit the variation that exists with respect to the structural power of 
business. I intend to contribute to building the structuralist theory by exploring which 
actors exercise power rooted in the control over investible funds, how these actors 
exercise power, to what degree different actors are able to exercise structural power, 
how their power varies with changes in the patterns of resource control and to what 
extent policy is responsive to the policy concerns of major providers of investible funds. 
My second goal is to understand the mechanisms through which power rooted in the 
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control over investible funds translates into central bank policy. A better understanding 
of these mechanisms is particularly important because arguments linking aid and 
resource dependence to policy outcomes are often under-developed in a causal sense. 
With these goals in mind, I have developed two structuralist propositions, which will be 
explored in the chapters ahead. As Winters (1996: 141) has pointed out, a consideration 
of the structural power of investors “is most helpful in predicting the character or 
orientation of a country’s policies when the impact of structural power is high”, not 
when this power is effectively blocked. Thus, in developing the propositions related to 
the direction of policy when the structural power of private investors is lower, I look 
beyond the literature on structural power. I build on insights from two sets of literature: 
First, literature on aid and on the policy preferences of donors, which control a 
significant share of investible resources in aid dependent countries. Second, literature on 
resource dependence and on the policy preferences of governments in resource 
dependent countries. 
My first proposition is that in developing countries which are more dependent on aid, 
the central bank policy stance is more likely to be stability-oriented. This stance may be 
reflected in relatively higher aversion to inflation, more stringent financial regulation 
and a lower prioritisation of policies to promote financial deepening. The key 
underlying contention is that donors have power over economic policy in aid dependent 
countries and that, as the literature on IMF and World Bank policy discussed in the last 
section suggests, both institutions have long considered price and financial stability to 
be the primary goals of central banks. Smaller businesses in aid dependent countries 
may have a preference for a policy stance oriented towards financial deepening. 
However, in aid dependent countries, donors are likely to have more power than smaller 
businesses, so that central bank policy is more likely to reflect donors’ preferences.   
My second proposition is that in developing countries which are more dependent on 
natural resources, the central bank policy stance is more likely to be oriented towards 
financial deepening. This stance may be reflected in relatively lower aversion to 
inflation, less stringent financial regulation and a higher prioritisation of policies to 
promote financial deepening. This argument is based on the structuralist literature and 
the literature on the political economy of natural resource dependence. The former 
suggests that access to resource revenues increases the policy space of governments 
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while the latter suggests that economic policy in resource dependent countries tends to 
be expansionary. As a policy stance oriented towards financial deepening is, in essence, 
expansionary, it is plausible that the stance of central bank policy in resource dependent 
countries is oriented towards financial deepening. As outlined in the last section, there 
are two major strands of explanations for the tendency of economic policy in resource 
dependent countries to be expansionary: The first suggests that access to resource 
revenues a) allows for an increase in public spending and b) results in higher demands 
that the resource rents be shared, each of which encourages expansionary policies. The 
second strand of explanations suggests that the weakness of private investors – a 
corollary of resource dependence – limits the constraints private investors are able to 
impose on policymakers’ ability to pursue expansionary policies and propels the state 
into the position of being the main engine of economic development. Moreover, the 
very weakness of the private sector provides an incentive to pursue policies oriented 
towards growth rather than stability.    
I do not make a prediction related to the stance of central bank policy in countries which 
have only modest access to replacement resources in the form of aid and natural 
resources and are thus reliant on private business for investment. Whether the central 
bank policy stance in countries reliant on private investors is oriented towards stability, 
financial deepening, or both, is likely to depend on the particular policy concerns of 
those groups of private investors that are important providers of investment funds. What 
these particular policy preferences with respect to central bank policy are is likely to 
depend on private sector characteristics that vary from country to country. 
Underlying these research questions and propositions is the view that the general 
orientation of central bank policy is determined by the government which, in turn, 
responds to structural pressures. The rationale behind this view is that even in countries 
where central banks enjoy considerable independence, there are limits to independence 
insofar as the mandates of central banks and thus their policy goals are usually set by 
the government and legislature whereas the central bank has discretion over the 
techniques and policy instruments used to attain those goals and the precise setting of 
these instruments. In fact, the most widely accepted definitions of central bank 
independence refer to central bank discretion to choose policy instruments with which 
to conduct policy that accords with directly or indirectly determined electoral mandates 
for economic policy rather than central bank discretion over the goals of policy 
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(Maxfield, 1997: 20-22). Thus, in analysing the stance of central bank policy it is 
important to keep in mind that this stance is the result of actions of policymakers within 
the central bank but inextricably linked to the government’s views of what should be the 
goals of economic policy.  
Methodological Implications 
Given the comparative character of the propositions, the goal to examine mechanisms 
linking the sources of finance and central bank policy and the aim of building a theory 
that it is applicable to a wide range of developing countries, I opted for a mixed-
methods design, consisting of the use of case studies of Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda, 
and a quantitative statistical analysis. This approach allows us to improve our 
understanding of structural power by examining and contrasting the ways in which 
various actors exercise power and how structural power varies across time and place. 
Each country case study offers a historical narrative of the trajectory of central bank 
policy from the foundation of the respective central bank to the present. The case 
studies have two broad goals: First, to trace shifts in central bank policy and link those 
shifts to changes in power derived from the control of crucial investment resources. In 
doing so, the focus of the analysis is on variation within countries over time. Second, to 
explore the causal mechanisms which link countries’ major sources of finance and 
central banks’ policy stances. The major challenge here is that the structural forces 
which shape policy are rarely observable. To address this challenge, each case study 
seeks to establish a plausible causal chain. Specifically, each case study effectively 
answers five interrelated questions to illustrate and evaluate potential causal linkages.  
First, which are the key sources of investible funds and to what extent do the actors who 
control them have political power? To answer this question I address three issues: a) the 
relative importance of the source of finance in question in raising a country’s level of 
economic activity; b) the pattern of control related to the key sources of finance, which 
is defined by the actors who can position themselves as key providers of financial 
resources and the conditions they attach to the provision of funds; c) the vulnerability of 
the state to the use of structural power.                                                                                                                
Second, which policy stance do those who control the key sources of finance prefer and 
is the preferred policy stance in line with my propositions? I conducted extensive 
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interviews with members of the government, the business and the donor community and 
used secondary literature and statistical data to learn about their policy preferences.     
Third, is the policy stance in line with the preferences of those who control the key 
sources of finance? I have relied on both primary data from interviews and secondary 
literature to categorise the stance of central bank policy as oriented towards stability, 
financial deepening or both. I have based my categorisation on the goals of monetary 
and financial policies, the main policy instruments used to attain those goals and in 
some cases on the precise setting of these instruments.  
Fourth, is there evidence to suggest that those who control the key sources of finance 
influence policy through voice, the threat of exit or encouragement of social learning? 
In exploring whether influence is exerted through voice, I searched for overt 
engagement in the political process, for instance through business associations. In 
exploring whether those who control the major source of finance shape policy through 
exit, I tried to identify actions such as changes in investment behaviour which signal 
policy preferences. Yet providers of investible resources usually take such actions only 
after the failure of policymakers to accommodate their policy preferences. Often power 
operates in a more subtle manner, through the threat of exit and thus government 
anticipation. To support a claim that power operates through the threat of exit, I describe 
the constraints that limit the policy space of policymakers, point out the government’s 
perceptions about the policy concerns of those who control capital and show that policy 
becomes responsive to these concerns during moments of vulnerability to structural 
power. In exploring whether influence is exerted through encouraging social learning, I 
examined whether social interaction, for instance in the form of professional meetings 
and technical assistance, enabled those with structural power to transmit ideas about the 
orientation of central bank policy.  
Fifth, is there significant evidence that the sources of finance on which countries rely 
for investment shape central bank policy stances? In making a final assessment of 
whether the case study provides sufficient evidence of the existence of a causal 
relationship I am making standard ceteris paribus assumptions. I do not expect that a 
particular source of finance will always lead to the proposed policy stance. Following 
other structuralists, I reject the notion that there is an automatic relationship between 
structural factors and policy choices. My intention is rather to show how structures 
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constrain or enhance the choices some actors can realistically consider. Therefore, the 
propositions I developed are probabilistic not absolute statements. Consequently, failure 
to establish the proposed linkages in some cases is not enough to reject a proposition. 
What then is sufficient evidence to consider a proposition as plausible? While there are 
widely agreed standards of significance for statistical analysis, this is not the case for 
qualitative research. Therefore, we have to rely on more subjective standards. I draw 
inspiration from Prichard (2010) in considering a case study to provide sufficient 
evidence for the proposed relationships where an account of central bank policy can be 
meaningfully enhanced by including a country’s key source of finance and the political 
power arising from the control of capital as an explanatory factor. 
In constructing plausible causal chains, the case studies rely on various data sources, in 
particular academic literature, government documents, programme reports by donors 
and newspaper articles. In addition, quantitative economic and political data from 
ministries and central banks, the World Bank and the IMF supply a backdrop to the 
analysis. The key research inputs, however, are key informant interviews. I conducted 
more than 130 semi-structured interviews with central bankers, other government 
officials, donors, researchers and the business community (primarily bankers) during 
fieldwork in Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda. These interviews served to gather assessments 
of the central bank policy stance, key developments in central bank policy, the role of 
those who control a country’s key sources of finance in shaping central bank policy and 
the economic and political implications of a central bank’s policy stance. 
In selecting the country cases, I focused on African countries because the structuralist 
theory has not yet been applied to countries of this continent.39 The selection of Kenya, 
Nigeria and Uganda reflects both theoretical and practical considerations. A key 
theoretical consideration was that these three countries do not have regional monetary 
and regulatory authorities, hence the ability of their central banks to determine central 
bank policies at the national level.40 In line with the goal of this thesis to examine 
structural power in countries which vary with respect to the sources of finance on which 
they rely to finance investment, I selected Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda as country cases. 
                                               
39
 The term “Africa” refers to Sub-Saharan Africa in this thesis. 
40
 I had to exclude countries participating in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) and the Central African 
Economic and Monetary Community (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea and Gabon) from the group of eligible African country cases from the outset. 
46 
 
As Table 2.1 shows, the relative importance of aid allows for Uganda to be 
characterised as aid dependent while the relative importance of resource revenues 
allows for Nigeria to be characterised as resource dependent.41 Table 2.1 also suggests 
that moderate access to replacement resources in the form of aid and resource revenues 
and the relative importance of funds from the private sector to finance the state allow 
for Kenya to be characterised as dependent on the private sector. In maximising 
variation with respect to the main explanatory variable, a country’s major source of 
investible funds, this approach follows what Seawright and Gerring (2008) call the 
“diverse case method”. The ability of the German International Cooperation (GIZ), 
which funded a research project on finance in Africa in which I was involved, to assist 
in establishing contacts with the central banks of Nigeria and Uganda was the main 
practical reason for selecting these two countries.  
Table 2.1: Sources of Investible Funds, Averages 2000-2010 
 Kenya Nigeria Uganda 
Net ODA received (% of central government expense)  21.6 12.7 77.6 
Net ODA received (% of GNI)  4.3 1.9 14.3 
Natural resource exports (% of merchandise exports) 12 94.9 5.1 
Natural resource rents (% of GDP)  0.03 34.5 1.4 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)  0.6 3.3 4.2 
Tax revenue (% of GDP), average 2006-2010 17.8 4.1 11.6 
Source: World Bank (2013c) 
Before moving on to the empirical illustrations, the two major limitations of the case 
study methodology should be flagged at the outset. First, the elaboration of three 
country case studies reflects the breadth of the research question but implies the need to 
be selective in order to keep the research manageable. Given the breadth of my study, it 
has always been clear that it was not possible to describe every policy change that 
supports the claim of a relationship between the sources of finance and central bank 
policy and that I had to select appropriate case material that conveys the nature of that 
relationship. I also decided to limit the analysis to two areas of central bank policy, 
namely monetary policy and financial policy. In analysing financial policy I focus on 
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 A widely used threshold to characterise countries as aid dependent is net ODA exceeding 10% of GNI. 
Countries are often categorised as resource dependent if resource exports as a share of exports exceed 
30%. 
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central banks’ development finance activities, regulation and supervision.42 Moreover, 
while I am aware that other factors might account in a causal way for variation in 
central bank policy, I focus on examining the explanatory power of the key sources of 
finance, owing to the need to limit the scope of this research.  
Second, the focus on only three country cases permits an exploration of causal chains 
and historical specificity but raises concerns about the generalisability of the findings. 
In particular, conclusions with respect to each structural proposition are based on only 
one case. While inference based on a single case is quite common for studies with a 
focus on theory-building, there is a large risk of selection bias. 
The cross-national statistical analysis, presented in Chapter 6, seeks to address concerns 
related to generalisability. In exploring monetary and financial policy in developing 
countries across the entire developing world, the analysis sheds light on the domain of 
cases to which my arguments may apply; the so-called scope conditions. The statistical 
analysis is also fruitful in two other respects. First, it encourages the development of 
quantitative measures of some key theoretical concepts in my framework such as a 
policy stance oriented towards financial deepening. The development of measures of 
central bank policy stances in developing countries is an important contribution of this 
thesis because there was a lack of off-the-shelf quantitative measures of central bank 
policy which were adequate for the context of developing countries. Second, the 
statistical analysis can include some rival explanatory factors as control variables. The 
main drawback of the statistical analysis is the availability of data which, in turn, limits 
the regression techniques that can be applied and the ability to draw causal inferences. 
Thus, there is a lot to be gained by using a mixed methods approach which provides 
insights on causal mechanisms through case studies and on the generalisability of my 
propositions through statistical analysis. As we will see, each case study and each set of 
statistical analysis provides partial answers. Each piece of analysis is thus best seen as 
an incremental step on the way to reaching an assessment of the plausibility of the 
structuralist propositions. The next chapters present the first three steps, beginning with 
the case study of Uganda, followed by the case studies of Nigeria and then Kenya.  
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 The analysis of regulation and supervision is mainly related to banking services because non-bank 
financial institutions tend to be regulated by authorities other than the central bank. 
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3 The Political Economy of Central Bank Policy in Uganda 
This chapter presents a narrative of central bank policy in Uganda from the foundation 
of the central bank in 1966 to the present. It traces the evolution of Uganda’s central 
bank, the Bank of Uganda (BoU), from a central bank whose policies were primarily 
aimed at financial deepening to one of the most stability-oriented central banks in the 
developing world. My focus is on examining whether and how reliance on donors to 
finance investment has shaped this transformation. Not every policy choice reflects the 
political power of donors. The overall stance of policy, however, has become oriented 
towards enhancing stability in prices and the financial sector and, as we will see, 
policymakers chose this policy path in an understanding that it is important to secure the 
support from donors to finance investment and production in Uganda.  
The chapter, which spans the years 1966 to 2012, comprises three substantive sections 
followed by a concluding section which emphasises the main insights.43 The substantive 
sections deal with three distinct periods of Uganda’s central bank policy.  
• The first section focuses on the years 1966 to 1985, when both reliance on aid and 
responsiveness to donors was low. This section documents how central bank policy 
became ever more oriented towards financial deepening, seeking to expand credit to 
the state and the private sector. Yet the increasing neglect of stability considerations 
in monetary and financial policy and nationalist economic policies alienated both 
donors and private investors and contributed to the breakdown of the economy.  
• The second section spans the years 1986 to 2004. In this section I explain how the 
BoU’s responsiveness to the demands of donors to orient policies towards price and 
financial stability increased as the reliance on aid increased. I also describe the 
alignment of interests among donors and policymakers. An important sub-theme in 
this section is the tension between displaying responsiveness to donors and 
government efforts to control the allocation of resources according to its own 
priorities.  
• The third section focuses on the years 2005 to 2012, during which reliance on aid 
continued to be significant. This section describes and explains the emergence of a 
central bank policy stance which still places significant emphasis on price and 
financial stability but embraces financial deepening as a policy goal. As we will see, 
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 Table 3.A1 in the appendix providers a chronology of the major economic and political events. 
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the emergence of a policy stance which looks beyond guarding stability appears to 
have been facilitated by two factors: One is the widespread perception in Uganda 
that the stability-oriented policy stance has failed to transform the structure of the 
economy and generate broad-based growth. The other is donors’ increased concern 
for financial deepening.  
3.1 Expansionary Central Bank Policy, Neglect of Stability Considerations and 
Alienation of Donors and Investors, 1966-1985 
“We must (…) work for every cent before the bank can produce one cent. The bank is 
not, and will not be turned into a charity institution” (quoted in EACB 1966, 122). With 
these words Milton Obote, Uganda’s President, opened the BoU in 1966, five years 
after the country had become independent. The central bank was expected to become a 
hallmark of stability. When presenting the Bank of Uganda Bill to the parliament, the 
minister of finance at that time, Laurence Kalule-Settala, explained for instance that 
government borrowing from the central bank would be strictly limited to avoid inflation 
because that would reduce the value and the confidence in the newly created currency 
and ultimately undermine economic growth (Mutibwa, 2006: 55-56). As a lender of last 
resort the BoU would be prepared to lend to commercial banks in difficulties, but only 
at a price and against first-class security. Policymakers involved in drafting the central 
bank statute were aware that a delicate balance between stability and growth would 
have to be struck (Mutibwa, 2006: 55-58). Still, there was an agreement that the growth 
of the economy could only be achieved through sound economic policies, as also 
reflected in the preamble of the BoU Act of 1966 which states that the BoU “(...) shall 
issue legal tender currency and maintain external reserves in order to safeguard the 
international value of the currency, promote stability and a sound financial structure 
conducive to a balanced and sustained rate of growth of the economy (...).” 
Ugandan officials understood that without policies to guard price and financial stability 
it would not be possible to tap into much needed foreign resources and support. They 
considered a stability-oriented central bank important in order to increase confidence in 
the currency and attract foreign capital inflows (Helleiner, 2001; Mutibwa, 2006: 83). 
Moreover, a central bank focused on stability was important to garner support from the 
British in opening a central bank. The British supported the opening of central banks in 
their former colonies only if these banks were stability-oriented, fearing that central 
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banks would employ activist monetary management which contradicted the monetarist 
approach advocated by the Bank of England (BoE) (Helleiner, 2001: 9-10).44 Being 
responsive to the British was essential because Uganda had to rely on foreign 
assistance, mainly from the BoE, for staffing key positions in the BoU during its first 
years owing to the lack of indigenous central banking expertise. In fact, the main 
architect of the BoU Act was a British official, seconded from the BoE, who also served 
as the deputy governor of the BoU. The threat of donors and private investors exiting 
had thus been a concern for policymakers when the central bank was founded and the 
British, as an important donor for Uganda, had ample opportunities to articulate their 
preferences with respect to the orientation of central bank policy.   
Economic Decay 
In the ensuing years, however, mounting political and economic pressures made 
stability-oriented economic policies increasingly elusive. Uganda’s private sector was 
weakly developed at independence and estimates of the value of the subsistence 
economy in 1966 set the figure as high as one third of the GDP (Schultheis, 1975: 6). 
The economy was dependent on coffee and cotton exports, which in the mid-1960s 
contributed 56% and 25% respectively of foreign exchange earnings (Mutibwa, 2006: 
147). There was broad agreement among policymakers that both the government and 
the private sector needed  more funds to develop Uganda’s economy (Mutibwa, 2006: 
165-169).  
Financing was also needed to pursue the government’s “Ugandisation” strategy. 
Indigenous entrepreneurs hardly existed in Uganda and most large-scale enterprises and 
manufacturing were Asian- or British-owned (Schultheis, 1975; Kasozi, 1994; 
Moncrieffe, 2004). A major focus of public policy in the first decades after 
independence was thus on promoting the development of African traders and 
enterprises. A key element of this approach was the provision of subsidised credit to 
indigenous businesses, mainly through the state-owned Uganda Commercial Bank 
(UCB). In the name of “Ugandisation” both the regimes of Milton Obote (1962-1971) 
and Idi Amin (1971-1979) also nationalised foreign enterprises. The Amin regime also 
compulsorily purchased 49% stakes in three major foreign banks  (Brownbridge, 1998a: 
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 There were also economic reasons why the British were against the foundation of central banks in their 
former colonies. In particular, they sought to preserve the Sterling area because it offered a source of 
balance of payments support and bolstered the City of London as a financial centre (Helleiner, 2001: 10).  
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131). The “Ugandisation” policy culminated in the expulsion of Uganda’s Asian 
population in 1972 and the nationalisation of their firms by Amin’s regime. The 
parastatal sector expanded through such nationalisations, as did the sector’s financing 
needs. When military expenditure escalated under Amin, this put further strains on the 
government’s budget. Thus, mobilising finance for the government and the 
development of the parastatal and private sector became a major concern for Uganda’s 
policymakers.  
Options for raising finance for the government and the private sector were, however, 
limited. Uganda’s banking sector, which was mainly foreign-owned, was weakly 
developed in terms of size and diversity at that time and by focusing on short-term 
trade-related financing banks made only a limited contribution to meeting the country’s 
financing needs. Instead banks’ lending policies nurtured the belief that government 
intervention was necessary to ensure that the banking system made a greater 
contribution to the development of the economy (Brownbridge, 1998a: 127). Uganda’s 
export volumes fell sharply between 1973 and 1980, with the decline amounting to an 
average of -9.5% per annum. Exports thus made an ever-lower contribution to financing 
investment. Uganda also experienced a prolonged decline of private investment. 
Increasing hostility towards the Asian community and plans to nationalise major firms 
had already depressed investment and increased capital outflows under Obote. In 1970, 
for instance, this decline amounted to about 4% of GDP (Schultheis, 1975: 10). Yet 
after Amin expelled the Asian minority in 1972, which denuded the country of skilled 
businessmen, capital flight was rampant and investment collapsed.45  
Official development assistance to Uganda was low, amounting to a mere 1.7% of GNI 
during the 1970s, and under Amin, Uganda did not receive bilateral aid from Western 
countries. The contribution of aid to meeting the country’s foreign exchange needs was 
thus negligible. The prospects for an increase of aid were bleak during the 1970s owing 
to the authoritarianism and militarism of Amin’s regime. In short, Uganda’s financing 
needs at that time far exceeded the financing available and there were severe shortages 
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 Figures for private investment for the 1960s and 1970s are not available but the available data for total 
investment (i.e. including public and private investment) is instructive: While investment in African low-
income countries grew on average 6.3% between 1965 and 1973, the corresponding figure for Uganda is 
only 2.1%. In the following years Uganda’s situation deteriorated:  Investment growth between 1973 and 
1980 was -9.1 % whereas the average for other low-income countries in Africa in the same period was 
1.6% (Lateef, 1991: 22). Foreign direct investment during the 1970s was almost absent, amounting to an 
average of 0.02% of GDP (World Bank, 2013c). 
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of foreign exchange resulting in persistent balance of payment difficulties (Schultheis, 
1975; Lateef, 1991; Mutibwa, 2006:147-169).   
The state, including the central bank, was the most conceivable source of finance and in 
the eyes of Uganda’s politicians, the BoU was ideally placed to govern the financial 
system in a way that supported financing the economy, notably the government. The 
global ideological climate appears to help account for the orientation of central bank 
policy to financial deepening during the BoU’s first two decades. It was part of the 
predominant economic thinking at that time that states may play an activist role in 
financing development and many governments in developing countries pursued statist 
economic policies in the financial sector, supported by IFIs like the World Bank (Beck 
et al., 2009) and bilateral donors like the US government (Helleiner, 2001). That central 
banks would focus on meeting the financing needs of the state and the economy at the 
expense of safeguarding economic stability was not conceived by development 
economists and donors promoting such an approach, however. Nonetheless, this is what 
happened in Uganda from the early 1970s onwards. The BoU became, in the words of 
one observer, a mere service department for the government (Mutibwa, 2006: 260). 
The BoU’s monetary and financial policy became increasingly focused on financing the 
government and the private sector, rather than on guarding price stability. When Amin 
came to power through a military coup in 1971, one of the first steps of his government 
was to issue a decree to amend the BoU Act which increased the amount of money that 
the government could borrow from the BoU to finance its expenditure (Mutibwa, 2006: 
188-189). From 1973 onwards, the government regularly exceeded the statutory limits 
of government borrowing from the BoU that were set at 18% of recurrent revenues in 
the BoU Act. In 1979, for instance, the government borrowed 5.3 billion Ugandan 
Shillings, whereas the statutory limit was 1.3 billion (Mutibwa, 2006: 390).  
In order to improve access to finance for the private sector, the BoU created for instance 
credit schemes through which it sought to promote bank lending to agriculture. The 
BoU also regulated the allocation of financial resources in the banking sector by means 
of interest rate and foreign exchange controls. When inflation rose, nominal interest 
rates were seldom adjusted in response. Therefore, real interest rates were negative for 
much of the 1970s and 1980s (Brownbridge, 1998a: 128). The interest rate controls 
supported the government’s strategy to allocate investment funds to sectors considered 
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important to economic development such as agriculture and to channel funds to political 
constituencies.  
Orienting central bank policy towards financial stability received less attention and 
neither the BoU nor the government sought to address deficiencies in the Banking Act 
of 1969, the framework for the prudential regulation and supervision of banks. For 
instance, the Banking Act did not impose clear restrictions on insider lending and was 
more explicit on allocative than prudential requirements (Brownbridge, 1998a: 137). 
Moreover, the Banking Act did not grant the BoU the authority to force banks to 
improve management, lending practices and internal controls unless the BoU had the 
support of the Ministry of Finance (Brownbridge, 1998a: 136-137). The Ministry of 
Finance also had the authority for bank licensing. Often, however, the Ministry of 
Finance gave priority to political rather than stability considerations. It sometimes 
granted, for example, licenses to undercapitalised banks, often justified in terms of the 
need to support the development of local banks (Brownbridge, 1998a: 134). The BoU 
did not adjust minimum capital adequacy requirements to rising inflation and thus 
banks’ capital buffers were inadequate. Supervisory capacity within the BoU was also 
too weak to discharge many of the functions assigned to it and thus was unable to detect 
problems within the banking sector (Brownbridge, 1998a: 133). When the UCB and 
several local banks, which emerged in the 1980s, ran into financial difficulties, the BoU 
did not strengthen and enforce regulation but rather provided unconditional liquidity 
support.  
The BoU’s ever-increasing focus on financing the economy and the state apparatus was 
probably meant to make up for the fall in aid and private investment. By the 1980s, 
however, investment and production were close to collapse and the state faced a fiscal 
breakdown. In addition, there was a chronic shortage of foreign exchange (Mutibwa, 
2006: 453-506). The BoU’s monetisation of rising government debt contributed to 
inflation. Inflation rose from a modest 6% in the period between 1965 and 1973 to 45% 
in the period between 1973 and 1980 and skyrocketed in the 1980s, averaging 95% per 
annum between 1980 and 1987 (Lateef, 1991: 21).46 Interest rate controls combined 
with high inflation generated negative real interest rates, which, in turn, depressed 
saving and lending to the private sector. Moreover, most of the productive sector 
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 For comparison: Inflation in low-income sub-Saharan Africa averaged 19% per annum in the 1973 to 
1980 period and 28% per annum between 1980 and 1987 (Lateef, 1991: 21). 
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remained excluded from the credit it needed for production and investment owing to 
credit rationing in response to economic volatility, conservative lending policies of 
foreign banks and the direction of most subsidised credit to politically connected 
individuals. As Figure 3.A1 shows, bank lending to the private sector was marginal 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, averaging 3% and 5% of GDP respectively. Growth 
fell at an annual rate of -6.2% between 1973 and 1980 and -2.4% between 1980 and 
1987 (Lateef, 1991). Domestic investment collapsed in a business environment of 
rationed access to finance and rising inflation. Donors, however, were not inclined to 
substitute for the fall in financing from investors in the absence of stabilising policies 
and due to the political repression under Amin. Political instability and intermittent civil 
war were important causes of the economic crisis.47 Yet the crisis was compounded by a 
policy stance which sought to provide finance to the public and private sectors at the 
expense of price and financial stability (Brownbridge, 1998a; Tumusiime-Mutebile, 
2010).  
In an effort to reverse the economic decline and entice donors, the regime of Obote, 
which had come to power through elections in late 1980, attempted stabilisation. In 
1981, the government agreed on a structural adjustment programme (SAP) with the 
World Bank and the IMF. As Figure 3.A2 shows, aid, which had increased significantly 
after the fall of Amin in 1979, reached high levels between 1980 and 1983, peaking at 
10% of GNI in 1981. However, the government soon violated the conditions of the SAP 
relating to fiscal restraint. Budget discipline deteriorated when Uganda’s civil war 
intensified and government revenues were too low to cover expenditures. Moreover, the 
government did not dare to impose austerity on the public sector out of fear of losing 
popular support  (Mamdani, 1990; Lateef, 1991). As a result, the government resorted to 
the BoU’s printing press and inflation rose, breaching agreed fiscal and monetary 
benchmarks. The SAP was abandoned in 1984 with the initial recovery of the economy 
reversed. 
                                               
47Idi Amin was overthrown in 1979. In 1980, after the short presidencies of Yusufu Lule (April-June 
1979), Godfrey Binaisa (1979-1980) and Paulo Muwanga (May –December 1980), Milton Obote won 
allegedly rigged elections and became again President. Obote was overthrown in a military coup in 1985. 
Tito Okello, one of the leaders of the coup, became then President until 1986 when Yoweri Museveni 
came to power. It is estimated that politically inspired violence caused deaths of at least 800,000 
Ugandans between 1971 and 1985 (Tripp, 2010: 23). 
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3.2 Aid Dependence and Orientation of Central Bank Policy towards Stability, 
1986-2005 
In 1986, Yoweri Museveni, the leader of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), 
which had been fighting Obote’s regime since 1980 from the bush, came to power. 
When Museveni became president, he promised to pursue economic growth, political 
stability and legitimacy. Museveni was aware that to achieve these goals, he had to 
reverse the economic decline by restoring economic stability and raising the levels of 
investment. “The Museveni regime,” explained a senior official of the BoU, “has 
always had an understanding of what is good for growth.” Private investors, both 
domestic and foreign, would not start investing until the business environment had 
improved and the economy stabilised. Therefore, wooing donors was a priority. Donor 
support was desperately needed to obtain foreign exchange, reschedule foreign debt, 
reduce borrowing from the BoU and finance economic reforms. An important initial 
step was to negotiate new programmes with the World Bank and the IMF because only 
if these programmes were in place would bilateral donors step up assistance.  
Yet when several months after Museveni came to power his economic ministers first 
suggested a new SAP supported by the IMF and the World Bank, Museveni 
disapproved. Museveni had been a student of Marxist ideas and had criticised World 
Bank and IMF policies, including the SAP under Obote, on the grounds that these 
policies had not only failed to restore economic prosperity but had rather increased 
indebtedness (Mugyenyi, 1991: 63-67; Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2010). The NRM’s policy 
agenda, summarised in the 10-Point Programme, was aimed at building an 
“independent, integrated, self-sustaining and mixed economy” which combined private-
sector-led and state-led development. Adopting an IMF and World Bank supported SAP 
would mean accepting a programme which promoted the private sector as the main 
engine of growth, reduced the role of the state in the economy and increased the 
influence of foreign providers of capital.   
In 1986, however, the economic situation deteriorated further: government expenditure 
escalated, partly owing to ongoing civil conflict, the volume of exports declined due to 
a fall in world coffee prices and the balance of payment deficit increased. The new 
government also sought to meet expenditures by borrowing from the BoU, which 
contributed to skyrocketing levels of inflation, reaching 160% in 1986 and 200% per 
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annum in 1987. The NRM realised that a prolonged economic crisis would become a 
source of political instability and, anxious about popular discontent, the regime 
considered a change of the orientation of economic policy (Mugyenyi, 1991: 70).  
In November 1986, the NRM decided to begin serious negotiations with the IMF and in 
1987 Uganda embarked on a SAP. The SAP allowed the government to raise donor 
financing, notably several large credits from the IMF and the World Bank (an overview 
is provided in Tables 3.A2 and 3.A3 in the appendix). The World Bank and IMF 
programmes also triggered assistance from bilateral donors. By 1990, aid from members 
of the DAC had increased by nearly 600% compared to the level of such aid in 1985. 
The overall nominal net inflow of ODA had gone from US$192.3 million in 1986 to 
US$668 million in 1990 (Stein, 2009: 18).  The reform programme of the late 1980s and 
1990s in Uganda followed the broad principles of the Washington Consensus. Getting 
prices right (e.g. through exchange rate and tax reform), establishing fiscal discipline 
and macroeconomic stability, helping markets operate (e.g. through trade reform) and 
an emphasis on private sector-led development (e.g. through privatisation) were 
considered as the best strategy to increase investment and production. 
During these years, encouraging social learning through policy advice and technical 
assistance was an important mechanism through which donors shaped policy. "In the 
early days of the NRM government, IMF and the World Bank more or less ran a 
macroeconomic classroom with the president", according to an IMF representative 
(Holmgren et al., 2001: 136). An equally important mechanism through which donors 
sought to shape policy, however, was the use of conditionality (Holmgren et al., 2001). 
The pressure on the Ugandan government to comply with conditionality was high 
because structural adjustment loans were released in tranches and donors were able to 
delay disbursements when the government failed to implement measures as agreed 
upon.  
There was some early progress in devaluing the exchange rate as agreed with the IMF 
and by 1990 the government had largely liberalised the foreign exchange market. Yet 
reigning in inflation seemed elusive because the Ministry of Finance was not entirely 
committed to macroeconomic stabilisation and structural adjustment (Tumusiime-
Mutebile, 2010). Expenditures continued to exceed revenues and the government 
financed the gap through borrowing from the BoU. For this reason, inflation continued 
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to be high, as Figure 3.A3 in the appendix shows. Stabilisation policies also faced 
strong domestic opposition from: line ministries trying to avoid a reduction of transfers, 
groups within the civil society who feared that expenditure cuts and the devaluation of 
the exchange rate would hurt the poor and benefit an unproductive elite and those who 
considered fiscal discipline as a form of IMF-imposed “neocolonialism” (Mamdani, 
1990; Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2010: 41-42).  
For several years, the World Bank and the IMF did not impose sanctions on Uganda for 
failures to comply with conditionalities. It is difficult to know precisely why the IMF 
and the World Bank were so patient with Uganda and why they had continued to 
disburse funds despite the slow implementation of reforms and the violations of 
conditionality. According to some analysts, donors were eager to continue supporting 
Uganda because the country achieved high economic growth rates at a time when other 
African countries which had SAPs in place failed to generate growth: Average annual 
GDP growth rates in Uganda amounted to 5% between 1986 and 1992, whereas the 
African average for that period was only 1% (World Bank, 2013c). Uganda’s high rates 
of growth were mainly the result of enhanced political stability, favourable terms of 
trade and aid itself (Dijkstra and Kees van Donge, 2001). Still, high growth coincided 
with the SAP and this convinced donors of the need to bolster Uganda’s performance 
through continued structural adjustment lending, which allowed donors to present 
Uganda as one of the few success stories in Africa (Mosley, 1996; Dijkstra and Kees 
van Donge, 2001).  
By the end of 1991 and during the first months of 1992, however, donors began to exert 
pressure through “exit” and not only “voice”. Donors were concerned that the Ugandan 
government did not handle their import support in a transparent manner. They insisted 
that the rates in the government’s auctions of import support funds should be equal to 
the parallel rate of foreign exchange bureaus so that that the government’s auctions 
could no longer be a source of privileged access to foreign exchange (Dijkstra and Kees 
van Donge, 2001: 843). When the government refused to respond to donors’ requests, 
donors stopped disbursing, causing a fiscal crisis. The government failed to reduce 
expenditures and borrowed from the BoU to finance the resulting deficit. As a result, 
inflation surged, violating the benchmarks of the monetary programme. The IMF 
responded by suspending programme aid while donors requested control over 
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expenditure and a full liberalisation of the exchange rate before further disbursements of 
aid. This marked the onset of another fiscal crisis. 
Restoring Macroeconomic Stability 
The fiscal crisis made the government painfully aware of the extent to which it had 
become dependent on aid and the constraints donors imposed on policymaking. Thus, 
Museveni made a turnaround and showed a commitment to a stability-oriented policy 
stance, reshuffling his cabinet as a result. He sacked the minister of finance and replaced 
him with Emmanuel Tumisiime-Mutebile, an advocate of fiscal discipline and a 
stability-oriented policy stance, who until then had been permanent secretary in the 
Ministry of Planning and was set to become the governor of the BoU in 2001. Museveni 
merged the Ministry of Planning with the Ministry of Finance so that the new Ministry 
of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) could become a strong 
centre of economic decision making. The merger also centralised control over 
domestically-mobilised resources and aid resources, which were both channelled to 
MoFPED. Under Tumisiime-Mutebile, who enjoyed strong presidential backing, 
MoFPED would become the most powerful ministry within the government and 
establish an international reputation as one of the strongest finance ministries in Africa 
(Whitworth and Williamson, 2010: 9). The president mandated MoFPED to sustain 
macroeconomic stability by matching spending to resources (Byaruhanga et al., 2010). 
Government borrowing from the BoU was limited through expenditure cuts and, as a 
result, inflation was contained within three months of Museveni’s turnaround.  
In a statement following the 1992 budget speech, President Museveni then announced: 
“There will be no inflation. Inflation is indiscipline” (Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2010: 42). 
This statement sent a clear signal to both policymakers and donors that the re-
orientation of economic policy had full political backing. In the following months, 
Museveni’s new economic team strengthened the coordination between MoFPED and 
the BoU to ensure consistent macroeconomic management through tight fiscal and 
monetary policies. From 1992 onwards, the Reserve Money Programme was developed 
as a key instrument in liquidity management and implementing monetary policy. The 
BoU set a point target for inflation at 5%, which was more stringent than the targets set 
in most other African countries around that time. In 1993, the BoU’s statute was revised 
and the government delegated full authority for monetary policy to the central bank, 
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consolidating the role of the BoU as the guardian of price stability. In the 1993 Statute, 
achieving and maintaining economic stability was also set as the ultimate objective of 
monetary policy. The BoU became very effective in pursuing this mandate: Inflation 
rates between 1995 and 2005 averaged 4.9%, which is both below the self-set target and 
below the African average of 6.5% during the same time period (World Bank, 2013c).  
The fiscal crisis in 1992 marked a turning point, not only in the government’s economic 
policy but also in its relationship with donors. Donors, and in particular bilateral donors, 
content with the orientation of policy towards stability, increased their assistance. From 
1996 onwards, bilateral ODA flows have exceeded multilateral flows, which had 
hitherto dominated assistance (Holmgren et al., 2001). Figure 3.A2 illustrates the 
increase of ODA during the 1990s. With the exception of 1998, Uganda’s ODA to GNI 
ratio was throughout the 1990s and 2000s consistently above 10%, the conventional 
threshold for aid dependence (World Bank, 2013c). As Figure 3.A4 suggests, aid 
inflows were also large compared to exports. Thus, aid became a major source of 
foreign exchange. Uganda was also the first country declared eligible for assistance 
under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Uganda received a major 
debt relief in 1997, followed by a further debt reduction under the “enhanced HIPC 
Initiative” in 2000. Moreover, grants increased substantially and outnumbered loans in 
Uganda in the 1990s (Holmgren et al., 2001: 106). From the end of the 1990s, Uganda 
received a large share of aid in the form of budget support. For much of the 1990s, 
donors financed more than half of the government’s budget. Budget support has 
certainly provided the Ugandan government with considerable policy space to spend 
funds in line with its development priorities. Yet budget support also gave donors 
significant influence on policy decisions because donors became considered legitimate 
stakeholders in policy processes and were consulted in important domestic matters such 
as the budget processes (Whitworth and Williamson, 2010: 17). The use of donor funds 
was thus controlled internally by the government and externally by donors. 
Not only did the amounts and types of foreign assistance change, but so too did the 
mechanisms through which donors shaped economic policy in Uganda. Before 1992, 
the government had implemented reforms only reluctantly and in response to 
conditionality. From 1992 onwards, however, there was a strong ownership of reforms 
among key policymakers so that formal conditionality, although still included in World 
Bank and IMF arrangements, became less instrumental in inducing reforms (Harrison, 
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2001; Holmgren et al., 2001). Instead, encouraging social learning became an important 
channel through which donors shaped policy. Social learning was facilitated by an 
increase in technical assistance which allowed for more dialogue. While technical 
assistance grants had only accounted for about 10% of all ODA flows to Uganda in the 
early 1980s, this figure reached about 16% in the decade after 1992 (Holmgren et al., 
2001: 110). By international comparison, Uganda has made unusually good use of 
technical assistance, especially the BoU (Holmgren et al., 2001: 110). With a view to 
improve the implementation of reforms agreed on in World Bank and IMF programmes, 
donors also funded the salaries of staff in the MoFPED and the BoU, seconded technical 
advisors to these institutions and sponsored study trips (Mallaby, 2004: 220; 
Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2010: 43-44). In order to intensify the exchange with donors, the 
BoU in turn offered the IMF and the financial sector programme of the GIZ office space 
within the premises of the BoU, where they remain today. Policy dialogue among the 
government, the BoU and donors also took place when new monetary and financial 
reform programmes were negotiated and existing programmes evaluated.  
The interaction among donors and Ugandan policymakers facilitated the exchange of 
ideas on reform priorities so that donors and policymakers developed a common 
understanding of the goals of central bank policy and the kind of instruments that 
should be used to attain them. Rather than setting the agenda for reform, the role of 
donors became to facilitate the implementation of reforms by providing financing and 
expertise and by strengthening the hand of reformers. In some cases, donors assisted 
reformers also by including certain conditionalities requested by reformers in their 
programmes (Holmgren et al., 2001: 141). 
In the following years, Uganda earned a reputation as ‘a pioneer of macroeconomic 
stabilisation and structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa’ among donors (Collier 
and Reinikka, 2001: xiii). Ugandan policymakers were committed to orienting central 
bank policy towards stability. Yet pursing this stance would have been more difficult if 
there had been more organised political opposition (Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2010: 49). 
Uganda’s political opposition was decimated by war, HIV/Aids and economic collapse 
while the NRM enjoyed popular support from citizens tired of civil conflict and 
economic chaos. Moreover, during the first decade of its rule, the NRM diminished 
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organised political opposition by effectively establishing a one-party system.48 “The 
lack of an organised political class,” explained a senior official of the BoU, “gave 
Museveni a window of opportunity to rule in a technocratic way: he sought to ensure 
low inflation, and did not interfere in markets.”49 The reform process was, however, not 
always running smoothly. Often the process was slow and there was conflict about the 
direction of policy within the government. A case in point is the area of financial reform 
to which we turn now.  
Financial Reform 
After having created a policy environment in which the central bank could assume its 
role as the guardian of price stability, central bank policy reform focused on orienting 
financial policy towards enhancing financial stability. By the early 1990s, the two major 
public banks, the UCB and the Cooperative Bank, were insolvent. They had extended 
credit to borrowers unable or unwilling to repay loans with a view to deepening 
financial sectors and providing subsidised credit to politically connected individuals. Of 
the nine local banks, which were established in the second half of the 1980s and the 
early 1990s, four experienced solvency problems by the mid-1990s (Brownbridge, 
1998a: 133). Several factors account for the distress in local banks: the tightness of 
financial markets, fraud, the lack of managerial capacity, the weakness of internal 
controls and deficiencies in the regulatory framework (Brownbridge, 1998a). Moreover, 
automatic overdraft facilities with the BoU undermined the banks’ incentives to change 
business practices. 
From the donors’ perspective, the first meaningful steps to restore financial stability 
were the government’s repayment of a substantial amount of its debt to the banking 
system between 1992 and 1994 and the agreement on a financial sector adjustment 
programme in 1993. As agreed under the financial sector adjustment programme, the 
government and the BoU liberalised interest rates by 1994. Policymakers tightened 
regulation in the 1993 Financial Institutions Statute, which replaced the Banking Act of 
1969. The Statute gave the BoU the authority to employ a range of measures for dealing 
with banks in financial distress and to issue prudential regulations pertaining to capital 
adequacy, liquidity and data to be supplied for supervisory purposes. More generally, 
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 Tripp (2010) is an excellent source on Uganda‘s hybrid political regime, which adopts elements of 
democracy while perverting it through patronage, violence and repression. 
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 A similar view offers Tumisiime-Mutebile (2010: 49). 
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the Statute increased the BoU’s independence from the MoFPED in licensing and 
regulating financial institutions. Nevertheless, rejected applicants for bank licenses had 
the right to appeal to the minister of finance and the BoU had to consult him before 
regulations were issued and insolvent financial institutions liquidated (Brownbridge, 
1998a: 137).  
With its new powers, the BoU took over and restructured three insolvent banks in 1993 
and 1994. The BoU also increased the minimum capital requirements to 1 billion and 
500 million Ugandan Shillings for foreign and local banks respectively (Brownbridge, 
1998a: 137). The establishment of lower capital requirements for local banks reflected a 
compromise between reformers in the BoU, who shared the view of donors that 
enhancing financial stability was the main policy priority and would indirectly support 
financial deepening, and advocates of financial deepening through state intervention and 
development of the indigenous banking sector (Byaruhanga et al., 2010: 74). Donors 
would have liked faster progress in tightening regulation and supervision. Yet as donors 
were convinced of the government’s commitment to reform, they also became less 
demanding, accepting that some measures were not implemented or implemented 
slower than expected (World Bank, 1997: 11; Dijkstra and Kees van Donge, 2001).  
However, the initial reforms left the BoU ill-equipped to regulate and supervise the 
financial sector effectively. When the number of banks increased, the BoU did not have 
the capacity to supervise them effectively. Resource constraints did not permit the BoU 
to achieve its goal of examining all banks every year (IMF, 1999b: 15). Moreover, the 
shared responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and the BoU in closing insolvent banks 
delayed interventions in weak banks as actions could only be taken after consultation 
processes (IMF, 1999b: 15). The BoU’s limited authority and capacity to regulate and 
supervise banks was a key reason for the banking crisis Uganda experienced in 
1997/1998.  
This crisis tipped the balance in the debate between reformers and supporters of a policy 
stance which was aimed at deepening financial sectors through state support of the 
indigenous banking sector (Byaruhanga et al., 2010). The IMF supported reformers by 
including the tightening of prudential regulation and supervision as a conditionality in 
lending arrangements and monitoring the financial reform process closely (IMF, 1999a; 
IMF, 2002). In the following years, policymakers strengthened the regulation and 
supervision of financial institutions considerably. In 2000, for instance, the BoU more 
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than doubled minimum capital requirements for banks and adopted equal capital 
requirements for local- and foreign-owned banks. The BoU’s authority in supervision 
was strengthened and the remaining shared responsibilities with the Ministry of Finance 
were minimal. In 2004, a new Financial Institutions Act, which included provisions on 
corporate governance and mandatory corrective action by BoU, replaced the 1993 
Financial Institutions Statute. Another landmark in promoting financial stability was the 
regulation of deposit-taking microfinance institutions in 2003. Before 2003, such 
institutions had neither been regulated nor supervised despite holding a large share of 
the public’s savings because the BoU had argued “don’t regulate what you can’t 
supervise”. Donors, however, made the regulation of microfinance deposit taking 
institutions a priority in their assistance to financial reform: They sponsored study trips, 
seminars and consultants to encourage and support the BoU in drafting the 
Microfinance Deposit-Taking Institutions Act.  
A final example of the constraints the stability-oriented coalition of donors and central 
bankers imposed on advocates of state-led financial development is the privatisation of 
the UCB. Both the BoU and donors considered the sale of the UCB necessary for 
safeguarding financial stability (IMF, 1999c; IMF, 2003c). The UCB was too big to fail 
and the BoU was unable to discipline the UCB owing to the UCB’s developmental 
mandate (Brownbridge, 1998a). Therefore, the privatisation of the UCB became an IMF 
conditionality. Yet the planned sale of the UCB re-ignited the struggle between 
reformers and advocates of state-led financial development. The privatisation became a 
subject of intense debate in the parliament and among the public. Parliamentarians tried 
to stop the sale by arguing the BoU lacked legal powers to privatise the BoU. Museveni 
then intervened in support of the BoU, arguing that Parliament could not stop the central 
bank from selling the UCB because the sale was not a privatisation but rather a 
resolution of the BoU’s intervention in the UCB (Byaruhanga et al., 2010). A team, 
funded by British donors, then investigated allegations that the BoU lacked a legal basis 
for selling the UCB and found no substance to these claims (Byaruhanga et al., 2010). 
In 2002, the UCB was sold to Standard Bank, a South African corporation.  
It is unlikely that the UCB was sold only because of donor conditionality. Nonetheless, 
the role of donors appears to have been significant: The IMF’s conditionality 
strengthened the hand of reformers by making clear how constrained the options 
policymakers could realistically consider in restructuring the insolvent bank were and 
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that donors were only willing to support the restructuring process if the bank was 
privatised.  
This section has hopefully illustrated the vulnerability of the Ugandan government to 
the demands of donors, the channels through which donors influenced policy and how 
the anticipated and actual consequences of not being responsive to donors shaped 
policy. But what was the impact of adopting a stability-oriented policy stance on the 
economy? I have already provided a partial answer, namely that donors, satisfied with 
the stability-oriented policies, provided a significant amount of investible resources. 
Another impact was an increase of the level of private investment owing to restored 
economic and political stability. Greater stability in the business environment certainly 
benefited not only large-scale business but also small entrepreneurs and smallholder 
farmers. Yet small-scale business received only limited redress from the state for their 
lack of access to finance, restraining investment and growth in this segment. The 
economy responded to increased levels of investment with an average growth rate of 
6% between 1996 and 2000 and 7% between 2001 and 2005 (World Bank, 2013c). The 
rising level of economic prosperity also allowed Museveni and the NRM to strengthen 
their political power base: Economic activity increased popular support and, by 
increasing the state’s access to and control of financial resources, permitted to “fuel a 
political patronage machine” (Tripp, 2010: 185). Moreover, the positive economic 
effects of stabilisation policies increased the credibility of donors’ advice and in turn the 
government’s receptiveness to further reforms (Mosley, 1996; Dijkstra and Kees van 
Donge, 2001).   
The picture that emerges from the story told is thus that the political and economic gains 
of stabilisation policies initiated a virtuous cycle. Positive effects of previous stabilising 
reforms strengthened the government’s support for further reforms, which themselves 
were facilitated by donor expertise and financing. As a result, a stability-oriented central 
bank policy stance, which donors and the government considered the most effective 
approach to enhance growth and deepen financial sectors, became entrenched.  
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3.3 Responsiveness to Concerns for Stability and Financial Deepening, 2005-
2012 
If the first two decades under the NRM government were devoted to enticing donors 
and putting firmly in place a set of stability-oriented policies, the years from the mid-
2000s onwards have focused on developing the country’s productive capacities and 
pursuing both stability-oriented and growth-oriented policy goals.  
Why has the policy agenda become wider? One major factor is more political 
competition. In the 2000s, the regime took a number of steps to open up political space, 
the most important being the return to multipartyism in 2005. As a consequence of more 
political competition, President Museveni and other political leaders have become more 
concerned with maintaining political support through policies aimed at broad-based 
economic prosperity rather  than, as in the past, mere poverty reduction (Tripp, 2010; 
Hickey, 2013). The NRM’s Manifesto “Prosperity For All” is a fine example of this 
shift in focus (NRM, 2011). Moreover, with greater political openness, Parliament, 
academia and civil society became more engaged in debates on economic issues and 
criticised the government for what was perceived as a single-minded focus on 
macroeconomic stability, which neglected more broad-based growth and 
industrialisation (Doya, 2010; Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2010: 48; Kiiza, 2012). Another 
reason for the policy agenda widening is the growing political frustration that economic 
stability and growth have not translated into structural change in the economy, including 
industrialisation and formal sector job creation, with the country remaining aid 
dependent (Whitworth and Williamson, 2010: 25; NRM, 2011; Ssewanyana et al., 2011; 
Hickey, 2013).  
The task, if the government was to jumpstart a structural transformation and to maintain 
political support, was to change the orientation of economic policy and step up efforts to 
mobilise investible resources. Since the mid-2000s, the government has therefore 
revised its approach to governing the economy, with the shift perhaps best encapsulated 
in Uganda’s National Development Plan (NDP), which in 2010 replaced poverty 
reduction strategy papers and aims at structural transformation. In particular, the NDP 
promotes a greater role of the state in the facilitation of private-sector-led development. 
The NDP also reflects the shift in thinking that macroeconomic stability should remain 
a government priority but that macroeconomic stability alone is not enough to promote 
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economic development and sustain high growth rates. In the NDP, the government 
proposes policies which directly promote the structural transformation of the economy 
and policies to deepen financial sectors to finance private sector development (GoU, 
2010).  
Not all parts of the government were happy with the change towards a policy stance that 
permitted a greater role of the state in promoting economic development and financial 
deepening. In particular the BoU and parts of the Ministry of Finance feared that the 
shift in policy bore risks for hard-won gains in macroeconomic stability (Doya, 2010; 
Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2010).50 Moreover, even if most policymakers agreed that greater 
effort had to be made to develop the real economy “there remains,” a MoFPED official 
explained, “foremost the fear of going back. You always hear: we do not want to have 
policy reversals.”51  
Support for the shift in the orientation of economic policy came, however, from an 
unlikely source: the donor community, notably the World Bank. Donors have generally 
been supportive of an orientation of  economic policy towards the goal of structural 
transformation in Uganda and have encouraged the Ugandan authorities to make greater 
efforts to deepen financial sectors  (IMF, 2007; IDA/IMF, 2010). The reasons for this 
change in attitude among donors lie in both the international and the domestic domain. 
The major international factor is a change in ideology, which consists of greater 
scepticism of markets, a rethinking of the role of government in promoting economic 
development and agreement on the need to promote structural transformation in 
developing countries. This change in ideology has been encouraged by the greater 
political and economic weight of emerging countries, by learning from failures of 
Washington Consensus policies, by experiences with state-facilitated development in 
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 An illustrative example provides the discussion about the financing of the NDP. When the National 
Planning Authority, which had the responsibility for drafting the NDP, drew up a budget which amounted 
to a deficit of 14%, this rang the alarm bells in the BoU. The BoU insisted on cutting the budget, 
triggering a heated debate about the relative importance of macroeconomic stability and growth. In the 
end, the BoU prevailed and the NDP’s budget was reduced by 10% because of concerns about 
macroeconomic stability (Doya, 2010). 
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 Emmanuel Tumisiime-Mutebile, who has been the governor of the BoU since 2001, embodies this 
stance. He acknowledges that the country’s investment needs must be met and that an environment 
attractive to investors must be created, also through financial market development. Yet in Tumisiime-
Mutebile’s view “(…) the only way to sustain this attractiveness [of an emerging market like Uganda] is 
through deepening and widening the financial markets and managing the economy in a prudent manner 
through avoidance of policy reversals (…)”(Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2007). 
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Asia and by the rampant market failures as exposed by the global financial crisis.52 
There are three main reasons in the domestic domain which account for donors’ change 
in attitude: First, donors feared that without additional economic reforms growth would 
taper off in Uganda. Second, donors recognised that price and financial stability 
established the basis for financial deepening but that financial systems had remained 
shallow. Third, donors were convinced that the Ugandan government remained 
committed to guarding economic stability, which continued to be a key concern for 
donors, notably the IMF and the World Bank (IMF, 2005b; IMF, 2006b).  
Getting donors’ stamp of approval for the shift in the orientation of policy was 
important if policymakers were to mobilise financing to spur broad-based growth and a 
structural transformation. As Figure 3.A5 shows, the sum of net inflows of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), domestic private investment and export revenues has increased 
since the mid-2000s, indicating that private investors play an increasingly important 
role as sources of finance. Yet by African standards, Uganda’s private sector has 
remained weakly developed and policymakers’ discretion over the use of resources 
supplied by the private sector is limited. Policymakers’ discretion over government 
revenues and aid, which is mainly provided on terms agreed upon with the government 
and often as budget support, is higher. Government revenues, which except for about 
1% are tax revenues, have exceeded aid in recent years and dependence on donors as 
captured by aid as a share of government expenditure has been declining (see Figure 
3.A6). Yet tax revenues, which averaged 13% of GDP between 2005 and 2011, have 
remained well below the average for sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, from the 
perspective of the government, levels of tax revenues are not sufficient to finance the 
desired level of public investment (GoU, 2010: 64). The government is aware that aid 
remains a key source of finance and winning the material and technical support of 
donors remains critical due to the shortfall in government revenues, the government’s 
ceiling on commercial borrowing under the country’s IMF programme and weakly 
developed domestic financial sectors (GoU, 2010: 62-66).53  
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 In a speech in 2010, the president of the World Bank noted for instance: “As economic tectonic plates 
have shifted, paradigms must shift too. . . This is no longer about the Washington Consensus (but about) 
securing transformation” (Hickey, 2013: 194). 
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 Aid dependence may decline in the future as significant oil reserves have been discovered and oil 
production is expected to start in 2018. Donors, however, are likely to continue to play an important role 
in Uganda for some time: As advisors on how to invest the oil revenues in a way that maximises returns 
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Pursuing fiscal, monetary and financial policies that are in line with the preferences of 
donors has been at the centre of efforts to ensure the continued support of donors, 
notably the IMF. There are several reasons for policymakers being responsive in these 
particular policy areas: First, in the areas of fiscal, monetary and financial policy there is 
an alignment of interests among Uganda’s policymakers and donors, particularly the 
IMF. Interaction of the IMF and policymakers has both facilitated and continuously 
strengthened this alignment of interests. As a senior BoU official explained: “The 
relationship [with the IMF] has become close and technocratic, some even argue too 
close.” Second, donors have tolerated governance failures in recent years, but this was 
mainly because they were satisfied with the conduct of economic policy and economic 
performance (Tripp, 2010). Slippages in economic policy would further complicate 
Uganda’s increasingly thorny relationship with donors. Third, Uganda’s policymakers 
are keen on positive assessments of their monetary and financial policy by the IMF. 
Since 2005, Uganda has had a Policy Support Instrument (PSI) in place with the IMF.54 
Under the PSI, the IMF closely surveys Uganda’s monetary, fiscal and financial policy 
and policymakers agree with the IMF on policy targets. Uganda no longer receives IMF 
financing but, as a senior government official explained, “we still need the IMF to give 
a signal that everything is alright – to donors and to markets.” Donors make the 
provision of aid conditional on Uganda’s successful participation in an IMF 
programme. Foreign investors, who are considered key to jumpstarting the economy’s 
productive activities and mobilising additional financial resources, base their investment 
decisions in part on the assessments of the policy environment by the IMF. The 
influence of the IMF in Uganda thus no longer rests on the provision of financing, but 
the provision of knowledge and of signals to potential providers of financing.  
Since 2005, policymakers have taken several steps which indicate the continued 
commitment to guarding stability and greater concern for financial deepening. In the 
area of monetary policy, the BoU continued to place significant emphasis on guarding 
price stability. The main reform in recent years in pursuit of this goal is a shift in the 
policy framework from a monetary targeting towards an inflation targeting (IT) regime. 
                                                                                                                                         
and, in the case of the IMF, as providers of a signal to investors about the quality of the country’s 
economic policies. 
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 The IMF describes the PSI on its website as a “tool that enables low-income countries that do not want 
– or need – to secure Fund advice and support without a borrowing arrangement.(…) The PSI is designed 
to promote a close policy dialogue between the IMF and a member country, normally through semiannual 
Fund assessments of a member's economic and financial policies” (IMF, 2014). 
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The BoU felt that monetary targeting became increasingly ineffective in achieving the 
desired medium-term target of 5% inflation (Kasekende and Brownbridge, 2011). IT 
was considered a superior framework, even though IT requires setting inflation control 
as the primary policy objective, which, at times, involves allowing growth to dip below 
its potential. The IMF, which has advocated IT in a number of developing countries and 
supported reforms of Uganda’s monetary policy framework for many years, welcomed 
this decision. Without support from the IMF, moving towards IT would have been 
difficult because the government lacked the technical capacities to implement an IT 
regime (IMF, 2013c). Moreover, the IMF encouraged reforms to strengthen central bank 
independence, which is a prerequisite for an IT regime but is politically contested. In 
particular, the IMF lent credence to the BoU’s demands for more central bank 
independence by including institutional reforms to enhance central bank independence 
as goals in the PSI. In the area of financial policy, safeguarding financial stability has 
remained the BoU’s major priority. The fact that Uganda’s banks weathered the global 
financial crisis well because they were profitable and well-capitalised at the onset of the 
crisis also confirmed the BoU in its policy stance (Kasekende, 2010).   
While the policy concerns of the BoU related to safeguarding price and financial 
stability paralleled those of donors and the BoU often spearheaded reforms, this was 
different in the area of financial deepening. In the late 2000s, there was a consensus 
among BoU officials on the importance given to different central bank objectives: Price 
stability was considered the primary goal, followed by financial stability. 55 Only some 
officials, arguing that the BoU had in recent years made greater efforts to promote 
financial development, considered financial deepening a tertiary goal. Still, throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s, there was a small group of staff in the BoU that felt that the BoU’s 
policy stance should be oriented towards both stability and financial deepening instead 
of having stability as the paramount objective. This group did not share the position of 
the BoU’s management; namely, that the major contribution of the BoU towards growth 
was to maintain stability.56  
Donors encouraged the BoU to promote financial deepening by insisting that such 
efforts were within the BoU’s mandate, by providing information that Uganda lagged 
                                               
55Interviews with several BoU officials in Kampala, December 2010 and December 2011. 
56
 Interviews with several BoU officials in Kampala, December 2010 and December 2011. See for 
instance Tumusiime-Mutebile (2011) for an illustration of the position of the central bank governor. 
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behind other African countries in financial access, by requesting the BoU to address the 
shallowness of Uganda’s financial sectors and by funding activities that support 
financial deepening. In a Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) update in 
2004, the World Bank and the IMF highlighted, for instance, that the banking sector 
was well capitalised, profitable and stable but that Uganda’s financial sector had 
remained shallow and exclusive. Policymakers were urged to make greater efforts to 
increase financial access (IMF, 2006b: 32). In 2007, donors funded a survey on access 
to financial services in Uganda and provided figures underscoring the urgency of 
increasing access. A senior BoU official recalled in an interview: “We have price 
stability and financial stability, but the FinScope survey showed us that they [the banks] 
do not serve anybody.”57 In 2009, the World Bank published a study with the 
programmatic title “Making Finance Work for Uganda” which plainly criticised some 
of Uganda’s prudential regulations, claiming that they were impeding financial access 
(World Bank, 2009). What followed was a tense debate between the World Bank and 
central bankers in which the World Bank argued that greater consideration should be 
given to potential trade-offs between financial stability and financial deepening. As 
these examples illustrate, donor support in the area of financial policy has become 
inextricably linked to greater central bank engagement in deepening financial sectors.  
Smaller businesses had long voiced their concerns about the lack of access to finance 
but these concerns received only more redress from the BoU when the government and 
donors set financial access on the policy agenda.58 As the BoU’s regular dialogue with 
the private sector on financial reform includes only the banking sector, which is wary of 
policies to increase financial access that may reduce current levels of profits, donors 
have played an important role in voicing the demands of businesses excluded from 
access to finance.  
A milestone from the donors’ perspective in moving towards a policy stance which 
places more emphasis on financial deepening was the establishment of a credit reference 
bureau, a follow-up on a recommendation of the FSAP update in 2004 (IMF, 2006b: 
36). Credit reference bureaus help borrowers to generate a credit history, thus 
                                               
57
 FinScope is a study of consumers' perceptions on financial services which has been carried out in a 
number of African countries, funded mainly by British aid. 
58
 The Enterprise Survey published by the World Bank, for instance, found that in 2006 around 48% of 
SMEs consider access to and/or cost of finance as a "major" or "very severe" obstacle (World Bank, 
2013a). 
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supporting them in getting access to finance. Setting up the bureau, which started 
operating  in 2009, would, however, have been difficult if not impossible if donors had 
not agreed to subsidise its operation because neither the banks nor the government were 
willing to bear the full costs of its operation. Assisted by donors, the BoU also took 
further steps to promote financial deepening such as the issuance of consumer 
protection guidelines in 2011 or the licensing of mobile money operators in 2013. From 
the BoU’s perspective, the main challenge lies in identifying policies which increase 
access to finance without unduly increasing risks to financial stability and reversing the 
liberalisation of the financial sector.  
Is the BoU shifting again to a policy stance which emphasises financial deepening and 
neglects stability? The government certainly exerts pressure on the BoU to support the 
government’s efforts to mobilise resources for investment. For instance, in 2009 the 
government requested the BoU to administer an agricultural credit facility, which 
provides medium- and long-term financing for agricultural projects at subsidised 
interest rates. In 2011, President Museveni also increased government borrowing from 
the BoU above permitted levels leading to Uganda failing an IMF programme review 
(Manson, 2011).59 Yet despite government pressure to pursue expansionary policies, 
most observers agree that donors place constraints on deviating from a stability-oriented 
policy stance. The managing director of an international bank explained in an interview: 
“Investors would not really mind if the BoU becomes more interventionist: if you have 
a controlled environment, you attract a certain type of investors. But the external 
partners in Uganda, the IMF and the World Bank, do not want to see a more 
interventionist BoU.” Moreover, donors use their influence to assist policymakers in the 
BoU in building institutions which help to entrench a stability-oriented policy stance, as 
exemplified by efforts to increase central bank independence. That said, aid dependence 
is declining in Uganda and so the perceptions of policymakers in Uganda of the 
constraints they face regarding donors are beginning to change. 
                                               
59
 In 2011, the government increased domestic borrowing for election-related and military expenses 
above the levels agreed with the IMF under the PSI. Moreover, a substantial amount of the funds was 
borrowed from the BoU without parliamentary approval. Governor Tumisiime-Mutebile’s criticised in a 
Financial Times article that Museveni’s continued embrace of “elements of Marxism” was undermining 
the economy (Manson, 2011). Museveni’s press secretary responded by saying there was no way the BoU 
governor could argue with the president over national matters (Wafula, 2011). He added: “If you disagree 
with the President you can write to him…and if the disagreement is fundamental then you resign.” 
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3.4 Conclusion 
Before moving to the next case study, which explores the policy trajectory of Nigeria’s 
central bank, it is important to pause here and emphasise five basic points of this 
chapter which illustrate the arguments of this thesis.  
First, the account of the trajectory of central bank policy in Uganda can be meaningfully 
enhanced by considering the structural constraints arising from aid dependence as an 
explanatory factor. The actual and anticipated consequences of not being responsive to 
donors’ concerns for economic and political stability became important considerations 
for Uganda’s policymakers and encouraged a stability-oriented policy stance as aid 
dependence increased. The IMF’s policy concerns related to central bank policy have 
received major attention, owing to the signals the IMF provides to other donors and 
private investors regarding the quality of central bank policy.  
That said, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that reliance on donors is not 
the only factor which has shaped central bank policy in Uganda. As the description of 
central bank policy in the 1970s suggests, ideas about the role of central banks in 
financing the economy, an international factor, appear to have influenced policy. In the 
late 2000s, for instance, more political competition increased the pressure on the 
government to develop the real economy, including through a policy stance oriented 
towards financial deepening. 
Donors influenced the stance of central bank policy through several mechanisms: 
During the BoU’s early years, when Uganda was reliant on donor countries for the 
secondment of staff to the BoU, voice and contribution to social learning were the main 
channels through which donors influenced policy. Through explicit conditionality 
(voice) and withholding aid disbursements (exit), donors induced the orientation of 
central bank policy towards stability in the early 1990s. Since policy has become 
responsive to donors’ policy preferences in the early 1990s, encouraging social learning 
and, at least for the IMF, the threat of exit, have become the dominant modes through 
which donors have shaped policy.  
Second, the exercise of structural power is difficult to observe, hence those with 
structural power are not ordinarily seen as wielding significant political power. In the 
case of Uganda, the emergence of a common understanding of policy priorities and the 
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alignment of interests among donors (notably the IMF) and Ugandan policymakers 
make it particularly difficult to establish the influence of donors on central bank policy 
from 1992 onwards. If a clearer distinction between the preferences of the Ugandan 
government and the preferences of donors was possible, this would help in deciding to 
what extent the case of Uganda supports my argument that donors shape central bank 
policy in aid dependent countries. It was therefore important to trace shifts in central 
bank policy, such as the orientation of policy towards stability in 1992 and the 
orientation of policy towards financial deepening in the late 2000s, and link these shifts 
to the government’s vulnerability to the concerns of donors. 
Third, while policymakers’ perceptions of the constraints they face regarding donors 
help to explain the BoU’s stability-oriented policy stance, the extent to which this 
stance has become entrenched has a great deal to do with the particular circumstances in 
Uganda. Four major factors appear to account for this entrenchment and to have 
influenced the responsiveness to donors as mediating factors. I have already mentioned 
one major factor: the weakness of Uganda’s political opposition, which liberated the 
regime from pressures to pursue more expansionary policies and which allowed for the 
governing of the economy in a technocratic way with a strong centre for decision 
making. Another factor may be that orienting monetary and financial policy towards 
enhancing stability was a common concern to all donors during the 1990s and early 
2000s. The alignment of interests among donors increased the effectiveness of donor 
pressure. A third factor may be that Uganda has continuity in political and technical 
personnel. The key figures in orienting the central bank policy stance towards stability 
in the early 1990s, notably President Museveni and Tumisiime-Mutebile, who was 
minister of finance before he became central bank governor, have remained in power. 
Personnel continuity has also facilitated the establishment of close relationships with 
donors which are conducive to social learning. Finally, it is also of no small importance 
that at the time when Uganda became highly dependent on aid, a new policy paradigm 
based on the idea that the role of the state in governing finance lies mainly in enhancing 
stability was emerging internationally. This major ideological change contributed to the 
shift to a stability-oriented policy stance in Uganda. That said, the case of Uganda 
appears to support the finding of earlier research, that ideas are more likely to translate 
into policy when they are supported by powerful actors (Hall, 1993; Gómez-Mera, 
2011). 
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Fourth, in accounting for the direction of policy when the structural power of business is 
low it is important to look at the preferences of those who supply significant 
“replacement resources”, which in Uganda are donors. I formulated the proposition that 
in developing countries which are more dependent on aid, the central bank policy stance 
is more likely to be stability-oriented because this is the stance donors prefer. However, 
as the last section shows, the BoU has, since the mid-2000s, placed more emphasis on 
financial deepening, apparently responding to both internal political pressures and 
external pressures from donors. This is not to say that the case of Uganda contradicts 
my proposition because promoting stability has remained a primary goal of the BoU. 
However, the finding that donors appear to have encouraged a greater focus on financial 
deepening is a reminder that the direction of the relationship between the reliance on aid 
and the central bank policy stance is likely to depend on the preferences of donors. 
Thus, when in aid dependent countries donors’ policy concerns shift, the policy options 
policymakers can reasonably consider may shift as well.  
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3.5 Appendix 
Figure 3.A1: Private Credit in Uganda, 1966-2011 
 
Source: Data on private credit drawn from the World Bank (2013b) and  data on GDP drawn from the 
World Bank (2013c). Note: Data for Uganda before 1982 refers to total credit to the private sector. 
 
Figure 3.A2: Net ODA to Uganda, 1960-2011 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c).  
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Figure 3.A3: Inflation in Uganda, 1981-2012 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c). Note: Data for Uganda only available from 1981. 
 
Figure 3.A4: Net ODA to Uganda and Ugandan Exports, 1960-2011 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c).  
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Figure 3.A5: Major Sources of Investible Funds in Uganda, 2005-2011 
 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c) except for data on domestic private investment, which 
is drawn from various IMF country reports. 
 
 
Figure 3.A6: Aid and Government Revenue in Uganda, 2000-2011 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c).  
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Table 3.A1: Chronology of Major Economic and Political Events 
  
1961 Uganda becomes independent from the United Kingdom. 
1966 The BoU is established. 
1971 Idi Amin seizes power through a military coup. 
1972 Idi Amin expels Uganda’s Asian population. 
1979 Idi Amin is overthrown. 
1981 Milton Obote’s regime begins a structural adjustment programme 
(SAP). 
1984 The SAP is abandoned. 
1986 Yoweri Museveni, the leader of the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) comes to power. 
1987 The Museveni regime embarks on a SAP. 
1991 Donors suspend aid until early 1992. 
1992 President Museveni orients policy towards stability, announcing for 
instance that inflation is indiscipline. 
1997 Uganda experiences a major banking crisis which lasts until 1998.  
2001 Emmanuel Tumisiime-Mutebile is appointed governor of the BoU.  
2005 Uganda returns to multipartyism. The first Policy Support Instrument 
with the IMF is put in place. 
2006 Emmanuel Tumisiime-Mutebile is reappointed governor of the BoU  
2010 Uganda’s National Development Plan encapsulates the government’s 
commitment to structural transformation and a greater role of the state 
in the facilitation of private-sector-led development. 
2011 The BoU introduces an inflation-targeting framework. 
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Table 3.A2: World Bank Policy Reform Loans to Uganda, 1980-1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: ERC = Economic Recovery Credit. SAL = Structural Adjustment Loan/Credit. SAD = Sector 
Adjustment Credit. TAL = Technical Assistance Loan. SIL = Sector Investment Loan. - not available. 
Source: Holmgren et al. (2001: 108) 
 
 
 
  
World Bank (millions of US$) 
Loan Type 
Amount 
Approved 
Approval 
Year 
Closing 
Year 
Reconstruction Credit ERC 72.5 1980 1982 
Technical Assistance TAL 8 1980 1985 
Reconstruction Credit II SAL 70 1982 1985 
Technical Assistance II TAL 51.3 1983 1992 
Agricultural Rehabilitation Sector 
Adjustment Credit SAD 66.1 1983 1992 
Reconstruction III SAL 50 1984 1987 
Economic Recovery Credit SAL 65 1987 1991 
Technical Assistance III TAL 18 1988 1995 
Public Enterprises TAL 15 1988 1995 
Economic Recovery I/II 
Supplement SAL 26.7 1989 - 
Economic Recovery Credit II SAL 125 1990 1993 
Poverty and Social Cost of 
Adjustment SIL 28 1990 1995 
Agricultural Sector Adjustment SAD 115 1990 1996 
Structural Adjustment Credit I SAL 125 1991 1994 
Economic and Financial 
Management Technical Assistance TAL 29 1992 1999 
Institutional Capacity Building TAL 36.4 1992 2000 
Financial Sector Adjustment Credit SAD 100 1993 1997 
Structural Adjustment Credit II SAL 80 1994 1996 
Structural Adjustment Credit III SAL 125 1997 1999 
Education Sector Adjustment Credit SAD 80 1998 - 
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Table 3.A3: IMF Policy Reform Loans to Uganda, 1980-1998 
 
International Monetary Fund (1980-1984 in 
millions of SDR, 1987 - 1997 in millions of US$) 
Time 
 
Year 
 
Amount 
approved 
Amount 
drawn 
Standby Operation 1 year 1980 12.5 12.5 
Trust Fund Loan 1 year 1980 22.3 22.3 
Compensatory Financing Facility 1 year 1980 25.0 25.0 
Compensatory 1 year 1981 45.0 45.0 
Standby I 1 year 1981/82 112.5 112.5 
Standby II 1 year 1982/83 112.5 112.5 
Standby III 1 year 1983/84 95.0 65.0 
Structural Adjustment Facility 2 years 1987 69.7 49.8 
ESAF 3 years 1989 179.3 179.3 
ESAF, additional arrangement 1 year 1992 39.8 39.8 
ESAF 3 years 1994 180.0 180.0 
ESAF 3 years 1997 138.0 78ª 
Note: ESAF = Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility. a Disbursements until end of 1998. 
Source: Holmgren et al. (2001: 109) 
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4 The Political Economy of Central Bank Policy in Nigeria 
The case study of Uganda shows that central bank policy trajectories can change 
dramatically and that economic collapse may be a critical juncture on the way to policy 
change. As this chapter will show, central bank policy in Nigeria is, in contrast to 
Uganda, characterised by relative continuity. Even though at various points in its history 
Nigerian governments sought to alter the policy trajectory and orient central bank policy 
to a greater extent towards price and financial stability, financial deepening has been a 
primary goal of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) since its establishment in 1959. The 
evidence suggests that the incentives created by resource dependence and the 
government’s control of resource revenues help to account for the orientation of policy 
towards financial deepening.  
The chapter spans the years 1959 to 2012.60 It comprises five substantive sections and a 
conclusion that summarises the basic points of the chapter. The main objective of the 
substantive sections is to trace how access to oil revenues has influenced the stance of 
central bank policy. Correspondingly, the level of oil revenues has been my main 
criterion for dividing the narrative of the Nigerian case into periods. 
• The first section covers the years 1959 to 1982. It describes the pressures on the 
CBN to pursue policies oriented towards financial deepening and how access to and 
control of significant oil revenues widened the fiscal space to pursue such policies. I 
also explain how access to oil revenues moulded Nigeria’s political economy, 
thereby raising barriers to orienting central bank policy more towards stability.  
• The second section spans the years 1982 to 1985. The section is devoted to 
government attempts to orient policy towards stability in response to declining oil 
revenues.  
• The third section covers the years 1986 to 1993. It offers an account of Nigeria’s 
SAP, which was probably the single greatest effort to satisfy the policy demands of 
IFIs and foreign creditors in order to secure funds which would help to deal with a 
sharp decline in oil revenues. I also explain how the SAP lapsed due to a 
combination of pressures to consolidate political power, donors’ failure to reduce 
aid in response to the inconsistent implementation of reforms and rising oil 
revenues.  
                                               
60
 Table 4.A1 in the appendix providers a chronology of the major economic and political events. 
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• The fourth section, which spans the years 1993 to 1998, describes the government’s 
limited responsiveness to the policy concerns of donors and the private sector 
despite declining oil revenues. It also highlights that the theory of the structural 
power of capital does not provide an entirely satisfactory explanation of the 
orientation of central bank policy in all time periods.  
• The fifth section focuses on the period from 1999 to 2012. It describes how, since 
the return of democracy in 1999, Nigerian policymakers have struggled to orient 
policy towards stability in the context of high oil revenues and have sought to 
maintain financial deepening as a primary policy goal.  
4.1 Orientation of Central Bank Policy towards Financial Deepening in the 
Period of Buoyant Oil Revenues, 1959-1982  
In the early 1950s, Nigerian politicians began to loudly voice their demands for the 
establishment of a central bank which could strengthen the indigenous banking sector 
and assist in financing the country’s economic development (Uche, 1997: 143). 
Strengthening indigenous banks was a major concern for Nigerian businessmen and 
politicians. They felt deep resentment against the colonial, foreign-owned banks, which 
were perceived to discriminate against African business in the provision of financial 
services (Uche, 1997: 223). The hope was that, as indigenous banks grew, they would 
serve African businesses better. Yet most indigenous banks were expected to be closed 
with the introduction of banking regulation in 1952 because they were poorly 
capitalised and staffed. Many Nigerian politicians believed that the establishment of a 
central bank would help to rescue these indigenous banks. The BoE, however, opposed 
replacing the existing currency board system with a central bank until 1957 and delayed 
its establishment.61 
When Nigeria’s central bank was established in 1959, a year before the country’s 
independence, the British had, as a colonial power, considerable influence over the 
orientation of central bank policy and tried to institutionalise a stability-oriented policy 
                                               
1 In 1953, a BoE report came out against the establishment of a central bank in Nigeria because it 
considered financial markets too weakly developed for the central bank to carry out its monetary policy 
functions (Fisher, 1953). Another conclusion of the report was that if the central bank was to provide 
constant support to the weak indigenous banking sector this would ultimately hinder the development of a 
private banking sector. Only when neighbouring Ghana decided to abandon the West African currency 
board and issue its own currency and when a report by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development came out in favour of a Nigerian central bank, the BoE gave up opposition and Loynes, an 
advisor at the BoE, recommended the establishment of a Nigerian central bank (Loynes, 1957). 
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stance. The views and recommendations of an advisor to the BoE, J.B. Loynes, formed 
the basis for the central bank statute (1979: 41). Reflecting Loynes’s recommendations, 
the Central Bank Act of 1959 stated, for instance, that the promotion of monetary 
stability and sound financial structure were among the principal objectives of the CBN 
and stipulated limits on CBN lending to the government. In an effort to increase 
domestic and international confidence in the currency, the Nigerian pound was fixed at 
par with the pound sterling in the CBN Act.  
When the central bank was established, it was envisaged that the CBN would support 
financial sector development and the mobilisation of domestic funds for financing 
economic development (CBN, 1979: 43; 56). Nonetheless, there was broad agreement, 
in the government and among politicians, that stability should not be compromised for 
political reasons (CBN, 1979: 42).  
First Oil Boom and Other Pressures on the CBN to Pursue an Expansionary Policy 
Stance  
Despite intentions to allow the CBN to operate above the political fray, pressures on it 
to pursue an expansionary policy stance mounted soon after independence. One source 
of pressure was Nigeria’s bitter civil war, which was in part caused by Nigeria’s ethnic 
divisions and lasted from 1967 to 1970. The civil war and subsequent reconstruction 
efforts increased the financial needs of the government and the CBN’s policies became 
geared towards financing soaring government expenditure (CBN, 1979: 109-112). For 
example, in the late 1960s, the government adjusted the ratio of external reserves to the 
CBN’s demand liabilities continuously downward and the statutory limits on 
outstanding government debt upward in order to facilitate credit accommodation to the 
government (CBN, 1979: 56-57).  
The second significant source of pressure on the CBN to pursue an expansionary 
economic policy stance was the emergence of an economic development model, which 
was based on statist and nationalist economic policies. A major concern of the 
government was that the indigenous private sector was weakly developed at the time of 
independence. In particular, key sectors of the economy like industry and banking were 
dominated by foreign-owned firms. In the late 1960s, foreigners controlled about 95% 
of large-scale and 72% of small-scale industries in Nigeria (Balabkins, 1982: 55). 
Foreign investors had been welcome upon independence because investment capital was 
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scarce. Yet from the late 1960s onwards, public sentiment, official ideology and policies 
changed: The small class of Nigerian businessmen vocally demanded  more 
opportunities for profit, including through the indigenisation of foreign-owned 
businesses (Turner, 1976a: 65). The military government, which had come to power 
through a coup in 1966, considered statist and nationalist economic policies as a means 
to promote national unity, economic reconstruction after the war and the development 
of the economy, notably of the indigenous private sector (Balabkins, 1982). Import 
substitution, indigenisation62 and the involvement of the state in economic activities, 
including banking, were the cornerstones of the government’s economic development 
policies. For the CBN, the state’s efforts to develop the economy through statist and 
nationalist economic policies translated into greater pressure to support the 
developmental aspirations of the government by providing financing to the private 
sector and the government, and by expanding the regulation of the financial sector. 
The third source of pressure on the CBN to support an expansionary economic policy 
stance was the government’s access to a vast amount of discretionary resources in the 
wake of the first oil boom in 1973/1974. Oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1956, but it 
was not until the late 1960s that the state took more interest in the commercial 
exploitation of oil. In 1969, the government issued the Petroleum Act which vests the 
entire ownership of all petroleum discovered within Nigeria’s territorial boundaries in 
the state. The government also set up a state-owned oil company in 1971, which from 
1973 onwards, began to acquire equity stakes in foreign oil companies and to operate 
through joint ventures with oil majors who were granted territorial concessions (Watts, 
2004: 60).63 By the mid-1970s, oil had moved to the centre of economic accumulation 
in Nigeria. Oil exports, which had constituted 8% of total exports upon independence, 
amounted to 93% of exports in 1977 (Karl, 1997: 206). Between 1970 and 1974, the 
relative share of petroleum in foreign exchange earnings rose from 28% to over 90% 
(Balabkins, 1982: 135). The Nigerian state gained access to and control of enormous 
financial resources when oil revenues began to rise in the early 1970s owing to the 
public ownership of oil and gas reserves and equity stakes in the oil and gas industry.64 
                                               
62
 The government issued in 1972 and 1977 indigenisation legislation, which required expatriates to take 
on Nigerian partners in some activities and reserved certain activities exclusively for Nigerians. 
63
 See Frynas (1998) and Obi (2010) for more details on the evolution of Nigeria’s oil industry. 
64
 While the government’s access to oil revenues rose, the power of the foreign oil companies remained 
significant because they, not the Nigerian state, controlled the exploration and production process 
(Turner, 1976b). 
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Then in 1973/1974, in the wake of the oil embargo of the Organisation of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries, oil prices quadrupled and Nigeria’s foreign exchange 
reserves increased rapidly. As Figure 4.A1 shows, oil also became the single most 
important source of government revenues, accounting for an average of more than 76% 
of its revenues between 1975 and 1980 (CBN, 1994b: 97-98). 
What was the effect of access to and control over a significant amount of discretionary, 
investible resources on the Nigerian state? Faced with the task of reconstruction 
following the civil war and pressure to rapidly deliver economic growth and spur the 
“Nigerianisation” of the economy, the government embarked on a massive programme 
of oil-funded, state-led economic development. The oil windfall was seen as a chance to 
finance economic diversification and industrialisation. As Figure 4.A2 shows, 
government expenditure soared following the oil boom. Whereas many other African 
countries struggled to mobilise the funds needed to realise their developmental 
aspirations, oil revenues provided the Nigerian government with a material basis for 
funding the indigenisation process and government policies to support private sector 
development.  
When official ideology and policies became based on the idea of state-led and oil-
financed development, the CBN aligned its operations with the government’s policy 
stance. Specifically, central bank policy became heavily oriented towards financial 
deepening by facilitating access to finance for the government and the private sector. 
The orientation of CBN policy towards financial deepening is most evident in the area 
of financial policy. The CBN promoted financial deepening, for instance, through its 
ownership of and provision of financial assistance to public development banks such as 
the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank and the Nigerian Agricultural Development 
Bank (CBN, 1979: 143-144). To carry out development financing functions, the CBN 
also established in 1977 an agricultural finance department, which, for instance, 
administered an agricultural credit guarantee scheme (CBN, 1979: 147).  
In addition, the CBN made extensive use of financial regulation for allocative purposes 
(Brownbridge, 1998c: 106). The main piece of regulation in this regard was the 1969 
Banking Decree. In particular, it empowered the CBN to set minimum deposit rates to 
encourage saving and it enabled the setting of sector specific maximum lending rates to 
encourage lending to sectors which were considered particularly important for economic 
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development such as agriculture (Brownbridge, 1998c: 107). On the basis of the Decree, 
the CBN developed over time a scheme of interest rate controls. According to the World 
Bank (1983a: 43), Nigeria’s scheme was “perhaps one of the most rigid and 
comprehensive credit allocation schemes” in market-oriented developing economies.65 
In addition, in 1977 the CBN issued rural branching regulation, which required 
commercial banks to set up rural branches to mobilise savings and facilitate the delivery 
of agricultural credit (World Bank, 1983a: 58).  
The CBN’s financial policy placed less emphasis on promoting financial stability than it 
did on financial deepening. The potential of the regulation laid out in the 1969 Banking 
Decree to guard financial stability, for instance, was deficient. Notably, the Decree did 
not require banks to classify loans according to quality or to make provisions for non-
performing loans, which would have reduced financial deepening (Brownbridge, 1998c: 
120). Moreover, banks with liquidity shortages had recourse to the CBN, regardless of 
the quality of their management (NDIC, n.d.). Thus, the CBN pursued “an implicit 
policy of not allowing banks to fail” (Brownbridge, 1998c: 119).66 Why did the CBN 
pursue this policy? One likely reason was the aim to support banks owned by the state 
and by politically connected individuals. According to the government, another reason, 
underscoring its concern for financial deepening, was that bank failures would have 
adverse effects on confidence in the banking system and the economy (NDIC, n.d.).   
Although price stability was formally a primary goal of the CBN, it often resolved 
trade-offs between price stability and financial deepening in favour of the latter. A 
principal source of inflationary pressure was the increase of government borrowing 
from the domestic banking system, notably the CBN’s monetisation of government 
debt, from the mid-1970s onwards.67 A major reason for the increase of government 
borrowing was the failure of the government to reduce expenditure when oil revenues 
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 The scheme specified for instance for the year 1981 interest rate ceilings for 16 different sectors, and 
requested banks to maintain a minimum credit allocation of 70% to indigenous borrowers, 16% of which 
should be reserved exclusively for small-scale enterprises owned by Nigerians (World Bank, 1983a: 44). 
In addition, the scheme specified that a minimum of 40% of merchant banks' loans and advances should 
be of long- term maturity (over three years) and a maximum of 20% with short-term maturity. 
66
 According to Brownbridge (1998c: 119) there were only four bank closures before the early 1980s, all 
of them occurring between 1960 and 1972. The frequency with which banks accessed CBN lender of last 
resort loans is not publicly available (Oluranti, 1991: 59 cited in Brownbridge, 1998c: 119) . 
67
 Data on government borrowing from the domestic banking system for the period 1970 to 1981 reveals 
for instance that from 1977 onwards, the share of government borrowing from the central bank as a share 
of total borrowing from the banking system exceeds 25%, peaking at 68% in 1978 and 69% in 1981 
(World Bank, 1983b: 57).  
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fell, as happened for instance in 1977.68 Although the CBN controlled the structure of 
interest rates, it avoided increasing interest rates to tame inflation because it wanted to 
keep the costs of borrowing for the government and the private sector at a low level to 
deepen financial sectors (World Bank, 1983a). Instead, the CBN imposed quantitative 
ceilings on the overall and sectoral expansion of credit to combat inflation.69  
Sometimes, as in 1979, credit ceilings were effective in reducing inflation (World Bank, 
1983b: 16).70 Often, however, credit ceilings were ineffective in guarding price stability. 
In some cases this was because the CBN was unable to limit government borrowing 
from the banking system, including from the CBN (World Bank, 1983a: 12). In other 
cases, credit ceilings were ineffective because banks failed to comply with ceilings on 
private credit. This happened for two reasons. First, banks were often unable to comply 
with changes in credit ceilings because their asset portfolio management had become 
rigid due to the sectoral credit allocation guidelines (World Bank, 1983a: 16). Second, 
the CBN often failed to enforce ceilings on private credit. As the CBN admits, “in 
pursuit of the objective of fostering the growth of a sound financial system to mobilise 
adequate development-oriented finance, the CBN has been obliged to be less 
constraining on the credit operations of the banking system than it otherwise would 
have been” (CBN, 1979: 127). In sum, credit ceilings were often exceeded to facilitate 
access to finance for the government and the private sector at the expense of price 
stability.  
The orientation of central bank policy towards financial deepening and the neglect of 
price and financial stability objectives was certainly not a phenomenon unique to 
Nigeria. Many other central banks in developing countries at that time, including the 
Bank of Uganda, pursued similar policies to deepen financial sectors and subordinated 
the goals of promoting price and financial stability. There are two main reasons for 
these cross-national similarities. First, in many countries civil conflicts and 
indigenisation imposed similar pressures on central banks to focus on financing the 
government and the private sector. Second, the idea that central banks in developing 
countries may play an activist role in financing development and use regulation to 
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 In addition, the federal government borrowed significantly from the banking system for on-lending to 
state governments and parastatals which experienced financial difficulties. 
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 The CBN rarely used the other monetary policy instruments it had at its disposal such as open market 
operations, discount rate, liquidity and cash reserve ratios, stabilisation securities and special deposits. 
70
 When credit ceilings were effective, they often helped to reduce inflation by curbing credit to the 
private sector rather than to the government (World Bank, 1983b: 16-18). 
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deepen financial sectors was part of the predominant economic thinking until the rise of 
neoliberalism from the late 1970s onwards.  
Yet what is different in Nigeria is that the state’s access to and control of a sizable share 
of investible resources significantly widened the fiscal space of the state, including that 
of the CBN, for expansionary and statist policies. While we do not know which policies 
the CBN would have pursued if the government had not had access to abundant oil 
revenues, it is clear that the material abundance presented the CBN with a wider range 
of options to promote financial deepening. With the funds it controlled, the CBN was, 
for instance, able to promote financial deepening through both allocative regulation and 
the provision of direct financing to the economy, rather than having to rely on 
regulation alone. The acquisition of stakes in public development banks, the provision 
of funds to these banks and the granting of agricultural credit guarantees to commercial 
banks, were all facilitated by abundant resources. 
Oil Dependence, State-Society Relationships and the Orientation of Central Bank 
Policy 
An account of the orientation of central bank policy towards financial deepening would 
not be complete if it focused only on the point that oil provided a material basis for 
expansionary policy. It is also important to consider how oil revenues shaped the stance 
of central bank policy through the effects they had on the relationship between the state 
and other actors, like business or donors. Oil dependence and the government’s control 
of oil revenues moulded the political economy of Nigeria in three major ways, each of 
which makes an orientation of central bank policy towards financial deepening and 
economic expansion, as opposed to stability, more likely. 
One way in which oil revenues shaped Nigeria’s political economy and, as a 
consequence, central bank policy was by making political stability dependent on the 
distribution of rents. In Nigeria, the state became a distributive state, using globally 
extracted resource rents to distribute these rents internally. The distribution of oil rents 
strengthened the government’s political power base in two ways: First, rents helped to 
sustain social peace in a country divided by ethnic conflict and unequal access to 
economic opportunity (Herbst and Soludo, 2001: 649). Second, distributing oil rents 
allowed for the dispensing of patronage to political constituencies and thus helped to 
cement loyalties. When rents were distributed, they assumed a variety of forms: Public 
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sector wages, the award of government contracts and licenses or subsidised credit for 
the private sector. Okolie (1995) for instance finds that the main beneficiaries of 
subsidised agricultural credit programmes were large-scale farmers made up mainly of 
serving and retired military officers, top bureaucrats and wealthy business people. In 
orienting CBN policy towards financial deepening rather than stability, the state’s 
ability to enhance political stability by garnering political support could be greatly 
enhanced: The CBN could support the distribution of rents through its role as a financial 
intermediary, for instance through engagement in development financing, and its role as 
a regulator and supervisor, which allowed the CBN to micromanage economic 
opportunity.  
Another way in which oil revenues shaped Nigeria’s political economy and, as a result, 
a central bank policy stance oriented towards financial deepening was by increasing the 
importance of state support for private business. Oil revenues had created a difficult 
environment for Nigeria’s private sector. In particular, oil dependence had made 
economic expansion highly volatile due to the fluctuations in oil markets. By the late 
1970s, Nigeria had become an unpredictable stop-go economy in which the level of 
economic activity and government spending closely tracked the ups and downs of the 
oil sector.71 Moreover, oil-financed fiscal spending and lending had unwanted 
macroeconomic consequences. One consequence was Dutch disease, the reduction of 
the international competitiveness of export sectors such as agriculture due to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Another unwanted macroeconomic consequence 
was inflation, which, as Figure 4.A3 shows, was high and volatile from the mid-1970s 
onwards in Nigeria.72 When the business environment deteriorated due to the negative 
effects of oil dependence, the private sector became weaker and more dependent on 
state support in forms such as subsidised credit (World Bank, 1983b). Moreover, the 
negative effects of oil dependence on private sector development increased the state’s 
incentives to support the private sector through financial deepening. In fact, addressing 
the negative effects of oil dependence on the productive sectors by channelling funds to 
these sectors was a significant element of the rationale behind the use of the CBN’s 
credit allocation scheme (World Bank, 1983b: 2).  
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 An overview of the stop-go pattern of economic management provides Table 4.A2 in the appendix. 
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 Key drivers of inflation were oil-financed fiscal spending and the CBN’s monetisation of government 
debt, which partly stemmed from the failure to rein in expenditure when oil revenues declined (World 
Bank, 1983a). 
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A third, and from the perspective of the broader arguments of this thesis, particularly 
relevant way in which oil revenues shaped Nigeria’s political economy and, as a 
consequence, a policy stance oriented towards financial deepening was by reducing the 
political influence of non-state actors. Oil revenues allowed the government to gain 
control of a significant share of Nigeria’s investible resources. As a result, the 
government’s policy space increased, as did its power vis-à-vis other actors, including 
those which would have been in favour of orienting policy towards stability and 
restraining the role of the state. 
Business, for instance, was a limited source of pressure for orienting central bank policy 
towards stability and reducing the role of the state. Many Nigerian businessmen 
supported a policy stance oriented towards financial deepening because they had 
become reliant on state support or hoped to benefit from policies to increase access to 
finance (Okolie, 1995; Herbst and Soludo, 2001: 663, 669). For many foreign investors, 
some of which had struck profitable deals with the corrupt political elite and an affluent 
state, access to the state as a client or regulator of market entry was the primary concern 
(Turner, 1976a). Although for a few investors orienting policy towards stability and 
restraining the role of the state was an important policy concern, this group of investors 
was comparatively small and so too was the share of investible resources they 
controlled, hence their limited structural power. Into this category seem to fall, for 
instance, the foreign shareholders of Nigeria’s four largest commercial banks. These 
banks had been foreign-owned until the government, facilitated by oil revenues, 
acquired controlling equity stakes in the 1970s. The CBN’s controls on interest rates, 
rural branching requirements and credit guidelines reduced the profits of these banks 
(World Bank, 1981: 13; World Bank, 1983a; Brownbridge, 1998c: 109-110). These 
direct impacts on profits probably upset foreign shareholders. However, reductions in 
the banks’ profits did not impede credit expansion because the government as a major 
shareholder used its powers to reinforce compliance with the CBN’s regulation 
(Brownbridge, 1998c: 109) and the state’s access to oil revenues reduced the need to 
increase the profitability of banking operations. Therefore, the government could afford 
to display limited sensitivity to banks’ foreign shareholders regarding their concerns 
over profitability. 
The political influence of donors was also limited because they provided only a small 
share of investible resources in Nigeria. Specifically, Nigeria had never sought IMF 
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financing involving conditionality by the early 1980s. In addition, aid as a share of GNI 
decreased as oil revenues increased in the 1970s, as Figure 4.A4 shows. On the one 
hand, low reliance on aid reflected donors’ efforts to reduce aid in response to Nigeria’s 
rising oil revenues in the 1970s (Herbst and Soludo, 2001: 652). On the other hand, 
Nigerian leaders had been keen to reduce their reliance on aid when oil revenues 
increased. Reliance on aid and the accompanying conditionality was seen to reduce the 
policy space gained through oil revenues (Okolie, 1995: 35-36; Herbst and Soludo, 
2001; Vreeland, 2003). A commonly held perception in Nigeria has been, as a CBN 
official explained, that “as Nigeria is not an IMF debtor country, it is freer”.73 Given the 
limited reliance on donors until the mid-1980s, it is not surprising that the Nigerian 
government did not address donors’ criticisms of elements of central bank policy such 
as the interest rate scheme, which the World Bank deemed “excessive” (World Bank, 
1983a). 
The powerful incentives of oil dependence to orient central bank policy towards 
economic expansion became particularly evident when Nigeria experienced a second oil 
boom and bust. Following the Iranian revolution, oil prices almost doubled between 
1979 and 1981. Accordingly, government revenues increased by 31% in 1979 and 21% 
in 1980 (Karl, 1997: 247). Donors voiced warnings at the beginning of the boom that 
the government should exercise fiscal restraint to limit inflationary pressures and 
maintain careful debt management.74 Even the civilian government of Shehu Shagari, 
which had just come to power through elections in 1979, stressed the need to limit 
expansionary policy (Forrest, 1986: 175; Tijjani and Williams, 2006).  
Nonetheless, the oil windfall once again set in motion expansionary policies to finance 
an agenda of state-led growth. For instance, the CBN relaxed oversight over credit 
policy and credit to the private sector exceeded ceilings in 1980 and 1981 (World Bank, 
1983a: 44; Lewis, 2009: 155-156). In addition, fiscal and monetary policy became 
expansionary. The 1981 budget, for instance, allowed for a sizable increase of 
expenditure. When oil revenues declined from mid-1981 onwards, the government was 
reluctant to reduce its expenditure (World Bank, 1983b). As a result, the budget deficit 
increased significantly, from a mere 0.5% of GDP in 1980 to 9.5% in 1981. To finance 
fiscal deficits, the CBN embarked on money creation and lent funds to the government 
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 Interview Abuja, 4 February 2012. 
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 See for instance World Bank (1979: iii-iv). 
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at an hitherto unprecedented scale of 4.1 billion naira, amounting to 7% of GDP (World 
Bank, 1983b: 3; Herbst and Soludo, 2001: 657). Even when government revenues 
declined by 44% in 1981 owing to falling oil prices, the budget for 1982 remained 
expansionary. It is difficult to know precisely why the government failed to orient its 
policy towards stability. Yet it appears that pressures to stimulate the economy, 
incentives to dispense patronage and the weakness of groups in favour of stabilisation 
such as donors combined to pose barriers to changing the course of policy.  
4.2 Attempts to Adjust to Declining Oil Revenues, 1982-1985 
The expansionary policy spurred by the second oil boom had generated a full blown 
crisis by 1982 when the boom had turned to bust. In particular, there was an acute lack 
of funds to finance imports and government expenditure as foreign exchange reserves 
had fallen and government revenues declined by 19% owing to falling oil prices. To 
meet its financing needs, the government turned to the domestic banking system. 
Government borrowing from the central bank and domestic banks expanded by 57% in 
1982, increasing credit expansion to such an extent that the CBN was unable to enforce 
its ceiling on credit growth (Forrest, 1986: 12). The government also looked to 
international institutions to raise funds. Nigeria withdrew its final entitlement from the 
IMF in 1982 (Forrest, 1986: 12) and incurred international commercial debt through 
syndicated bank loans. In 1982 and 1983, the government contracted foreign debt over 
three times what the country had accumulated in the 20 years since gaining 
independence (Awoseyila, 1996: 28).  
In addition, the government announced a stabilisation package in April 1982, which was 
laid out in the Emergency and Stabilisation Act. The Act aimed at short-term 
stabilisation rather than structural reform and included measures such as a cutback of 
government expenditure, and stringent import and exchange controls. The policy 
package also incorporated an increase of interest rates and the imposition of advance 
deposit requirements for imports to contain inflation and financial deepening (World 
Bank, 1983a: 5). In addition, the CBN stopped issuing letters of credit (IMF Survey 
1982: 103). 
Yet the government was unable to regain control over the economy. Investors 
responded to the deteriorating business environment with capital flight (World Bank, 
1983b: 4; Forrest, 1986: 13). The government had difficulties to service its commercial 
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debt because of a lack of foreign exchange. Moreover, by 1983, Nigeria’s access to 
credit was severely constrained: Credit markets were tight because of the international 
debt crisis, sparked by Mexico’s default in 1982, and international banks responded to 
Nigeria’s loss of expenditure control with withholding capital.  
In 1983, the government stepped up its efforts to stabilise the economy. The 
government’s stabilisation strategy had three major elements: First, in January 1983, the 
government reinforced some of the measures of the Emergency and Stabilisation Act. 
Second, the government borrowed massively from the CBN for immediate financial 
relief (CBN, 1994b: 94). Third, the government began negotiations with the IMF. 
President Shagari had delayed this step because he did not want to be the first Nigerian 
leader in history to submit to IMF conditions (Vreeland, 2003: 36). Yet approaching the 
IMF was now necessary because international banks blocked credit to most developing 
countries unless they secured an IMF seal of approval (Okolie, 1995: 203). The strategy 
worked and the dialogue with the IMF helped Nigeria to secure refinancing agreements 
to convert some arrears on letters of credit into medium term loans (Forrest, 1986: 13).  
However, the negotiations with the IMF reached a stalemate over key elements of a 
stabilisation programme such as the devaluation of the Nigerian naira and, as a result, 
the government did not reach a programme agreement with the IMF (Lewis, 2009: 158). 
A major reason for the stalemate was that 1983 was an election year and the 
government did not want to give the impression that it was going to institute a tougher 
reform programme (Herbst and Soludo, 2001: 661). Moreover, the government was 
keen to signal to the public that it would not bow to IMF conditionality because the 
public was opposed to an IMF arrangement (Vreeland, 2003: 35-37).  
The failure to pursue a consistent reform programme had devastating effects. The 
economic situation continued to decline, with the country’s GDP contracting by 5% in 
1983 and inflation soaring from 8% in 1982 to 23% in 1983. Moreover, while Shagari 
was re-elected in 1983 due to a combination of vote-buying, fraud and intimidation, he 
was soon overthrown in a military coup by General Muhammadu Buhari. Among the 
reasons given for the coup were the enduring economic crisis and widespread corruption 
(Herbst and Soludo, 2001: 661-662). The fall of Shagari’s administration and the 
economic decay thus underscore the economic and political instability which may arise 
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when those supplying investible resources, such as commercial banks and donors, 
withhold their funds and the state has no access to replacement resources. 
When General Buhari came to power in 1983, he announced a “war against 
indiscipline”, promising to restore economic stability and reduce widespread corruption. 
Confronting a fiscal crisis and a steep economic decline, the Buhari regime sought to 
regain control over the economy and win the confidence of international creditors so 
that debts could be rescheduled and new debt accessed. Negotiations with the IMF 
resumed, but the Buhari regime was unable to reach an IMF agreement due to its lack of 
willingness to be responsive to IMF concerns in key policy areas such as devaluation, 
privatisation and financial liberalisation (Lewis, 2009: 161). Instead, Buhari embarked 
on a reform programme which combined monetary contraction,  fiscal retrenchment and 
tight import and exchange controls (Olukoshi and Abdulraheem, 1985; Okogu, 1986). 
The idea was to solve Nigeria’s liquidity problem by withstanding three years of 
austerity (Forrest, 1986: 24). Structural adjustment reforms, which the IMF and the 
World Bank advocated and which required more wide-ranging measures such as 
devaluation and financial liberalisation, could then be postponed. 
Although the regime made some progress in restoring financial discipline, the economy 
suffered from the weight of the austerity measures. In addition, efforts to reschedule  
debts were not successful because international creditors rejected Nigerian proposals to 
reschedule debt in the absence of participation in an IMF programme (Forrest, 1986: 
24). Moreover, due to the austerity measures, popular support for the government 
declined to the extent that protests ensued, which were swiftly repressed. Yet repression 
was unable to restore political stability. Divisions within the military about the use of 
repression and a lack of popular support for the government provoked a successful coup 
attempt in August 1985, led by General Ibrahim Babangida (Forrest, 1986: 23).  
4.3 Structural Adjustment in the Context of Rising Oil Revenues, 1986-1993  
The economy was in crisis when Babangida came to power. Average growth had been 
negative between 1980 and 1985. Moreover, the government was starved of revenue, 
challenging the state’s ability to distribute rents. The government understood that if it 
was to stay in power it had to undertake reforms which would help to mobilise 
investible funds. However, tinkering on the margin and intensifying the austerity 
measures and import controls, as Shagari and Buhari had attempted, was not a viable 
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option. Such measures had failed to reverse the economic decline and lacked the support 
of the IMF which was needed both to begin debt rescheduling talks with private lenders 
and to access new credit (Herbst and Soludo, 2001: 650). The government was aware 
that the only option it could realistically consider was to embark on a SAP that was 
supported by the World Bank and the IMF (Herbst and Soludo, 2001: 662). As 
Babangida’s Finance Minister Kalu Idika Kalu stressed, the question was not whether 
Nigeria should take the IMF loan and the accompanying conditionality but whether it 
could afford not to do so (Herbst and Soludo, 2001: 666). While the government also 
wooed domestic and foreign big business (Olukoshi and Abdulraheem, 1985: 100-101), 
getting the support of the IFIs was particularly urgent at that time because the balance of 
payments benefits of private investment would not be felt for some years.  
Data on Nigeria’s debt burden reveals that the government experienced immense 
structural pressures to be responsive to donors and private lenders by changing the 
orientation of policy in the mid-1980s. Non-concessional debt as a percentage of total 
exports serves as a relatively good measure of the pressure for reform because it 
indicates how much revenue government leaders had available in light of their almost 
complete dependence on oil export earnings for government revenue (Herbst and 
Soludo, 2001: 650). As Figure 4.A5 shows, the ratio of non-concessional debt to total 
exports, and thus the pressure for reform, was tremendously high in 1986. Moreover, oil 
revenues were, as Figure 4.A2 shows, at a very low level in 1986 as oil prices halved 
that year.  
Given the immense pressure for reform by this stage, the government embarked on a set 
of structural adjustment reforms in July 1986. The objectives of the policy package 
included laying the basis for sustainable non-inflationary or minimally inflationary 
growth; reducing unproductive investments in the public sector; intensifying the growth 
potential of the private sector; and financial reform, including the removal of credit 
allocation and the maintenance of positive real interest rates (FRN, 1986). These 
objectives were broadly in line with those of the SAPs supported by the World Bank 
and the IMF in other developing countries. However, in an effort to secure domestic 
support for reform official rhetoric insisted that the SAP was “produced by Nigerians 
for Nigerians” (Babangida, 1987 cited in Herbst and Soludo, 2001: 665). Moreover, 
although the IMF officially monitored Nigeria’s SAP, the government did not accept a 
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conditional IMF loan and made minimal use of technical assistance, which would have 
facilitated social learning (Herbst and Soludo, 2001). 
Though the prospect of debt rescheduling provided strong incentives for reforms, their 
implementation was very inconsistent (Moser et al., 1997: 12). The reform of Nigeria’s 
central bank policy illustrates the inconsistency of the reform process. Monetary policy, 
for example, was tightened in 1986 and 1987. Yet after protests in 1988 and 1989, the 
CBN embarked on reflationary measures to cushion the effects of structural adjustment 
by reducing the costs of borrowing for the government and private sector (Lewis and 
Stein, 1997: 11). Between 1991 and 1993, monetary policy became increasingly 
expansionary, raising the volume of financial transactions. The CBN’s advances to the 
government, for instance, increased by 359% between 1991 and 1993 (CBN, 1994a: 
17).  
The CBN’s efforts to orient financial policy towards financial stability were equally 
inconsistent. The CBN, for instance, removed interest rate controls in 1986 and 1987. 
Yet in 1989, the CBN also introduced a maximum interest rate spread between saving 
and prime lending rates and in 1991 the CBN re-imposed ceilings on maximum lending 
(Herbst and Soludo, 2001: 668). Credit allocation guidelines were simplified but 
maintained and development financing schemes, such as the agricultural credit 
guarantee scheme, remained in place. The CBN also continued to support financial 
deepening through its ownership stakes in development banks.  
In an effort to orient financial policy more towards financial stability, the CBN 
established a mechanism for dealing with distressed banks, provided limited deposit 
insurance and imposed stricter prudential standards (Brownbridge, 1998c: 120). The 
Banks and Other Financial Institutions Decree of 1991, which replaced the Banking Act 
of 1969, increased the CBN’s disciplinary powers, providing it, for instance, with the 
authority to take over the management of distressed banks.  
The degree to which the CBN was able to enhance financial stability was, however, 
limited. Although regulation had been tightened in 1991, political interference impeded 
its enforcement (Lewis and Stein, 1997: 11; Brownbridge, 1998c: 121). Another 
problem was that the state used the financial liberalisation process as a means to protect 
the patronage system and reallocate rents to political constituencies. In 1986 and 1987, 
the CBN liberalised entry into the banking sector and opened an inter-bank foreign 
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exchange market. The persistence of multiple foreign exchange rates offered 
opportunities for arbitrage, allowing banks to garner returns of 300% or more on gross 
investment (Lewis and Stein, 1997: 7).75 Given these immense profit-making 
opportunities, applications for banking licenses quadrupled within three years. The 
CBN and the government granted a large amount of licenses so that the number of 
banks operating in Nigeria tripled between 1986 and 1992 (NDIC, 1990: 44). Yet in an 
effort to distribute rents to political supporters most of these licenses were granted to 
politically connected individuals, many of whom lacked professional experience in 
banking (Lewis and Stein, 1997). Mismanagement and fraud in the new banks and 
limited capacities of the CBN to supervise the large number of banks dramatically 
increased financial fragility.  
In 1992, the programme with the IMF expired and was not renewed due to the 
deterioration of economic management. What accounts for the inconsistent 
implementation of monetary and financial reform in Nigeria? One factor appears to be 
pressure to consolidate power by placating domestic political interests and consolidating 
the support of key constituents (Lewis and Stein, 1997: 12). As Herbst and Soludo 
(2001: 663; 669) explain, the structural problems in the Nigerian economy, such as a 
limited credit system and a difficult business environment, prevented business from 
supporting the SAP and both ordinary citizens as well as the ruling elite had become 
accustomed to subsidies, patronage and rents. Therefore, the SAP was met with mass 
rioting and unrelenting criticism from most groups within Nigerian society. The 
government, however, wanted to increase its popular support, particularly because 
Babangida had, in parallel to the SAP, initiated a process of transition to civilian rule 
and announced that elections were to be held in 1993. Expansionary monetary, fiscal 
and financial policy served to increase political support (Lewis and Stein, 1997). 
Another factor may be that before 1992, donors did not sanction the inconsistent 
implementation of reforms by withholding funds, reducing the incentives to correct the 
course of policy. As Figure 4.A4 shows, from 1986 onwards donors began to reward the 
fact that Nigerians finally seemed to be taking reform seriously. Similarly, the IMF 
offered three standby arrangements between 1987 and 1991 which in turn led to three 
debt rescheduling agreements between 1986 and 1991 with the Paris Club of creditor 
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countries (Herbst and Soludo, 2001: 656). Only when the SAP lapsed in 1992 did 
donors respond to reform reversals and economic decay by reducing aid.  
A third factor accounting for the inconsistent implementation of reforms, which directly 
relates to the broader arguments of this thesis, appears to be that access to replacement 
resources in the form of oil revenues increased over the course of the SAP. As Figure 
4.A2 shows, oil revenues increased steadily from 1986 and, following the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990, Nigeria experienced an oil windfall which lasted until 1991. As 
explained above, the government was under strong pressure to buy political support 
through expansionary policy. Moreover, the access to oil revenues reduced the power 
the IMF and World Bank had gained over policymakers through their influence on debt 
rescheduling (Herbst and Soludo, 2001: 671-673). Thus, incentives to be responsive to 
the policy concerns of the IFIs declined. Given the pressure for expansionary policy and 
the reduced influence of donors, it is not surprising that, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the CBN’s emphasis on financial deepening increased. In particular, monetary 
policy became increasingly expansionary and interest rate controls were reintroduced, 
as outlined above. This suggests that the increase in oil revenues contributed to the 
return to a policy stance oriented towards financial deepening and economic expansion.  
Economic mismanagement and several deferrals of the transition to democracy reduced 
Babangida’s popular support and, in June 1993, he was defeated in the presidential 
elections. A few months later, General Sani Abacha overthrew an interim government in 
a military coup.  
4.4 Reform Reversals and Stabilisation Policies after the Boom, 1993-1998  
When Abacha seized power, oil revenues were still considerable and donors and large-
scale private investors were unable to influence policy when economic management 
further deteriorated. Large firms and multinational enterprises, which had organized 
themselves under the umbrella of the Nigerian Economic Summit Group, lobbied the 
government extensively in 1993 to promote price stability and to rely more on market 
mechanisms, including by deregulating interest rates (Kraus, 2002: 423). Yet in 1993 
monetary and fiscal policies remained expansionary and the Abacha government 
reversed core elements of the SAP, returning to a regime of administrative controls on 
finance, trade and foreign exchange (Lewis and Stein, 1997: 15). The CBN, for 
instance, introduced new interest rate ceilings in 1994 to deepen financial sectors. 
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Economic reformers, like the Finance Minister Kalu, who had been an architect of 
Nigeria’s SAP, were replaced in 1993 and 1994. Moreover, governance deteriorated 
with regulators like the CBN, for instance, inadequately funded, frequently being 
undercut by intervention from the executive and plundered by senior officials, including 
Abacha (Lewis, 2009: 178). Opposition to the regime was met with political repression. 
When oil revenues declined steadily after 1993, the regime oriented policy increasingly 
towards stability. For instance, the CBN was empowered in 1994 to pursue measures to 
address fraud in the banking sector which scholars considered to be “draconian” but 
arguably aimed at enhancing financial stability.76 In addition, the CBN reduced the 
volume of financial transactions in the economy through monetary restraint and by 
raising interest rate ceilings in 1995, displaying greater responsiveness to the policy 
concerns of the large-scale private sector and donors to rely more on market 
mechanisms and promote economic stability (IMF, 1998: 6-7; Kraus, 2002: 423; Lewis, 
2009: 176).77  
However, the orientation of policy towards stability insufficiently addressed the policy 
concerns of donors and business. In light of the reversal of key elements of economic 
liberalisation, political repression and predation, donors drastically reduced aid, as 
shown in Figure 4.A4. Investors also responded to the policy environment by 
withholding funds. Debt rescheduling, for instance, was suspended (Herbst and Soludo, 
2001: 656). Foreign firms disinvested and gross fixed capital formation dropped by 26% 
between 1994 and 1996 (Lewis, 2009: 177). In 1995, the economy contracted and 
between 1994 and 1998 GDP growth averaged a mere 2%. Greater efforts to respond to 
structural pressures only began when the retired General Olusegun Obasanjo came to 
power after elections in 1999, a year after Abacha’s death. 
Using an approach focused on structural power, we would have expected that the 
Abacha regime is more responsive to the policy concerns of business and donors given 
that oil revenues were declining and thus unable to replace investible resources provided 
by donors and private investors. The government’s failure to be fully responsive to the 
policy concerns of donors and private investors suggests that the structuralist approach 
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 See for instance Brownbridge (1998c: 120). While the banking sector was close to collapse, restoring 
financial stability was not the only objective of the measures to reduce fraud. The Abacha regime also 
prosecuted bankers because many of them were aligned with the opposition (Lewis, 2009: 178). 
77
 The regime also made an effort to attract FDI by repealing indigenisation policies for most sectors in 
1995.  
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does not provide an entirely convincing explanation for policy during Abacha’s regime. 
The reasons for the government’s failure to be more responsive are not clear. As regards 
donors’ policy concerns related to the reversal of economic and financial liberalisation 
and the weakening of regulatory institutions such as the CBN, a likely explanation for 
the government’s failure to be responsive is that responsiveness would have reduced 
possibilities for corruption and the micromanagement of opportunity, which the regime 
had used to benefit political supporters.  
4.5 In Search of a Balance between Financial Deepening and Stability, 1999-2012 
The task, if President Obasanjo was to rule with some political stability, was to enhance 
economic prosperity. Democracy, as Obasanjo relentlessly explained, would “not be 
sustained unless, in the shortest time possible, we are able to give what I call a 
democratic dividend to our people” (Reuters, 2000). The government was convinced 
that, after decades of military rule, multi-party democracy could only be cemented if 
standards of living increased. The government’s strategy to enhance economic 
prosperity was based on two cornerstones: Securing debt relief and raising levels of 
private investment. 
The government was aware that the effects of its efforts to raise private investment on 
production and economic diversification would not be felt for some years and that 
addressing the tremendous debt burden would bring quicker financial rewards. When 
the government came to power in 1999, servicing of external debt amounted to 9% of 
exports (World Bank, 2013c). Securing debt relief was imperative to free up 
government resources. Such resources would be needed to dispense patronage, 
stimulate economic activity and honour the government’s pledge to improve basic 
public services such as health and education. Yet despite rising oil prices, a sizable 
share of government revenue continued to be diverted to servicing debt (IMF, 2001).  
Raising private investment was the second cornerstone of the government’s strategy. As 
Figure 4.A6 shows, in the early 2000s, government revenue still made up a significant 
share of investible funds, owing to the government’s virtual monopoly over Nigeria’s 
export earnings. The share of investible funds supplied by private investors was sizable. 
Yet the non-oil export sectors remained weakly developed: Between 1999 and 2003 fuel 
exports accounted on average for more than 98% of merchandise exports (World Bank, 
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2013c). Moreover, capital flight was extensive.78 Macroeconomic volatility, uncertainty 
regarding the economic policy stance of the newly elected government, pervasive 
corruption and limited access to finance combined to create a poor investment climate. 
Yet the government knew that private investment in the non-oil sectors would be 
essential if there was to be a sustainable increase of economic activity and a reduction in 
Nigeria’s vulnerability to oil price volatility (Obasanjo, 2003; NNPC, 2004; Okonjo-
Iweala, 2007: 12).  
The remainder of this chapter will describe how oil dependence has shaped the CBN’s 
contribution to achieving the goals of debt relief and raising private investment. I make 
no effort to describe all of the CBN’s policies to raise private investment. Instead, I 
selected case material which explains how the CBN’s efforts to raise private investment 
appears to have contributed to a banking crisis in 2009 and shaped the crisis response. 
The focus of the analysis is on the dynamics surrounding the banking crisis because 
they are well suited to convey the orientation of financial policy in the 2000s and the 
role of oil dependence in shaping the policy stance.  
 Securing Debt Relief 
"I will not stop talking about debt remission," Obasanjo announced in 2000 (Reuters, 
2000). Given Nigeria’s experience of 20 years of arrears accumulation, debt 
restructuring and rescheduling, securing debt relief had become a priority of the 
Obasanjo regime. The government’s strategy to reduce the debt burden had two 
elements: The first entailed visits to plead for debt relief (Nwozor, 2009). During his 
first administration from 1999 to 2003, Obasanjo travelled extensively to Western 
countries, making over 180 foreign trips within four years (Sonowo, 2003: 50). The 
second element of the government’s strategy to reduce the debt burden was to intensify 
the dialogue with the IMF because creditors made debt relief conditional on the IMF’s 
stamp of approval of Nigeria’s economic policies. The Nigerian government’s first 
major step was to agree on an IMF Stand-By Arrangement beginning from July 2000. 
During his first term, Obasanjo’s success in reducing the debt burden was limited. An 
initial achievement was that the Paris Club of international creditors agreed to 
reschedule US$23.4 billion of Nigeria’s US$33.5 billion foreign debt in December 
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 According to some estimates, the figure of Nigeria’s total private wealth moved off-shore is as high as 
70% (Collier, 2003 cited in Utomi et al., 2007: 18).  
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2000. So long as Nigeria’s policies would be approved of by the IMF, Nigeria would be 
given a grace period of three to ten years, depending on the category of debt (The 
Economist, 2000). Yet Obasanjo did not secure debt relief during his first term.  
A key reason for the failure to secure debt relief was that, from 2000 onwards, the 
government and CBN pursued expansionary monetary and fiscal policies (IMF, 2003b: 
5; Callaghy, 2009). Against the backdrop of buoyant oil revenues and pressure to 
deliver a democracy dividend before the presidential elections in 2003, the government 
massively increased expenditures (IMF, 2001).79 Instead of fighting inflationary 
pressures, the CBN supported the government’s expansionary policy stance by 
extending a significant amount of credit to the government and seeking to maintain a 
low level of interest rates in the economy. 
The CBN was aware that expansionary monetary policy would impede its ability to 
reach the monetary and inflation targets agreed with the IMF. However, facilitating 
investment, particularly in the non-oil sectors, took priority (IMF, 2001: 21; IMF, 2004: 
22). During Article IV consultations, the IMF urged policymakers to orient policy 
towards stability (IMF, 2003b), but without success. Once again, high oil revenues 
provided the material basis for expansionary policies and efforts to reduce oil 
dependence generated incentives for policies oriented towards financial deepening. It 
was clear that expansionary policy would alienate the IMF. Yet the government was 
willing to pay this price to ensure re-election and high oil revenues provided the policy 
space to pursue expansionary policies (Wallis, 2002; DMO, 2004: 14; Callaghy, 2009: 
21). As the Nigerian government was not reliant on the IMF’s financial assistance, the 
IMF resorted to its only disciplinary measure: It suspended the programme with 
Nigeria, which had been the precondition for debt relief. 
When Obasanjo won another term of office in 2003, securing debt relief remained on 
the top of the government’s policy agenda. A comfortable majority in the parliament 
and high oil prices generated a benign economic environment and thus a unique window 
of opportunity for economic reform (IMF, 2004: 6; Utomi et al., 2007: 21). Obasanjo 
seized this opportunity. He appointed a new economic team of internationally respected 
technocrats, including Charles Soludo, a renowned economist who was to become 
central bank governor in 2004, and Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, a former Vice President of 
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 The fiscal deficit amounted to 3% of GDP in 2001 and 6% of GDP in 2002 (IMF, 2003b: 6). 
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the World Bank. The economic team knew that an IMF arrangement would be 
unpopular. Thus, the team designed a “home-grown” reform programme, the National 
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), which was to be 
formally monitored by the IMF but not supported by an IMF loan (Okonjo-Iweala, 
2007: 5-6). The commitments of NEEDS were to create an environment conducive to 
investment, growth of the non-oil economy and poverty reduction. This was to be 
achieved by enhancing macroeconomic stability, increasing the effectiveness of public 
spending, promoting the private sector and addressing corruption and rent-seeking 
behaviour (NNPC, 2004). The hope was that if the reform programme was “as strong or 
stronger than what the IMF would have put in place” it would be acceptable to the Paris 
Club (Okonjo-Iweala, 2007: 5). The IMF agreed to a programme of intensified 
surveillance which was replaced by a PSI in 2005.  
By 2005 the IMF was broadly satisfied with the orientation of economic policy in 
Nigeria. NEEDS responded to criticisms by the IMF that Nigeria lacked a 
comprehensive poverty reduction and reform strategy and the commitments of NEEDS 
were broadly consistent with the IMF’s reform recommendations (IMF, 2004: 14-16). 
Fiscal restraint reduced pressures on the CBN to fight inflation through monetary policy 
tightening. When inflation rose, the CBN tightened monetary policy (IMF, 2005a; IMF, 
2006a). Moreover, the CBN reviewed its policy instruments with a view to enhance 
price stability (IMF, 2005a: 6). Though financial deepening remained a primary goal of 
financial policy, the CBN implemented major reforms to enhance financial stability 
which had been recommended by a Financial Sector Assessment by IMF and World 
Bank in 2001/2002 (IMF, 2004: 15). Nigeria earned recognition from the IMF for its 
ability to maintain macro-economic prudence in an environment of high oil revenues.  
In 2005, the Paris Club agreed to grant debt relief, which was fully implemented after a 
successful programme review under the PSI in 2006 (IMF, 2006a). The government 
achieved a 60% debt write-off. Policymakers had been able to use the policy space 
provided by buoyant oil revenues to design a “home-grown”, politically acceptable 
reform programme, to buy off key political constituencies and to increase social service 
expenditure while maintaining fiscal and monetary restraint (Utomi et al., 2007: 21; 
Callaghy, 2009: 35). This episode underscores that oil dependence increases the 
propensity for expansionary policies but also shows that there is no determinism and 
that governments may use the policy space provided by oil revenues to employ those 
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policies which seem best suited to enhance their chances of staying in power. That said, 
pressures for a policy stance oriented towards financial deepening did press themselves 
on policymakers. These pressures are the subject of the remainder of this section. 
The Banking Sector Consolidation and the Banking Crisis of 2009  
A serious concern for the government in the early 2000s was that many Nigerian banks 
were fragile, preferred lending to the government rather than to the productive sectors 
and had become reliant on public sector deposits rather than making efforts to mobilise 
savings from the public (Soludo, 2004). Therefore, financial reform was a key element 
of policymakers’ efforts to raise private investment and diversify the economy (NNPC, 
2004: 24; 75). NEEDS, for instance, aimed at strengthening the financial sector and 
encouraging it to play a developmental role by financing the real economy (NNPC, 
2004: 75). When Charles Soludo, one of the key architects of NEEDS, became CBN 
governor in 2004, he seized the opportunity to develop a reform programme aimed at 
achieving exactly these goals. 
Barely two months in office, Soludo shocked the banking industry when he presented 
the 13-Point Banking Reform Agenda to bankers at a special meeting in July 2004. The 
13-Point Agenda included various measures to strengthen financial stability and 
increase banks’ incentives to reach out to new customers.80 The centrepiece of the 
agenda was the consolidation of the banking sector through an increase of the minimum 
capital requirement for banks from about US$15 million to US$190 million. Banks 
were given 18 months to comply with the requirement, which was envisaged to be 
achieved through mergers and acquisitions.  
When Soludo (2004: 3) announced the reforms he argued that mergers and acquisitions 
would be an instrument for enhancing banking sector efficiency, size and developmental 
roles. Soludo argued the consolidation would help to ensure the safety of depositors’ 
money, facilitate access to finance for entrepreneurs and create internationally 
competitive banks that would mobilise international capital, each of which supports 
financial deepening. Many banks were badly affected by the consolidation because it 
would force them to close down business or merge with other banks. Although the 
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 Other points on the agenda were for instance the adoption of a zero tolerance in the regulatory 
framework, the enforcement of dormant laws and the withdrawal of public sector funds from banks 
(Soludo, 2004).  
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affected banks voiced their complaints loudly over the next months, they were 
ultimately powerless: Many of Nigeria’s 89 banks were weak players because they were 
dependent on government deposits and had a volatile resource base given that 
government revenues depended on volatile oil markets. This weakness helped Soludo to 
gain presidential backing for his reforms. In addition, the IMF and the World Bank 
supported the consolidation arguing that it would contribute to financial stability if the 
reform was accompanied by tighter regulation and supervision.  
At first, the banking consolidation seemed to have achieved the expected positive 
outcomes: The number of banks declined, so that out of 89 banks, only 25 larger banks 
remained. The banking sector deepened and banks moved into the formerly untapped 
retail sector in response to pressure to use the funds raised from the increased 
capitalisation. As Figure 4.A7 shows, credit to the private sector roughly doubled in 
nominal terms between the end of 2005 and September 2007. High oil revenues fuelled 
the growth of deposits and thus credit. Nigeria’s consolidated banking sector attracted 
the interest of international investors owing to strong global liquidity and Nigeria’s 
high, oil-driven growth. Given the banking sector’s high share on the stock exchange, 
the stock market boomed.81 
However, the CBN failed to ensure the adequacy of the capital of merged institutions 
and the tightening of regulation and supervision in line with the expansion of finance. In 
2008, the global financial crisis magnified the risks in the Nigerian banking system: 
When oil prices experienced large swings in the wake of the crisis, some Nigerian banks 
were badly affected because they were heavily exposed to the oil sector. Moreover, 
when, as a result of falling oil prices and the global financial crisis, international 
investors pulled their funds out of Nigeria, the share prices of banks declined. Some 
banks were heavily affected because the value of their equity declined and defaults on 
loans provided for equity investments increased.82 A weak prudential framework, 
dependence on the oil sector, the downturn of the stock market and concerns about 
banks’ rising share of non-performing loans and the accuracy of their financial reporting 
combined to produce a full-blown banking crisis.83 In 2009, 10 out of the 25 remaining 
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 For an overview of the immediate effects of the banking consolidation see IMF (2008b: 23-28). 
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 Banks provided loans for borrowers to purchase equity in the banking sector, so-called margin-loans. 
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 For an overview of the causes of the banking crisis see Sanusi (2010) and World Bank (2010: xvii). 
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banks, accounting for about a third of banking system assets, were either insolvent or 
undercapitalised, underscoring the risks of major and rapid financial deepening. 
It is difficult to know precisely whether there is a link between oil dependence and the 
banking reforms which aimed at financial deepening because the impact of oil 
dependence on the banking consolidation cannot be directly observed.84 Yet such a link 
seems at least plausible: In Nigeria, the aim to reduce oil dependence was a major 
incentive for efforts to develop the private sector, including by improving its access to 
credit, while the banking consolidation was part of a larger strategy to position banks to 
finance the private sector (NNPC, 2004: 75; Soludo, 2004; Sanusi, 2012: 3). In addition, 
the banks that were most opposed to the consolidation because it forced them to close 
down or merge lacked the structural power to block the reform because the share of 
investment resources they provided was limited and their resource base depended on the 
state.  
When Soludo’s term as CBN governor ended at the onset of the banking crisis, 
President Yar Adua, Obasanjo’s successor, nominated Lamido Sanusi as CBN 
governor.85  Sanusi, a career banker, pledged to restore financial stability and enhance 
the contribution of the financial sector to the development of the real economy. Under 
Sanusi’s leadership, the CBN took quick and firm action to address the banking crisis: It 
rescued the failing banks, guaranteed inter-bank transactions and announced a 
commitment to protect depositors and creditors. The CBN’s bail-out of the failing banks 
suggests that banks had significant structural power despite the state’s control of sizable 
oil revenues, probably because they had gained systemic importance after the 
consolidation. Thus, the central bankers faced powerful structural constraints in dealing 
with distressed banks. However, the CBN took some measures that directly impinged 
on the interests of the banks. In particular, Sanusi replaced the management in eight of 
the failing banks and published the names of loan defaulters, including some politicians. 
The CBN did not care that some parts of the banking industry complained loudly that, 
in their opinion, the CBN’s measures were “draconian”. One reason for the CBN’s 
measures was frustration over the banks’ limited contribution to raising private 
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 This is not to say that the banking consolidation did not simultaneously aim at enhancing financial 
stability. Yet, as both the reasons Soludo gave for the reforms and the failure to follow up on 
recommendations of the IMF to upgrade regulation and supervision during the consolidation suggest, 
deepening financial sectors was for the CBN at least as important as enhancing financial stability.   
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 Umaru Musa Yar'Adua was President of Nigeria from 2007 to 2010. 
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investment (Sanusi, 2010). Meanwhile, to what extent oil revenues provided the 
political space to take such measures is not clear. 
The medium-term goal of Sanusi’s crisis response was to position the banking sector so 
that it could support private sector development. Accordingly, the CBN strengthened 
prudential regulation and supervision to enhance bank stability.86 Monetary policy was 
aimed both at price stability and at ensuring low interest rates to encourage bank 
lending to the private sector (IMF, 2011: 9). In addition, the CBN massively expanded 
its development financing activities. The CBN’s Development Finance Department, 
which had replaced the Agricultural Financing Department, set up various schemes to 
provide loans at below-market interest rates and to guarantee bank loans to preferred 
sectors such as agriculture. Sanusi was convinced that to diversify the economy and 
develop the private sector “a more interventionist, directional economic policy stance 
should be adopted” and championed by the CBN (Sanusi, 2010: 15; 18). Buoyant oil 
revenues, which facilitated a significant increase in the CBN’s capital in 2007 from 300 
million to 100 billion Nigerian naira, provided the material basis for the CBN’s 
development financing efforts. 
While the CBN earned much recognition for the regulatory reforms to restore financial 
stability, its longer term agenda of supporting economic diversification and private 
sector development through “directional” central bank policy has been controversial. 
Business representatives complain that the funds of development financing schemes are 
diverted to political constituencies but remain in favour of such schemes as they lack 
other sources of financing.87 The IMF criticised the CBN’s efforts to stimulate lending 
to the private sector through expansionary monetary policy and development financing 
schemes and urged the CBN to focus on ensuring price and financial stability (IMF, 
2011). Yet as the Nigerian government is not reliant on IMF financing, the IMF is not in 
a position to impose conditions which aim at orienting central bank policy towards 
stability. Moreover, other donors working on financial deepening admitted that the CBN 
was their preferred project partner because the CBN had, through its resource base, the 
political clout to implement reforms and well-skilled officials.88 Even within the 
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 Measures include the repeal of universal banking guidelines in 2010 in favour of a “back-to-basics” 
banking model, the design of a macro-prudential policy framework and the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards in 2012. 
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 Interviews with representatives from Nigeria’s Manufacturing Association in Lagos, 2 February 2012. 
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 Various interviews with senior aid officials in Abuja, in October 2010 and January 2012. 
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government, criticism emerged that the scope of the CBN’s interventions to support 
financial deepening had become too wide, that it was engaging excessively in what 
should be fiscal operations and that it was taking on responsibilities of other ministries 
such as capacity building for entrepreneurs. The CBN replied to such criticisms by 
saying that “it fills the gaps left by other ministries by adding its own resources,” as a 
CBN official put it.89  
Ultimately however, access to oil revenues and its political-economic consequences not 
only enlarged the CBN’s policy space but also posed a limit on the extent to which the 
CBN under Sanusi was able to transform Nigeria’s political economy. This became 
clear in 2014, when Sanusi charged that there was a shortfall of US$ 20 billion in oil 
revenue owed to the treasury by the state oil company. President Jonathan Goodluck 
subsequently dismissed him from office, allegedly due to financial malpractice. These 
allegations were never proven and it is widely believed that Sanusi’s dismissal was the 
consequence of his efforts to defy powerful vested interests which benefited from the 
systemic corruption encouraged by resource revenues. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The material presented in this chapter is broadly in line with the proposition that in 
developing countries which are more dependent on natural resources, the central bank 
policy stance is more likely to be oriented towards financial deepening. In Nigeria, 
changes in oil revenues have tended to induce changes in its central bank policy. When 
oil revenues increased in the 1970s, for instance, the CBN’s policy stance became 
oriented towards financial deepening. In response to declining oil revenues, efforts were 
made to orient Nigeria’s central bank policy towards stability from the 1980s onwards. 
Yet reforms ended with an oil boom in the early 1990s. In the 2000s, high oil revenues 
complicated efforts to orient policy towards stability and oil dependence appears to have 
encouraged policies to deepen financial sectors.  
The causal pathways linking resource dependence to a policy stance oriented towards 
financial deepening were broadly those outlined in Chapter 2. In particular, the evidence 
suggests that abundant resource revenues provided the material basis and increased the 
incentives for the Nigerian state to buy political support from key constituencies and to 
develop the private sector through policies to deepen financial sectors. Moreover, the 
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state’s access to resource revenues appears to have reduced the power of non-state 
actors, notably donors, to influence the stance of central bank policy. Specifically, when 
oil revenues increased, responsiveness to the interests of the IMF and the World Bank 
declined, even when both institutions sought to influence central bank policy through 
coordinated action. 
That said, the approach focused on structural power cannot always explain the central 
bank policy stance in Nigeria. In the 1990s, for instance, the Abacha regime failed to 
respond to declining oil revenues by becoming more responsive to the policy concerns 
of donors to limit central bank interventions in financial markets. Moreover, the 
evidence suggests that oil revenues do not alone account for changes of the central bank 
policy stance. For instance, the events surrounding the implementation of the SAP 
under Babangida suggest that pressure to secure political support may also encourage a 
policy stance oriented towards financial deepening.  
A final and important point that Nigeria’s case demonstrates is that while higher 
resource revenues for the state may enhance the policy space for central bank activities 
to promote financial deepening, there may not necessarily accrue large benefits for the 
broader population. In Nigeria, a policy stance oriented towards financial deepening 
was often pursued at the expense of stability and served to dispense patronage, rather 
than to increase productive investment. In fact, central bank policy in Nigeria illustrates 
the contradictory tendencies of state-led and oil-financed development which are well 
documented in the literature (Karl, 1997; Watts, 2004). On the one hand, access to and 
control over oil revenues tend to enhance the policy space and render the state more 
visible. On the other, oil revenues often result in uncontrolled, corrupt and volatile 
development that undermines the state’s ability to govern the economy. 
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4.7 Appendix 
Table 4.A1: Chronology of Major Economic and Political Events 
1959 The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is established. 
1960 Nigeria becomes independent from the United Kingdom. 
1966 The Nigerian military seizes power through a coup. 
1967-1970 Nigeria descends into civil war. 
1974 Nigeria experiences its first oil boom. 
1979 Elections bring the civilian government of Shehu Shagari to 
power. 
1979-1980 Nigeria experiences a second oil boom. 
1982 The Nigerian government enacts the Emergency and 
Stabilisation Act to cope with the decline of oil revenues. 
1983 General Muhammadu Buhari seizes power through a military 
coup and begins the “War Against Indiscipline”. 
1985 General Ibrahim Babangida seizes power through a military 
coup. 
1986 Nigeria embarks on a SAP. 
1990-1991 Nigeria experiences another oil windfall. 
1992 Nigeria’s SAP lapses and expires.  
1993 General Sani Abacha seizes power through a military coup. 
1998 General Sani Abacha dies. 
1999 Elections bring the civilian government of Olusegun Obasanjo 
to power. 
2004 The Nigerian government develops the National Economic 
Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). 
2004 CBN governor Charles Soludo presents the 13-Point Banking 
Reform Agenda. 
2005 The Nigerian government secures a debt relief. 
2008 Nigeria’s economy is badly affected by the global financial 
crisis. 
2009 Nigeria experiences a systemic banking crisis.  
2010 CBN governor Sanusi Sanusi resolves the financial crisis and 
begins to step up the CBN’s development financing operations. 
2014 President Jonathan Goodluck dismisses the CBN governor 
Sanusi from office. 
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Table 4.A2: Nigeria’s Stop-Go Economy – Developments in the 1970s 
 
                                               
90
 Figures relating to the growth of government revenues, government expenditure and net lending, and 
oil export earnings are from Karl (1997: 244-267) and are real growth rates. The real rate of growth of 
government expenditures and net lending includes government expenditures plus lending minus 
repayments (1997: 250). 
Year Developments in the economy 
1974 When oil prices surged in 1974, the revenues of the Nigerian 
government did so as well. The real rate of growth of government 
expenditure, for instance, reached 58%.90 State spending had a 
multiplier effect: Private investment rose, also because of direct 
incentives offered by the state, such as access to subsidised credit. 
The real rate of growth in the non-oil economy rose from less than 
5% in 1973-1974 to around 15% in 1974-1975 (IMF, 1977: 1).  
1975 In 1975, oil revenues fell dramatically: Demand for Nigeria’s oil 
had declined dramatically owing to the ensuing recession in 
Western countries and the oil glut in petroleum markets. Oil 
exports earnings declined by 28%. By that time, Nigeria was 
already oil dependent so that the level of economic activity and 
government spending closely tracked developments in the oil 
sector. Government expenditure and net lending fell by 86% in 
1975. Real GDP growth fell by 5% in 1975 (World Bank, 2013c).  
1976 In 1976, oil export earnings increased by 17%, and so did 
government expenditure and net lending, growing by a stunning 
1166%. GDP growth reached 9% in 1976 (World Bank, 2013c). 
However, Nigeria had a large current account deficit despite high 
external reserves because of massive imports.  
1977/1978 In 1977, oil export earnings increased be a meagre 4% and in 
1978, oil export earnings declined dramatically, by 33%, owing to 
the discovery of North Sea and Alaskan oils and the failure of the 
Obasanjo government to reduce oil prices. The government was 
forced to cut expenditure and net lending by 30% in 1977 and 42% 
in 1978. Growth, amounting to 6% in 1977, fell by 6% in 1978 
(World Bank, 2013c). 
112 
 
Figure 4.A1: Oil Revenue as a Share of Government Revenue in Nigeria, 1961-
2012 
 
Source: Data drawn from the CBN (2009; 2012). 
 
Figure 4.A2: Government Expenditure and Oil Revenue in Nigeria, 1961-2012 
 
Source: Data drawn from the CBN (2009; 2012). GDP data drawn from the World Bank (2013c). 
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Figure 4.A3: Inflation in Nigeria, 1961-2012 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c).  
 
Figure 4.A4: Net ODA to Nigeria and Oil Revenues in Nigeria, 1960-2011 
 
Source: Data on ODA drawn from the World Bank (2013c). Data on oil revenue drawn from the CBN 
(2009; 2012). Note: Data for oil revenue/GNI not available for 1999. 
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Figure 4.A5: Non-Concessional External Debt to Exports in Nigeria, 1970-2012 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c).  
 
Figure 4.A6: Major Sources of Investible Funds in Nigeria, 2003-2012 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c) except for data on domestic private investment, which 
is drawn from various IMF country reports. 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
2
T
o
ta
l e
xp
o
rt
s 
(b
ill
io
n
s 
o
f 
cu
rr
e
n
t 
U
S$
)
N
o
n
co
n
ce
ss
io
n
a
l e
xt
e
rn
a
l 
d
e
b
t 
(%
 o
f 
to
ta
l e
xp
o
rt
s)
Nonconcessional external debt (% of total exports)
Total exports (billions of current US$)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
Remittances, received
Domestic private  
investment
Foreign direct investment, 
net inflows
Revenue, excluding grants 
Net ODA received
115 
 
Figure 4.A7: Private Credit in Nigeria, 1965-2011 
 
Source: Data on private credit drawn from the World Bank (2013b) and data on GDP drawn from the 
World Bank (2013c). 
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5 The Political Economy of Central Bank Policy in Kenya 
Despite large differences between the cases of Uganda and Nigeria, they share a 
common feature, namely that both have had significant access to investible resources 
that could replace those supplied by private investors. The final case study looks at the 
trajectory of central bank policy in Kenya to examine the extent to which   forces may 
shape central bank policy in a country that is dependent on private business to finance 
investment. Kenya appears to be an appropriate example of a developing country reliant 
on private investment: For much of Kenya’s history since independence, private 
investment has been the most easily accessible type of resources to finance investment. 
Specifically, Kenya has not had significant access to resources that could have replaced 
private capital and enlarged the policy space, such as resource rents. As Figure 5.A1 
shows, the only exception is the short phase from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, when 
Kenya received a large amount of aid and reliance on donors increased.91  
As I will delineate in this chapter, the evidence that private investors had structural 
power over central bank policy in Kenya is ambiguous. The material suggests that in the 
period from independence until the late 1970s and in the period from 2003 onwards, the 
policy stance of Kenya’s central bank was responsive to the policy concerns of business 
and donors to induce them to supply financing. However, particularly in the period from 
the late 1980s to 2002, policymakers’ responsiveness was partial and varied. 
This chapter, which spans the years 1960 to 2012, has five substantive sections and a 
conclusion, which summarises the main insights of the chapter.92 My criterion for 
dividing the narrative of the Kenyan case into periods is changes in the potential 
pressure to be responsive to the interests of providers of investible funds. As investment 
rates decrease, pressure to be responsive to the concerns of providers of investible funds 
increases and, structuralist theory hypothesises, policy should become more responsive. 
Correspondingly, each substantive section delineates the government’s policy response 
to a decline of investment rates, focusing on central bank policy.93 Thus, I expand the 
number of observations, from one country’s case to a larger amount of periods. 
                                               
91
 Aid exceeded the commonly used threshold for aid dependence of 10% of GNI between1988 and 1993. 
92
 Table 5.A1 in the appendix provides a chronology of the major economic and political events. 
93
 Figure 5.A2 in the appendix illustrates the periodisation. I created a 3-year-moving-average trendline of 
investment rates which smoothes out fluctuations to identify trends. As pressure to be responsive to the 
policy concerns of the providers of investible funds is likely to be particularly high when smoothed 
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• The first section covers the period from 1960 to 1975. During this period, 
policymakers were attentive to the policy preferences of the groups controlling 
investible resources to reverse the outflow of capital that had begun before 
independence and restore investor confidence.  
• The second section spans the years 1976 to 1984. The point of this section is to 
account for central bank policy reforms that were pursued following a series of 
economic challenges and which responded to some major concerns of donors and 
business.  
• The third section, which covers the years 1985 to 1992, has two subsections. The 
first subsection explains that policymakers were keen to display responsiveness to 
the interests of major suppliers of investible funds in order to reverse a trend of 
declining investment and growth. The second subsection illustrates the efforts of the 
government to circumvent the constraints business and donors imposed on the use 
of other strategies to maintain power.  
• The fourth section is devoted to the period from 1993 to 2002. While the 
government showed significant sensitivity to the interests of donors and investors at 
the beginning of the period, the government responded only partially to these 
interests from the mid-1990s onwards. I conclude that an explanation focused on 
structural power does not provide a wholly satisfying explanation for the stance of 
central bank policy over this period.  
• The fifth section covers the period from 2003 to 2012. It focuses on government 
efforts to jumpstart investment and growth by creating a policy environment 
favourable to private investors. This section closes by highlighting the conflicts 
which emerged for Kenya’s central bank between addressing the policy concerns of 
business related to financial deepening and their policy concerns related to stability. 
                                                                                                                                         
investment rates have been declining for several years, I used years when smoothed investment rates had 
declined for two or more consecutive years as cut-off points of periods. The criterion that pressure for 
policy change is considered high after two or more years of declining investment rates is conservative but 
somewhat arbitrary. Yet, there is no entirely objective criterion for deciding on when pressure for 
responsiveness is high enough so that we can expect policy to change because, as Winters (1996: 9) 
points out, “the ability and willingness of different populations (and even of the same population at 
different times) to tolerate investment shortfalls and collapses varies widely.” As Figure 5.A3 shows, a 
similar periodisation would have been possible if I had selected the cut-off points of periods based on 
smoothed GDP growth rates. 
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5.1 Restoration of Investor Confidence and Orientation of Central Bank Policy 
towards Stability and Financial Deepening, 1960-1975 
When Kenya became independent from the British in 1963, President Kenyatta’s 
government embarked on an economic development model which was quite unusual in 
the African context and can be described as “managed capitalism” (Mwega and 
Ndung’u, 1994: 21).94 Key features of the government’s economic development 
strategy, which is best encapsulated in the Sessional Paper of 1965 on “African 
Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya”, were the following: a mixed 
economy, which supported public and private participation in the economy as well as 
partnership between public and private enterprise; an agricultural export strategy; and 
the promotion of domestic and foreign private investment. Moreover, for the 
government, raising economic growth, rather than distributing wealth, was the 
overarching policy goal. For instance, the government argued in the Sessional Paper of 
1965: “Other immediate problems such as Africanization of the economy, education, 
unemployment, welfare services, and provincial policies, must be handled in ways that 
will not jeopardize growth. The only permanent solution to all of these problems rests 
on rapid growth” (GoK, 1965: 18). Due to this attitude, Kenya was widely considered a 
vigorous follower of a pro-capitalist development path by the mid-1970s (Barkan, 1979; 
Lehman, 1990). 
Before examining what this development model implied for the country’s central bank 
policy, it is necessary to explore why the Kenyan government, in contrast to many 
others in newly independent African countries, opted for an economic development 
model which was market-based and supportive of the private sector. One major factor 
relates to the political constituency of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), 
Kenyatta’s party. In the early 1960s, KANU had its primary base of political power 
among the Kikuyu, the ethnic group to which Kenyatta belonged.95 Although among the 
Kikuyu income levels varied, they were collectively among the most prosperous ethnic 
                                               
94
 In the early years after independence, official rhetoric was, however, that Kenya embraced African 
Socialism. There are many definitions and interpretations of African Socialism, a development paradigm 
followed by many African politicians in the 1950s and 1960s, including for instance Julius Nyerere of 
Tanzania. In 1965, the Kenyan Government outlined as the key features of African socialism in Kenya 
the following elements, which indicate the divergence from the socialist model followed in many other 
African countries: political democracy, mutual social responsibility, various forms of ownership, a range 
of controls to ensure that property is used in the mutual interests of society and its members, diffusion of 
ownership to avoid concentration of economic power, and progressive taxes to ensure an equitable 
distribution of wealth and income (GoK, 1965). 
95
 In addition, KANU included and was based on the Luo, a smaller ethnic group, at that time.  
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groups in Kenya and many Kikuyu had been successful in private investment and 
capital accumulation.96 In fact, many scholars interpreted the accumulation of capital 
which took place largely, but not exclusively, among the Kikuyu as the rise of a 
bourgeoisie (Leys, 1978; Swainson, 1980) or a gentry (Bates, 1989). A predominant 
explanation in the literature for the government’s promotion of private capital 
accumulation has thus been that this policy stance was intended to benefit the 
government’s political constituency.97 From this perspective, responsiveness to the 
concerns of the private sector reflects the ‘class’ basis of electoral politics in Kenya, 
although one that had a strong ethnic dimension.  
As I intend to show in this section, responsiveness to the interests of the government’s 
political constituency is not the only plausible explanation for the government’s 
commitment to private investment under Kenyatta. It can also be attributed to the 
structural power of those who control investible funds. The evidence suggests that 
political leaders possessed, separate from the economic interests of their political 
constituencies, independent interests to maintain a continuous flow of new investment 
and were aware that continued investment required policies favourable to those who 
control investment resources.  
Structural Pressures to Encourage Investment 
In the three years preceding independence, Kenya experienced a significant decline in 
investment. When at the first Lancaster Conference in 1960 constitutional concessions 
were granted to indigenous politicians and the British revealed their intention of giving 
power to the Africans, foreign investors, most of whom were British, began to withhold 
and relocate investment (Leys, 1975: 58; Tignor, 1998: 351-385).98 Investors’ behaviour 
was driven by an uncertainty about the attitude of an incoming African government 
towards the business sector. In particular, businesses feared the expropriation of private 
property and while the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), Kenya’s second 
major African party besides KANU, had stressed its receptivity to private enterprise and 
foreign investment, KANU’s attitude towards business was ambiguous (Tignor, 1998: 
                                               
96
 The Kikuyu were among the most prosperous groups in Kenya because they had been the main 
beneficiaries of education, employment in the formal sector, and programs for the intensive development 
of smallholder agriculture during the colonial period (Bates, 1989; Barkan, 1994: 12).  
97
 See for instance Throup (1987), Bates (1989) and Holmquist et al. (1994).  
98
 Within four months after the conference, the securities on the Nairobi stock exchange declined by 12% 
and the transfer of capital out of the countries was as estimated at 4,250,000 pound sterling in 1960 
(Tignor, 1998: 357). 
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380).99 One faction of KANU had a pro-capitalist orientation, but KANU also had a 
vocal left wing with a socialist and Marxist orientation, the KANU ‘radicals’, which 
refused to guarantee property rights to foreign investors.   
The decline in foreign investment affected Kenya’s economy badly because it was 
reliant on foreign business as a source of investment financing and employment. Kenya 
had a more sophisticated economic base than other colonies in the region owing to its 
legacy as a British settler colony. Specifically, Kenya had in comparison to 
neighbouring Uganda and Tanzania a larger export-oriented agricultural sector, large-
scale agriculture was more prevalent and the economic structure was more diversified 
because there had been significant investment in the industrial sector from 1945 
onwards. However, growth and employment in these sectors depended to a significant 
extent on the continuous flow of new foreign investment because the colonial 
government had established close links between multinational firms and African cash 
crop agriculture and a large share of investment in the industrial sector came from 
multinational enterprises (Swainson, 1980).100 Moreover, in the early 1960s, European 
farmers and agricultural capital still played an important role in the Kenyan economy, as 
providers of investible funds and employers (Tignor, 1998: 365).101  
Thus, when foreign business began to withhold investible funds and lay off staff from 
1960 onwards, Kenya experienced an economic crisis from which it should not recover 
until 1964 due to the country’s reliance on foreign investment (Leys, 1975: 58). The 
economy contracted by about 8% in 1961, unemployment rose, and the number of 
bankruptcies increased (Leys, 1975: 58; Hazlewood, 1979: 13). Due to capital flight and 
loan defaults, banks, building societies and insurance companies came under severe 
financial pressure (Tignor, 1998: 357). The crisis also adversely affected the 
government’s finances to such an extent that Britain increased aid to Kenya 
(Hazlewood, 1979: 13). 
                                               
99
 KADU had a more economically marginalised constituency than KANU. That KADU was keen to 
signal its responsiveness to foreign and domestic private investment despite having a political 
constituency that was less economically dominant than KANU’s constituency is an additional indication 
that responsiveness to the economic interests of the political constituency is not the only explanation for a 
policy stance that supports private investment. 
100
 Investment in Kenya’s industrial sector before independence came from foreigners and Kenya’s Asian 
population. Indigenous investment in industry only increased after independence. 
101
 The contribution of African cash crop agriculture to the total marketed agricultural production between 
1960 and 1962 was still limited, amounting to about 20% (Tignor, 1998: 365). 
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It is in this wider context that policymakers in Kenya embarked on an investor-friendly 
development model with Kenyatta (1968: 147) announcing before independence that the 
government of an independent Kenya would not be a “gangster government”  but rather 
a government that would respect property rights and encourage foreign investment. 
When in 1963 KANU won the national elections and Kenya became independent, the 
KANU government sought to restore business confidence and a continuous flow of new 
investment (CBK, 1976: 17). Kenyatta and his economic team stressed in policy 
statements such as the Sessional Paper of 1965 that raising investment would be a 
priority.  
From the perspective of the government, much attention would have to be given to 
eliciting foreign savings, from donors and foreign private investors, in order to raise 
levels of investment and growth. Domestic investment would be impeded for some time 
due to the shortage of capital stemming from the low rate of domestic savings and taxes, 
the latter being the single most important source of government revenue. “In order to 
compensate for our shortage of domestic capital, in order to grow rapidly so that our 
aspirations can be realized,” acknowledged the government for instance in the Sessional 
Paper of 1965, “we must borrow from foreign governments and international 
institutions and stimulate the inflow of private capital from abroad”  (GoK, 1965: 19). 
In raising foreign capital, the issue was not only about attracting new investors but, 
importantly, also about inducing those foreign investors already located in Kenya to 
supply needed resources and not to exit.  
Eliciting funds from donors and foreign investors to finance investment would require 
displaying responsiveness to the policy concerns of business. In the years preceding 
independence, foreign business had used both voice and exit to indicate that foreign 
investment would only increase if the incoming African government would have a pro-
business attitude and guarantee property rights (Tignor, 1998: Chapter 11). A World 
Bank mission, which had consulted extensively with the private sector in 1962, warned 
for instance in a report published just before independence that ensuring that foreign 
and Asian capital stayed and was invested in Kenya would require the government, after 
independence, to reassure investors that government interference in business would be 
limited. Other donor missions had also emphasised that it was necessary to improve the 
business environment for foreign investors in independent Kenya and that the 
promotion of private enterprise would be a central goal of their assistance (Leys, 1975: 
122 
 
60-61). Thus, the government was aware that “the foreign ownership and management 
of productive assets could mean that economic decisions in Kenya might be dominated 
by foreign rather than domestic considerations” (GoK, 1965). 
Yet structural pressures stemming from the power of foreign investors and donors were 
not the only pressures to be considered. There were strong demands from indigenous 
business and trade unions to increase the participation of the indigenous population in 
the private sector. There was also agreement within KANU and the government that 
promoting indigenous business was important to reduce the economic dependency on 
foreign and Asian investors and acquire “economic sovereignty” in the future (Leys, 
1975; Swainson, 1980; O'Brien and Ryan, 2001: 485). While KANU’s left wing had 
lost influence as radicals had been purged from the party and KADU had dissolved to 
join KANU in 1964, Africanisation remained, as in other newly independent African 
countries, a central concern. The challenge was thus to support indigenisation without 
antagonising donors and foreign investors. A balance was struck by developing a policy 
framework which was responsive to the policy concerns of donors and foreign investors 
while promoting indigenisation. In promoting indigenisation the government followed a 
two-pronged approach. On one prong were measures to support indigenous private 
investment, while on the other was public investment in productive sectors and banking, 
sometimes in the form of joint ventures with foreign investors, to increase government 
control over investment in the economy (Leys, 1975).  
Central Bank Policy Response to Structural Pressures 
Central bank policy in the early years after independence illustrates the efforts of the 
government to be responsive to the policy concerns of donors and private investors. In 
1965, the government decided to establish a central bank for Kenya. The government 
understood that if it was to prevent capital flight, create confidence in a new Kenyan 
currency and secure investment and donor support from abroad, it was important to 
signal that maintaining monetary stability would be a key goal of the central bank 
(Hazlewood, 1979: 146; Helleiner, 2001: 14). The minister of finance was therefore 
quick to provide reassurances in 1965 that “it is the firm intention of this Government to 
maintain a sound currency which will be strong and respected and a national credit 
policy based on the maintenance of as high a level of economic activity within the 
country as is consistent with the integrity of national money” (CBK, 1967: 5).  
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Yet ensuring monetary stability was not the only objective the central bank would have 
to fulfil. In line with the government’s aspirations to raise domestic investment, the new 
central bank was also expected to support financial deepening by developing a stable 
financial sector and facilitating the expansion of credit, particularly to indigenous 
business (GoK, 1965: 32; CBK, 1976: 10). During this time, the IMF, which the 
Kenyan government had asked to provide support in the establishment of the central 
bank and expert personnel during the central bank’s first years of operation, was 
generally supportive of assigning central banks a twin mandate of promoting stability 
and financial development (Helleiner, 2001). Thus, when the Central Bank of Kenya 
(CBK) was established in 1966, there were domestic incentives and support from the 
IMF to pursue a policy stance oriented towards both stability and financial deepening.  
The main legislation signalling this stance was the Central Bank Act of 1966. It states 
the principal objectives of the CBK as: “to regulate the issue of notes and coins, to assist 
in the development and maintenance of a sound monetary, credit and banking system in 
Kenya conducive to the orderly and balanced economic development of the country and 
the external stability of the currency and to serve as banker and financial adviser to the 
Government.” 
To enhance price stability, the CBK sought to regulate the growth of the money supply 
by controlling the level of credit. In doing so, the CBK relied in particular on ceilings 
on credit expansion, minimum deposit and maximum lending rates as monetary policy 
instruments. During its first decade of operation, the CBK repeatedly demonstrated its 
willingness to use these instruments when challenges for price stability arose, for 
instance in 1971, when credit expanded rapidly, and in 1974, in the wake of the first oil 
crisis which affected Kenya badly, being an oil importer (CBK, 1976).  
To promote financial deepening, the CBK relied, like many other developing countries 
at that time, to a significant extent on controlled interest rates. From the CBK’s 
perspective, low and stable interest rates were important for encouraging investment. 
Frequent changes of interest rates in contrast would lead to uncertainty in repayments, 
which could discourage new investment (CBK, 1986: 54-55). Therefore, the CBK 
rarely changed lending rates until the 1980s and real interest rates became negative in 
the 1970s when inflation increased (O'Brien and Ryan, 2001: 497).  
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Besides controlled interest rates and aggregate ceilings on credit expansion, however, 
commercial banks were, unlike in many other African countries, not restricted in the 
allocation of credit and were able to make lending decisions based on commercial 
criteria (Brownbridge, 1998b). Rather than interfering in the allocation of credit of 
private banks, the government relied on moral suasion and on setting up government-
owned financial institutions to direct credit to sectors which were considered a priority 
for economic development, like agriculture. One exception was the stipulation that 
banks lend at least 17% of their net deposit liabilities to the agricultural sector 
(Brownbridge, 1998b: 82).  
It is difficult to know precisely why the CBK deviated in the case of agricultural lending 
from its policy of limited interference in private bank lending. One plausible 
explanation is that policymakers wanted to display responsiveness to the concern for 
affordable credit of the powerful agricultural sector, which was the major source of 
foreign exchange and had to be nurtured to achieve a high level of economic activity. 
That there were no penalties imposed on banks which failed to meet the agricultural 
lending requirement (Kariuki, 1993: 291) suggests, however, that the CBK was 
reluctant to alienate private banks and that the structural power of these banks, most of 
which were foreign-owned in the 1970s, was high.  
The CBK’s efforts to establish a policy framework to guard financial stability were 
limited. While the Banking Act of 1968 assigned the CBK the responsibility for bank 
supervision and specified some prudential requirements for banks and other financial 
institutions such as minimum capital requirements and restrictions on loan 
concentration, the CBK’s prudential framework was weak: The CBK’s supervisory 
capacity was limited, banking laws were lax and responsibility for licensing financial 
institutions remained, as in many other African countries at that time, outside the central 
bank, but rather with the Ministry of Finance (Brownbridge, 1998b: 95). A major reason 
for the limited emphasis the CBK placed on preventing financial crises was that until 
the late 1970s, the banking system mainly consisted of subsidiaries of multinational 
banks which were deemed to have qualified staff, strong internal controls and thus 
minimal need for regulation and supervision (World Bank, 1989: 14).  
That the CBK’s policies sought to create a policy environment conducive to investment 
by promoting monetary stability and financial deepening is reflected in economic 
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indicators. As Figure 5.A4 shows, inflation was moderate, except for the years 1974 and 
1975, when inflation increased in the wake of the first oil crisis. Moreover, in the late 
1960s and 1970s, the financial sector was stable and grew rapidly. As Figure 5.A5 
shows, credit to the private sector was expanding significantly. However, a large share 
of credit was extended to large-scale business, rather than to emerging Kenyan 
entrepreneurs. At times, the CBK would have liked to have been more proactive in 
encouraging lending to indigenous enterprises but the government’s responsiveness to 
foreign investors posed limits on the extent to which this was possible. The CBK tried, 
for instance, to restrict lending to foreign-controlled companies in order to release funds 
for lending to indigenous enterprises, but the government often intervened in favour of 
foreign businesses (CBK, 1976: 17; Kaplinsky, 1980).  
Rising investment rates suggest that investors considered Kenya’s policy environment 
favourable. As Figure 5.A2 shows, domestic investment grew in the first decade after 
independence, from 12% of GDP in 1964 to 19% in 1974 (World Bank, 2013c). There 
was also a positive trend of net inflows of FDI, as Figure 5.A6 shows. External capital 
inflows, including both private and public, increased from almost 17% in 1966 to 43% 
in 1979 of Kenya's gross investment (GoK, 1983 : 43).  
5.2 Economic Decline and Partial Responsiveness to Providers of Investible 
Funds, 1976-1984 
The Kenyan economy entered 1976 in a weak economic position. Between 1973 and 
1975 Kenya experienced a marked decline in investment and production, largely 
because of the first oil shock, which slowed down the world economy and affected 
Kenya’s economy badly because of its dependence on the import of petroleum. GDP 
growth, for instance, fell from 6% in 1973 to 1% in 1975, as Figure 5.A3 shows. In 
addition, by the mid-1970s, Kenyatta’s deteriorating health meant less attention was 
paid to policy, allowing for a weakening of economic management during the final 
years of his presidency (Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 20; O'Brien and Ryan, 2001: 487). 
In 1976, Kenya experienced a tea and coffee boom which eased the economic crisis of 
earlier years. The boom also helped to achieve a level of economic activity sufficient to 
raise tax revenues and maintain the government’s popular support (Throup and 
Hornsby, 1998: 22; Prichard, 2010: 206). The improvement of Kenya’s economic 
position was, however, temporary. 
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The tea and coffee boom came to an end in mid-1977 and Kenya experienced further 
challenges which threatened investment and growth. A major economic shock was the 
break-up of the East African Community in 1977, which ended the favoured access 
previously enjoyed by Kenyan exporters to the Ugandan and Tanzanian markets. 
Another economic shock was the decline of investor confidence and the capital flight 
stemming from the uncertainty surrounding Kenyatta’s political succession after his 
death in 1978. While markets calmed down when Daniel Arap Moi, who was previously 
Vice-President, assumed the presidency, his economic team confronted additional 
problems, including: the limited job creation in the formal sector, which lagged behind 
the growth in the labour force; the low productivity of the state-owned enterprises 
sector; and slowing manufacturing sector growth as the limits to import substitution in 
the local market were reached (O'Brien and Ryan, 2001: 487).  
Moreover, the public sector and public employment had expanded much faster than the 
rest of the economy and government revenues. The rise in public expenditure combined 
with the decline in government revenues after the tea and coffee boom increased the 
budget deficit from less than 5% of GDP in 1976/1977 to an estimated 9% in 1978/1979 
(World Bank, 1980: 4). The government turned to the domestic banking sector, 
particularly the CBK, to finance the budget deficit. Accommodating the government’s 
financing needs, the CBK eased its credit policy (World Bank, 1980: 4). This allowed 
government credit to expand at an annual rate of 80% in 1978 (CBK, 1986: 19). 
Expansionary fiscal and monetary policy contributed to high inflation, which in 1978 
reached 17%, the highest value since independence except for the years 1974 and 1975 
when the first oil shock raised inflation. 
Investors responded to the deterioration of the business environment since the mid-
1970s by withholding investment and relocating. Real private investment, for instance, 
fell from 14% of GDP in 1971 to 10.8% in 1978 (Matin and Wasow, 1992: 4). As 
Figure 5.A6 shows, net FDI inflows declined between 1976 and 1978. Inflows from 
public sources like foreign governments and the World Bank exceeded private capital 
inflows from 1975 onwards (CBK, 1976: 20).  
Many economic policymakers were alarmed by these developments. By the late 1970s, 
they agreed that there had to be a significant change in the orientation of economic 
policy if Kenya’s economic decline was to be arrested (O'Brien and Ryan, 2001: 487). 
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With presidential support for economic policy reform, senior economic policymakers, 
mainly from the CBK and the Ministry of Finance, began to systematically review the 
government’s economic policies from 1978 onwards. Based on these reviews, the 
government developed a reform agenda and published several policy documents 
signalling its commitment to reform such as the 1979 Development Plan. Key goals of 
the reform agenda included the shift from import substitution to a strategy emphasising 
industrial competitiveness and export diversification and raising agricultural growth and 
foreign private investment. Among the policies proposed to increase private sector 
activity were: limiting government participation in productive sectors; reducing 
inflation, notably by reducing public borrowing; moderately increasing credit to the 
private sector and reviewing interest rate policy to increase savings and ensure adequate 
returns to financial institutions (GoK, 1979; World Bank, 1980; Lehman, 1990).  
The proposed reform agenda was highly responsive to the policy concerns of the IMF 
and the World Bank (World Bank, 1980). After independence, the IFIs and other donors 
had endorsed Kenya’s economic development model based on import substitution 
industrialisation and significant government intervention in the productive sectors and 
management of the economy. Yet in the late 1970s, there was an ideological shift away 
from government intervention to market processes at the international level and Kenya’s 
reform agenda resonated well with this change and the IMF’s and the World Bank’s 
new agenda of structural adjustment, which favoured an export-oriented development 
model, a liberal policy on foreign investment and the promotion of private investment 
as the ‘engine of growth’.  
It is unclear to what extent Kenya’s policymakers developed a strategy to promote 
investment that favoured economic liberalisation in order to elicit donor support rather 
than doing so out of genuine conviction. However, there are indications that donors’ 
interests and behaviour were important considerations in developing the reform agenda. 
First, according to the government, maintaining creditworthiness vis-à-vis donors was 
an important goal of Kenya’s economic reforms (World Bank, 1980: 50-57). Second, it 
seems that donors encouraged social learning. Specifically, from 1978, the policy 
dialogue between Kenyan and IFI technocrats intensified and the exchange of ideas 
helped to develop a common understanding of Kenya’s economic problems and the 
policies needed to address the problems of its economy (World Bank, 1980; O'Brien 
and Ryan, 2001).  
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The collaboration with the IFIs allowed the Kenyan government to secure sizable 
foreign assistance. In 1978 and 1980, the government negotiated IMF programmes 
focused on fiscal and monetary management. Both programmes entailed the reduction 
of government borrowing from the CBK as part of the conditions to be met for the 
disbursement of funds. During 1979, Kenyan policymakers also worked out a reform 
programme with the World Bank, which allowed Kenya to become the first sub-Saharan 
African country to receive World Bank structural adjustment lending in 1980 (O'Brien 
and Ryan, 2001). The focus of Kenya’s first structural adjustment loan was on 
increasing the export-orientation of the manufacturing sector. As Figure 5.A1 shows, 
reliance on ODA as a source of investible funds also increased steadily from the late 
1970s onwards. 
Despite agreement among Kenyan technocrats and donors on the contours of the policy 
change needed to reverse the decline of growth and investment, the reforms were poorly 
implemented. The government failed to meet the agreed ceilings on government 
borrowing from commercial banks and the CBK, thus the IMF programmes of 1978 and 
1980 were cancelled. Progress in the implementation of the first structural adjustment 
programme of the World Bank was also slow. 
Nonetheless, the IMF and the World Bank were willing to set up new programmes, 
although with greater conditionality (van der Hoeven and Vandemoortele, 1987: 13; 
World Bank, 2000: 4). An IMF arrangement set up in 1982 included, for instance, 
stricter ceilings on government borrowing from the banking system and the CBK, and 
an exchange rate devaluation as ex ante conditionalities (van der Hoeven and 
Vandemoortele, 1987: 13). The World Bank committed a second structural adjustment 
loan in 1982, which specified a larger reform agenda than the first loan, with key goals 
being to strengthen the export-orientation of the economy and economic liberalisation, 
which included the liberalisation of interest rates (World Bank, 1980).  
Investor confidence remained low, probably because of limited progress in improving 
the business environment, which continued to suffer from factors such as private credit 
being crowded out by high levels of government borrowing. Meanwhile, domestic 
private investment stagnated between 1979 and 1981 (Matin and Wasow, 1992: 5). 
Foreign investors continued to withhold funds, with net FDI inflows declining from 
1.3% to 0.2% over the same period. Kikuyu business, bureaucrats and politicians 
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privately voiced their complaints that Moi was not managing the economy well 
(Leonard, 1991: 176). The dissatisfaction over economic management contributed to the 
pressures that led to a coup attempt by members of the Armed Forces in August 1982 
(O'Brien and Ryan, 2001: 490). 
Although the coup of 1982 failed, it put economic reforms on hold for some time as 
President Moi became preoccupied with reorganising the civil service and the military 
to consolidate his power. However, Kenya’s senior economic policymakers eventually 
persuaded Moi that economic reform, to stabilise and liberalise the economy, had to 
proceed and IMF support had to be secured if the regime was to reverse the decline in 
investment and production (Leonard, 1991: 215-216; O'Brien and Ryan, 2001). By 
1983, Kenya had entered a new agreement with the IMF focused on fiscal and monetary 
stabilisation and Moi had appointed some proponents of economic reform to leading 
posts. George Satitoti, for instance, a respected academic, became minister of finance 
and Philip Ndegwa, a senior official, became CBK governor.  
With economic reformers in key positions, the government stepped up economic 
reforms. Kenya’s policymakers were highly successful with respect to restoring 
macroeconomic stability (CBK, 1986: 12). Besides fiscal policy, which achieved a 
reduction of government debt, central bank policy played a crucial role in enhancing 
stability. The CBK increased the emphasis placed on “the pursuit of domestic price 
stability to improve the climate for investment” (CBK, 1986: 12). Specifically, the CBK 
decelerated monetary growth and adopted from 1983 onwards a more flexible interest 
rate policy to reduce inflation. Lending rates were raised significantly so that they 
became positive in real terms (CBK, 1986: 55). In addition, the CBK sought to promote 
private investment by increasing deposit rates to increase savings (CBK, 1986).  
While Kenya’s policymakers addressed the concerns of the private sector for stable 
prices and access to affordable financing and donors’ concerns for economic stability 
and financial liberalisation, they made limited progress with respect to structural reform 
in areas other than central bank policy such as agricultural liberalisation. It is not clear 
why progress was limited. It may be that powerful groups opposed reforms or that 
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Kenya’s policymakers favoured gradual reform and gave central bank policy reform 
greater priority because of its central importance for the investment climate.102 
The response of Kenya’s major providers of investible funds reflects the mixed record 
of reform. The IMF was satisfied with the efforts of the CBK and the Ministry of 
Finance to orient policy towards stability and offered a successor programme in 1985 
(van der Hoeven and Vandemoortele, 1987: 13). Several other donors voiced 
complaints about limited progress in areas other than fiscal, monetary and financial 
policy. Yet ultimately, they disbursed their funds by 1984, albeit in the case of some 
major donors, like the World Bank, there were delays (Mosley, 1986). It is possible that 
donors realised that their good relations with Kenya might be jeopardised if they pushed 
too hard for structural reform at a time when Kenya’s government was not entirely 
committed to reform. Private investors continued to withhold funds: Average levels of 
real private investment and net FDI inflows were lower in 1983 and 1984 than in 1978 
and 1979 (Matin and Wasow, 1992; World Bank, 2013c), perhaps because Kenya 
experienced a drought in 1984, or perhaps because the reforms had only addressed a 
subset of investors’ concerns.   
5.3 Tensions between Responsiveness and Other Strategies to Maintain Power, 
1985-1992 
Moi’s economic team was aware that economic reforms had to go beyond stabilisation. 
Fiscal and monetary policy tightening had restored economic stability but had failed to 
raise investment to the levels of the 1970s and increase economic growth, which fell 
from an average of 5.6% between 1979 and 1981 to 1.5% between 1982 and 1984. 
Reversing the economic decline would require further efforts to improve the business 
environment and elicit donor support. There was disagreement between Kenya’s 
policymakers and the IFIs over the timing, pace and scope of politically sensitive 
reforms which reduced the role of the state. Yet Kenya’s technocrats did not dispute the 
view of the IMF and the World Bank that structural reforms that made the private sector 
the engine of growth were necessary (Lehman, 1990; O'Brien and Ryan, 2001).  
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 Progress was particularly limited in the area of agricultural liberalisation. Kenya’s powerful 
agricultural producers had benefited from a framework of public policies and controls oriented to 
supporting agriculture and was to be hurt by some of the agricultural liberalisation policies (Bates, 1989). 
Eager to maintain a policy environment that was responsive to the interests of agriculture, the government 
delayed structural adjustment in the agricultural sector (Mosley, 1986).  
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Responsiveness to the Concerns of Providers of Investible Funds 
From 1985, the government took decisive steps to entice donors and investors. The 
main document signalling the government’s commitment to create a responsive policy 
environment was the Sessional Paper No.1 "Economic Management for Renewed 
Growth" of 1986. Among the main themes of the Paper were: the key role of private 
investment in reviving growth, which was deemed to have been necessitated by fiscal 
stringency and the declining efficiency of the government’s direct investments; the need 
to establish a market-based “incentive environment under which private participants of 
all sizes in all sectors can make profits while simultaneously contributing to widely 
shared development” (GoK, 1986: 24-25); and the importance of financial sector 
development for raising national savings, which were needed to reduce reliance on 
foreign aid and investment, and for raising the productivity of investment by 
channelling savings to its most productive uses  (GoK, 1986: 16; 37). In the Paper, the 
government also stated that monetary policy was a key element of government efforts to 
establish an investment climate hospitable to domestic and foreign investors (GoK, 
1986: 98-99).  
From the mid-1980s onwards, the policy stance of the CBK broadly followed the thrust 
of the Sessional Paper. Responding to a major concern of donors, the CBK began, for 
instance, to shift from direct instruments of  monetary control such as credit ceilings to 
more indirect instruments of monetary policy, in particular more flexible lending rates 
(Swamy, 1994: 24). The government considered financial instability an impediment for 
investment and growth because it limited confidence in the financial system and 
efficiency of financial intermediation (CBK, 1986; World Bank, 1989: 39; 41). 
Therefore, the CBK tightened regulation and supervision in the wake of Kenya’s first 
major financial crisis during the mid-1980s, when several locally owned financial 
institutions failed. The CBK strengthened the prudential framework through 
amendments to the Banking Act between 1985 and 1988, covering, for instance, an 
increase of minimum capital requirements and the establishment of a system of deposit 
insurance. In facilitating the private sector’s access to investment funds, the CBK 
focused on measures which showed sensitivity to donors’ concerns for financial 
liberalisation and market-based allocation of resources. Specifically, the CBK supported 
government efforts to develop a private capital market and adjusted deposit rates to 
reflect inflation with a view to stimulating savings (CBK, 1986).  
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Donors and investors responded favourably to the government’s efforts to create a 
favourable policy environment. Between 1985 and 1989, the IMF offered a series of 
financing arrangements for structural reforms. From 1986 onwards, the World Bank 
provided several sectoral adjustment credits, including a Financial Sector Adjustment 
Credit in 1989, which aimed at supporting the CBK’s shift from direct to indirect 
monetary policy instruments, the full liberalisation of interest rates and strengthening 
the prudential framework. ODA continued to rise, amounting to 14% of GNI at the peak 
in 1990. Private investment and net FDI inflows also increased slightly, as Figures 5.A7 
and 5.A6 show respectively.103  
Policy Drift 
The economic policy reforms yielded financial returns for the economy. Yet Moi and 
his political allies were not entirely satisfied with the narrow, technocratic pursuit of 
economic reform because it posed constraints on providing benefits to political 
supporters, which was important for staying in power (Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 47-
48). The popularity of the regime had been declining during the 1980s (Throup and 
Hornsby, 1998). The Kikuyu elite was alienated by Moi’s efforts to redistribute 
economic resources from the Kikuyu towards other, more economically disadvantaged 
groups, notably the Kalenjin, the ethnic group to which Moi belonged. Moi’s regime 
had also lost popular support due to political repression, culminating in a constitutional 
amendment in 1982 to make Kenya a de jure single-party state, and the electoral fraud 
and intimidation that had marred the elections of 1983 and 1988. At the same time, 
pressure on the government by donors and domestic groups, including some KANU 
politicians, to hold multiparty elections increased from the late 1980s onwards. Given 
Moi’s goal to redistribute resources away from the Kikuyu, the regime’s decline in 
popularity and looming multiparty elections, from the late 1980s onwards Moi and his 
political allies shifted their attention increasingly towards maintaining power through 
providing benefits to their political supporters (Throup and Hornsby, 1998). These 
benefits often took the form of public office or financial rewards. 
The CBK played a key role in the regime’s efforts to consolidate power. In 1988, Phillip 
Ndegwa, who had been a strong proponent of economic liberalisation, was replaced by 
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 There is a slump of FDI inflows in 1988, perhaps because the election of 1988 increased political 
uncertainty. 
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Eric Kotut as CBK governor. Under Kotut, the CBK followed a parallel strategy: On the 
one hand, the CBK sought to comply with some of the conditions imposed by the IMF 
and the World Bank, such as the full liberalisation of interest rates and the introduction 
of open market operations as an instrument of monetary policy, while on the other, the 
CBK’s policies became oriented towards fuelling the system of patronage and 
corruption that increasingly underpinned Moi’s rule. For instance, the CBK became 
involved in several corruption scandals. The most notorious scandal was the 
Goldenberg affair, in which the CBK assisted in the fraudulent abuse of pre-shipment 
export finance and export compensation facilities provided to commercial banks. In 
doing so, the CBK, in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance, facilitated between 
1990 and 1993 the misappropriation of US$600 million, which was equivalent to 6% of 
Kenya’s GDP (IMF, 2008a: 8).  
In addition, the CBK’s financial policy became oriented towards providing benefits to 
political allies at the expense of guarding financial stability. In particular, the CBK 
protected so-called “political banks”, which were financial institutions owned by 
politicians or individuals with high-level political connections. The CBK lent large 
sums to political banks which, in turn, lent them on to politicians for purposes such as 
election campaign financing (Brownbridge, 1998b: 95; Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 
562-563). Moreover, when in the early 1990s many of these political banks experienced 
financial distress and became insolvent due to mismanagement and fraud, the CBK 
delayed the closure and restructuring of insolvent institutions by allowing them to 
circumvent regulation and by providing them with financial assistance (Brownbridge, 
1998b; O'Brien and Ryan, 2001: 497).  
Monetary policy became from the late 1980s onwards increasingly oriented towards 
supporting the government’s efforts to consolidate power at the expense of stability. 
Rather than addressing inflationary pressures stemming from increasingly expansionary 
fiscal policy, lending to political banks and the Goldenberg payouts, the CBK allowed 
the money supply to increase beyond the ceilings agreed with the IMF (Grosh and 
Orvis, 1996: 56; O'Brien and Ryan, 2001: 497). As a result, inflation increased 
dramatically after 1989, reaching 20% in 1991. 
Kenya’s major providers of investible funds were quick to respond to the deterioration 
of the business environment through large-scale corruption, macroeconomic instability 
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and financial fragility. Most foreign investors responded by withholding investment and 
relocating to other jurisdictions, as reflected by a decline in net FDI inflows between 
1989 and 1992. A few foreign investors voiced their complaints, using for instance 
international newspapers or foreign embassies as channels through which to convey 
their criticism (Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 84). Many domestic businesses responded 
by exit rather than voice, partly because their complaints had been ignored in the past, 
and partly because they feared sanctions from the state (Holmquist, 2002: 10-11).  
Donors also responded strongly to Kenya’s deteriorating policy environment. During 
the 1980s, donors had been willing to supply funds despite the Kenyan government 
having implemented reforms selectively and slowly because Kenya had a better record 
of economic reform and performance than many other African countries and because 
Kenya had aligned itself consistently with the West throughout the Cold War years, 
both economically and politically (O'Brien and Ryan, 2001: 474). The government was 
thus shocked when donors coordinated to suspend aid in response to Kenya’s 
deteriorating policy environment in November 1991.104 While aid for ongoing and new 
development projects, technical assistance, and emergency relief continued, donors 
froze the balance of payments support, which, since the 1980s, had become an essential 
source of financing imports and Kenya’s economic recovery more generally. Donors 
announced that aid would be suspended until progress was made in areas such as 
restoring macroeconomic stability, reducing corruption and creating an environment 
that is consistently supportive of private investment. Donors also stressed their ability to 
shift operations to countries with a more responsive policy environment where they 
deemed aid to be more effective, arguing that “there is growing competition for 
increasingly scarce donor resources, and that aid programmes are being re-examined 
with a view to ensuring the most effective use of these resources” (World Bank, 1991: 
11).  
5.4 Varying Responsiveness to Providers of Investible Resources, 1993-2002     
The period from 1993 to 2002 is characterised by varying responsiveness to the 
concerns of business and donors. As I will delineate in this section, power deriving from 
the control of capital helps to account for the policy stance in 1993 but does not provide 
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 The fact that Kenya had lost some of its strategic importance with the end of the Cold War appears to 
have facilitated coordinated donor pressure for reforms (Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 54). 
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a satisfying explanation for central bank policy in the years that followed. Specifically, 
from 1994 onwards, policymakers responded to some key concerns of business and 
donors and violated others despite significant pressures to raise investment.  
Responsiveness to Prevent an Economic Breakdown  
During the aid freeze, donors employed rolling conditionality where, as Grosh and 
Orvis (1996: 57) explain, “donors would request reforms, the government would 
implement reforms, the donors would demand additional reforms, and so on”. 
Multiparty elections, for instance, had been a precondition for resuming aid, but after 
they were held in 1992 and returned Moi to power due to a combination of a divided 
opposition, vote buying and intimidation, donors imposed additional conditions on 
economic reform. The Kenyan government was frustrated that donors, in their opinion, 
kept “shifting the goalposts” (Grosh and Orvis, 1996: 57; Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 
560-561). Yet the government sensed that it had to be responsive to donors because 
Kenya had become highly dependent on aid since 1988, with ODA as a share of GNI 
exceeding 10%, and because the country was unable to service its foreign debt without 
balance of payments support. For this reason, the government responded to donor 
conditionality from 1992 onwards with gradual reform.  
In February 1993, amidst an investment and foreign exchange crisis, the government 
floated the exchange rate for the first time and relaxed price and foreign exchange 
controls to display responsiveness to the IMF. However, when an IMF mission 
concluded that reform had not yet gone far enough to justify aid, citing for instance 
Kenya’s failure to control inflation, Moi lost his patience. In March 1993 he announced 
that Kenya would abandon “economically suicidal” IMF policies (Throup and Hornsby, 
1998: 561). Moi regretted that he had implemented any reforms in pursuit of aid as he 
believed donors never intended to restore aid (Grosh and Orvis, 1996: 57). Then private 
investors threatened to exit. International airlines, for instance, announced a withdrawal 
from Kenya as they could not repatriate earnings because the CBK did not have foreign 
exchange reserves. Horticultural farmers demanded a renegotiation of the SAP, arguing 
that their sector would otherwise collapse (Himbara, 1994: 153). Thus, within a month, 
the government bowed to structural pressures, needing capital to stabilise the system.  
In April 1993, Moi reached an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank. Among the 
first steps taken by the Kenyan government were the replacement of the CBK governor 
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Kotut with Micah Cheserem, a dedicated reformer, the closure of several political banks 
and the radical tightening of monetary policy to rein in spiralling inflation which 
reached 45% in 1993. In exchange, donors began to release frozen funds from mid-
1993. The re-engagement of the IMF and the World Bank also paved the way for a 
rescheduling of non-concessional Paris Club debt in 1994.  
Partial Responsiveness 
The deterioration of the business environment and the aid freeze had left the Kenyan 
economy in a weak position. Investment had declined from 20% of GDP in 1988 to 
17% in 1993. Growth averaged only 0.3% between 1991 and 1993. To reverse the 
economic decline, the government designed various economic reform programmes, 
notably the Policy Framework Paper “Economic Reforms for 1996-1998” and the 
“Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper” in 2000. A key goal of these reform 
programmes was the creation of a policy environment responsive to private investors 
through maintaining macroeconomic stability and promoting economic liberalisation.  
While the pressure to be responsive to the concerns of donors and private investors to 
induce them to supply investible funds was high in the period between 1994 and 2002, 
Kenya’s central bank policy was only responsive in some areas. The government made 
significant progress in enhancing macroeconomic stability, which it deemed important 
for raising private investment as well as being a major concern for donors (GoK, 1996; 
GoK, 2000). The CBK’s monetary policy, for instance, was oriented towards keeping 
inflation at low levels (IMF, 2000; IMF, 2008a). The government also resisted political 
pressure to reintroduce interest rate ceilings, which would have violated IMF 
conditionality and hurt the interests of commercial banks.105  
However, in other areas of central banking, the pace of policy reform was slow (O'Brien 
and Ryan, 2001:495). The CBK’s policy in relation to financial stability is a case in 
point: The CBK gradually strengthened the prudential framework and closed down 
political banks, possibly in response to, or assisted by, pressure from the IMF. Yet 
overall progress in orienting financial policy towards financial stability was slow, owing 
mainly to the CBK’s reluctance to discipline state-owned banks, which were financially 
distressed and had a large share of non-performing loans (IMF, 2008a).  
                                               
105
 In 2000, for example, parliamentarians tried to introduce interest rate ceilings but the government put 
the so-called “Donde bill” on hold. 
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Kenya’s major suppliers of investible resources responded to Kenya’s policy 
environment by withholding investible funds. Despite gradual progress in economic 
reform, many donors, including the World Bank, reduced aid from the mid-1990s 
onwards as they felt that the Kenyan government had failed to tackle corruption 
adequately. Governance issues were also the main reasons for the IMF cancelling 
programmes agreed with Moi’s government in 1996 and 2000 despite deeming Kenya’s 
macroeconomic policies sound and acknowledging that progress in structural reforms, 
e.g. in finance, had been made (IMF, 2008a).106 Thus, the stop-go pattern of structural 
adjustment lending, which had begun in the late 1970s, continued.107 As Figure 5.A7 
shows, domestic private investment experienced a steady decline from the mid-1990s 
onwards.  
While an approach focused on structural power provides a plausible explanation for the 
government’s reforms of Kenya’s central bank policy in 1993, this approach cannot 
wholly account for the partial responsiveness to donors and business from the mid-
1990s onwards. It is not clear why the government failed to be responsive to some of 
the major policy concerns of donors and investors. Yet a key factor seems to be that full 
responsiveness would have entailed reforms to reduce the role of the state and 
corruption. Such reforms would have limited possibilities to redistribute resources away 
from the Kikuyu, benefited the Kikuyu economically and threatened the patronage 
system which underpinned Moi’s regime (Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 597).108  
5.5 Wooing Investors and Orientation of Central Bank Policy towards Stability 
and Financial Deepening, 2003-2012 
Elections in December 2002 brought President Mwai Kibaki, the leader of a unified 
national opposition, the National Rainbow Coalition, to power and put an end to 24 
years of government under Moi and almost 40 years of KANU rule. Years of economic 
and political decay had taken a heavy toll on KANU’s popular support.  
The incoming government inherited a poorly performing economy. Growth had 
declined from an annual average of 7% in the 1970s to 4% in the 1980s and 2% in the 
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 As the IMF (2008a: 34) admits “the Fund became overly reactive to events on the ground, likely 
catalysed in part by pressures and second-guessing from donors and other parties.” 
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 Tables 5.A2 and 5.A3 in the appendix provide an overview over Kenya’s SAPs with the IMF and the 
World Bank, illustrating the stop-go pattern of assistance. 
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 For instance it is widely believed that Moi won the 1997 elections due to a combination of political 
repression, divided opposition and dispensing patronage. 
138 
 
1990s. The economic decline had to be reversed, both to enhance the government’s 
popular support, which also hinged on Kibaki’s election pledge to revive growth, and to 
raise tax revenues for financing the state apparatus and the spending promises made 
during the election campaign. For this reason, reviving the economy was a priority for 
Kibaki, who announced that his government would not rest until it achieved a GDP 
growth rate of at least 6% (GoK, 2003b).  
As soon as the new government took office, Kibaki’s economic team began to prepare a 
policy agenda for economic recovery, the Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) 2003-
2007. Investment was expected to be the primary driver of the economic recovery 
(GoK, 2004: 12). But how could it be encouraged? To answer that question, the 
government organised consultations with a wide range of stakeholders. Kibaki’s 
economic team made particular efforts to exchange ideas with aid donors and the 
private sector.  
The exchange with donors was important to ascertain which policies would induce them 
to increase aid, which had declined from 8% of GNI in 1995 to 3% in 2002. 
Government revenues from taxation could only partly cover the intended increase in 
public investment. Thus, if domestic borrowing and the subsequent crowding out of the 
private sector was to be limited, budgetary support from donors was necessary. For this 
reason, the government reiterated in policy statements its determination to restore good 
relations with donors, and policymakers collaborated closely with donors in developing 
the ERS (IMF, 2003a: Statement by the Executive Director for Kenya; GoK, 2004: 3). 
The exchange with private investors was important to ascertain which policies they 
would find most favourable and convince them of the government’s commitment to 
reform. Providing a business environment conducive to private investment was 
considered important for two reasons: First, the government considered the decline of 
private investment and the inefficiency of public investment a major cause of Kenya’s 
economic decline (GoK, 2003a: v; GoK, 2004: 15). Second, donors would only support 
the ERS if it was aimed at creating a policy environment conducive to private 
investment. The IMF, for instance, made it clear early on that privatisation, including of 
public banks, should be a key element of the ERS (IMF, 2003a: 30).  
The first major occasion for the government to display its responsiveness to business 
was the National Investment Conference in November 2003, which the government had 
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jointly organised with the private sector. At the conference, the government used the 
opportunity to present an interim version of the ERS and to send a clear signal to private 
investors about the importance the government attached to raising private investment. 
President Kibaki himself, for instance, delivered the opening speech and announced that 
his government would tackle pressing concerns for investors, including corruption and 
access to credit. Specifically, he announced that access to credit would be increased by 
establishing “a vibrant financial market” and by implementing “prudent fiscal and 
monetary policies” (GoK, 2003c). For the private sector, which had organised itself 
under the umbrella organisation Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) ahead of the 
conference, the event was an important occasion to voice its policy concerns and 
provide feedback on the ERS. Other important initiatives to attract investors were the 
organisation of an International Investor Conference in 2004 and the establishment of 
the National Economic and Social Council, a body comprising policymakers and the 
private sector to oversee the economic reform process. 
When the ERS was finalised in 2004, it included many of the issues to which donors 
and the private sector had attached importance for raising investment in the 
consultations, such as private sector-led growth, a low level of interest rates to increase 
access to affordable investment funds and stable exchange rates (IMF, 2003a; KEPSA, 
2003). In particular, the ERS called for “redefining the role of the state as a facilitator 
for private sector growth and investment” through “strengthening the policy and 
regulatory functions of the state” (GoK, 2004: 12). Among the main commitments the 
government made in the ERS were a “conservative monetary policy”, which ensured a 
level of inflation sufficiently low to maintain a stable exchange rate and low interest 
rates, and reform of the financial sector, which strengthened its regulations to increase 
savings and investment (GoK, 2004: 12). 
In the following years, Kenya’s central bank policy focused on increasing access to 
affordable financing and on strengthening prudential regulation and supervision, 
broadly reflecting the priorities set out in the ERS and sensitivity to the policy 
preferences of donors and private investors.  A major piece of legislation strengthening 
the CBK’s role in enhancing prudential regulation and supervision was, for instance, the 
Banking Sector Amendment Bill of 2006, which transferred bank licensing, regulatory 
and disciplinary authority from the Ministry of Finance to the CBK. In addition, from 
the mid-2000s onwards, the CBK made decisive steps to strengthen the financial system 
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by increasing efforts to restructure publicly-owned banks and limiting advances to these 
banks (IMF, 2009). IMF assessments conclude that slow but important progress was 
made in enhancing the CBK’s authority in regulation and supervision and in tightening 
the prudential framework (IMF, 2008a; IMF, 2009). The progress in strengthening the 
CBK’s role in guarding financial stability is reflected in a steady decline in the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans, from over 60% in 2003 to 23% in 2007.  
Before 2007, the major policy initiative of the CBK to increase access to affordable 
financing was the elaboration of the Microfinance Act of 2006, which regulates deposit 
taking microfinance institutions. The Act permits licensed deposit taking microfinance 
institutions to mobilise savings from the public, which, the CBK hoped, would help the 
microfinance industry to “play a pivotal role in deepening financial markets” (CBK, 
2008). Besides the regulation of microfinance institutions, there were no major policy 
reforms to enhance access to finance. Instead, the CBK relied on strengthening the 
financial system and monetary policy to support access to finance. While monetary 
policy was broadly oriented towards keeping inflation at low levels, an additional goal 
was maintaining low and stable interest rates to contain the cost of public and private 
borrowing (IMF, 2008a: 23-24; IMF, 2009: 24). For this reason, the CBK often 
hesitated to raise interest rates to address inflationary pressures, despite complaints of 
the IMF that price stability should be the primary goal of monetary policy.  
Renewed Focus on Financial Deepening and Tensions With Other Objectives, 2007-
2012 
From 2007 onwards, the most significant reforms of Kenya’s central bank policy aimed 
at financial deepening through increasing access to finance. The CBK’s efforts to 
deepen financial sectors appear to reflect four factors.   
• First, with financial stability restored and supported by a context of macroeconomic 
stability and a vibrant private sector, the CBK was, as an IFI representative 
explained, able to look beyond ensuring stability. The representative added that 
Kenya had, “the kind of benign conditions where a focus on serving the real 
economy can be followed through.”109  
                                               
109
 Interview with an official of an IFI in Nairobi, 7 December 2012. 
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• Second, the leadership of Njuguna Ndung’u, who became CBK governor in 2007 
and was reappointed for another four-year term in 2011. Several central bankers and 
donors interviewed in Nairobi argued that Ndung’u had the authority, capacity and 
personal commitment to mobilise support within the CBK and other parts of the 
government for policies that increase financial access.  
• Third, there has been a rethinking of the role of the state in promoting financial 
deepening at the international level since the late 2000s and the idea has gained 
ground that central banks may use their regulatory powers to encourage financial 
institutions to expand access to financial services (Beck et al., 2009). In addition, the 
exchange among central bankers, IFIs and donors on how central banks could 
promote financial deepening without compromising stability has intensified. 
• Fourth, and most relevant from the perspective of the broader arguments of this 
thesis, incentives to raise private investment through facilitating financial access and 
development have increased over time due to shortfalls in aid. While the 
relationship with the IMF improved gradually as the Kenyan government made 
incremental but steady progress in economic reform and the IMF began to place 
greater emphasis on its stipulation that any conditions attached to IMF assistance 
should be critical to macroeconomic performance, other donors continued to 
withhold aid due to concerns about corruption. Between 2003 and 2007, aid as a 
share of GDP increased by only 1.4%, rising from 3.5% of GDP to 4.9%. Over the 
same time period, private investment increased by 7.7% of GDP, rising from 7.8% 
to 15.5% of GDP. Moreover, as Figure 5.A8 shows, the share of investible funds 
contributed by donors is small compared to the share provided by private sources, 
like tax-payers or private investors. Given the limited inflows of investible resources 
from external sources, both donors and foreign investors, it is not surprising that the 
government’s attention turned to the domestic financial sector as a source of 
financing public and private investment. In fact, financial deepening through 
financial development and access was a key goal of Vision 2030, Kenya’s 
development plan for the period 2008-2012, which expected the financial sector “to 
drive high levels of savings to finance the country’s investment needs”.  
The thrust of the CBK’s reforms has been to use market-based mechanisms to facilitate 
private sector access to financial services, focusing on reducing the cost of financial 
services provision and enhancing competition among financial services providers. In 
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2008, for instance, the CBK issued a regulation to permit the establishment of credit 
reference bureaus in an effort to improve the private sector’s access to credit.110 Other 
important reforms were to permit, as one of the first African regulators, mobile payment 
services in 2007 and agent banking in 2010.111  
In interviews, CBK officials explained that they relied on market-based mechanisms to 
deepen financial sectors in an understanding that banks would not increase lending if 
the CBK interfered in their business activities.112 The CBK’s responsiveness appears to 
have been fruitful. Among banks, the CBK has earned a reputation as “an empowering 
regulator which builds regulation to deepen financial sectors around private-sector 
initiatives,” as stated by one CEO of a commercial bank.113 Developments in the area of 
financial deepening reflect the responsive policy environment. As Figure 5.A5 shows, 
credit to the private sector has increased steeply since 2007. According to Kenya’s  
Financial Access Survey 2013, the percentage of Kenyans with access to financial 
services from formal, regulated financial institutions increased from 15% in 2006 to 
33% in 2013 (FinAccess, 2013).114 
In light of the pressures to create a policy environment responsive to private investors, it 
is easy to imagine that the CBK makes significant efforts to simultaneously promote 
stability and financial deepening as both are important concerns for private investors in 
Kenya. Nonetheless, it has sometimes been difficult for the CBK not to promote one 
goal at the expense of another owing to the trade-offs that may emerge between goals.  
Monetary policy decisions aptly underscore the dilemma faced by the CBK in 
addressing competing objectives.115 After reining in inflationary pressures in 2008,116 
the CBK’s monetary policy remained relatively loose in 2009 and 2010 as Kenya faced 
                                               
110
 Credit reference bureaus may facilitate access to credit by helping borrowers to create a credit history 
and reducing the cost of screening borrowers. 
111
  Agent banking involves such third parties as petrol stations and other retail outlets in the provision of 
certain banking services. 
112
 Interviews with several CBK officials in Nairobi, 9 December 2010. 
113
 Interview with the CEO of a commercial bank in Nairobi, 17 December 2010. 
114
 In the survey, the category formal, regulated financial institutions comprises banks, deposit taking 
microfinance institutions and savings and credit cooperatives, capital markets and insurance providers. 
115
 A similar dilemma exists in the area of financial policy. On the one hand, the CBK seeks to promote 
financial stability through regulatory stringency because the CBK considers a stable financial system 
important for raising investment. On the other, the CBK has sought not to stifle financial innovations that 
increase access to finance, such as mobile banking, through regulation because it considers enhanced 
access to financial services important for growth.  
116
 Major reasons for the acceleration of inflation in early 2008 were supply disruptions following the 
outbreak of violence along political and ethnical lines after the presidential elections in December 2007.  
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an economic slowdown due to a series of shocks, including a drought and repercussions 
of the global financial crisis. In light of the multiple crises Kenya had faced and the 
government’s fiscal restraint, the IFIs considered the loose monetary policy stance 
appropriate.117 However, when in mid-2011 inflation accelerated due to strong domestic 
demand, fuelled by rapidly expanding credit to the private sector, the CBK hesitated to 
tighten monetary policy despite advice from the IMF to do so (IMF, 2012b). Loose 
monetary policy facilitated a growth of private sector credit of 36% in September 2011, 
about twice the rate of the year before, and contributed to rising inflation. Only when 
inflation reached 19% in October 2011 did the CBK tighten monetary policy. Although 
the CBK argued that it had delayed the response of monetary policy because it had 
assumed that inflation had been driven by international and domestic food price 
increases which would soon be reversed, it is widely believed that the CBK was also 
hesitant to tighten monetary policy out of concerns about financial deepening (Ochami, 
2011; Rapuro, 2011). A senior official of an IFI explained: “The CBK came out of a 
benign environment with successes in financial inclusion and wanted to maintain the 
growth momentum (...). The focus on financial inclusion may have taken away the 
focus on price stability, but one depends on the other.”118  
This episode is an important example of the conflicts that emerged for the CBK 
between addressing the concerns of business related to financial deepening and 
concerns related to stability. On the face of it, the failure to rein in inflation appears to 
indicate unresponsiveness to private investors. Yet, given the pressures on the CBK to 
raise private investment, it is likely that the CBK’s intention was in fact the opposite, 
namely to create a favourable environment for business by facilitating access to credit.  
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has offered an interpretation of the trajectory of Kenya’s central bank 
policy in Kenya through the lens of the theory of the structural power of capital. The 
Kenyan story offers four main insights which are relevant to probing the theory and 
extending it to central banking in developing countries.  
First, a major challenge for establishing a causal relationship between the structural 
power of capital and policy stances lies in the difficulties to observe the processes 
                                               
117
 Interview with a senior official of an IFI in Nairobi, 7 December 2012. 
118
 Interview with a senior official of an IFI in Nairobi, 7 December 2012. 
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involved in the operation of structural power and to isolate these processes from other 
factors. For instance, it is difficult to establish whether policies that address the policy 
concerns of private investors are driven by the intention to elicit funds from private 
investors, as official rhetoric holds, or by the intention to elicit donor funds because 
donors advocate improvements of the investment climate.  
That said, the material presented in this chapter does suggest that the policy concerns of 
those who control the sources of finance on which a country relies for investment help 
to account for the orientation of central bank policy in Kenya. The first and last section 
in particular suggest that the power derived from the control over scarce investible 
resources constrained the range of policy options Kenya’s policymakers could consider 
if they wanted to ensure a continuous flow of new investment.   
Second, different suppliers of investible funds tend to influence investment through 
different channels. In Kenya, donors relied heavily on voice, openly threatening exit if 
their conditions were not fulfilled. In addition, donors responded with exit when their 
policy preferences were violated, as happened in the 1990s. Facilitating social learning 
appears to have been an important mechanism for donors to shape central bank policy 
when relationships with the Kenyan government were good, as in the late 1970s, and in 
areas where there was an alignment of interests, as was the case in the late 2000s with 
respect to the promotion of financial access. While donors often sought to influence 
central bank policy through efforts to coordinate their actions, they were at times also 
able to shape the policy stance through the mere threat of exit, as was the case in the 
early years of the Kibaki government. Investors, in contrast, have usually shaped policy 
through more silent signals of support and protest, notably exit. That business was able 
to shape the ERS through voice suggests that voice may be an effective mechanism 
when the government faces strong pressures to be responsive and business is able to 
coordinate. 
Third, the case study of Kenya reaffirms the insights of the case studies of Uganda and 
Nigeria, that for explaining the orientation of policy it is necessary to look at the policy 
concerns of those who are important sources of investible funds. That the CBK’s policy 
stance in the late 2000s, for instance, was broadly oriented towards price stability, 
financial stability and financial deepening, appears to reflect that private investors and 
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donors considered stability in prices and the financial sector and access to finance all to 
be important elements of an environment favourable for investors.   
Finally, another point already familiar from the case studies of Uganda and Nigeria is 
that structural pressures to raise investible funds are not the only pressures on 
policymakers. In Kenya, the patronage network underpinning Moi’s rule, for instance, 
appears to have exerted strong pressures to pursue a parallel strategy of employing some 
policies which were responsive to the policy concerns of major suppliers of investible 
funds and others which violated them. Thus, an approach focused on structural power 
does not fully explain the trajectory of central bank policy in Kenya, but rather 
meaningfully enhances an account of Kenya’s central bank policy trajectory.  
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5.7 Appendix 
Figure 5.A1: Net ODA to Kenya, 1963-2012 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c). 
 
Figure 5.A2: Investment in Kenya, 1964-2012 
  
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c). 
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Figure 5.A3: GDP Growth in Kenya, 1964-2012 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c). 
 
Figure 5.A4: Inflation in Kenya, 1961-2012 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c).  
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Figure 5.A5: Private Credit in Kenya, 1963-2011 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013b). 
 
Figure 5.A6: Foreign Direct Investment in Kenya, 1970-2012 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c). Note: Data on foreign direct investment only available 
from 1970. 
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Figure 5.A7: Private Investment in Kenya, 1979-2009 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c). Note: Data on gross fixed capital formation of the 
private sector only available for the period 1979-2009. 
 
Figure 5.A8: Major Sources of Investible Funds in Kenya, 2003-2009 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c). 
  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
G
D
P
 (
b
ill
io
n
s 
o
f 
cu
rr
e
n
t 
U
S$
)
G
ro
ss
 f
ix
e
d
 c
a
p
it
a
l f
o
rm
a
ti
o
n
, 
p
ri
va
te
 
se
ct
o
r 
(%
 o
f 
G
D
P
)
Gross fixed capital formation, private sector (% of GDP)
GDP (billions of current US$)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sh
a
re
 o
f 
to
ta
l (
%
)
Remittances, received
Domestic private 
investment
Foreign direct investment, 
net inflows
Exports of goods and 
services 
Revenue, excluding grants
Net ODA received
150 
 
Table 5.A1: Chronology of Major Economic and Political Events 
  
1963 Kenya becomes independent from the United Kingdom. 
1965 The Kenyan government signals its commitment to a pro-capitalist 
development path in the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 "African 
Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya." 
1966 The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) is established. 
1973 Kenya’s economy is badly affected by the first oil crisis. 
1976-77 Fiscal discipline declines in the wake of a coffee boom and the 
subsequent decline in coffee prices worsens fiscal balance and 
contributes to large-scale public borrowing from the CBK. 
1977 The East African Community breaks up. 
1978 When President Jomo Kenyatta dies, capital flight increases until he is 
succeeded by Vice President Daniel Arap Moi. 
1979 Kenya’s economy is badly affected by the second oil crisis. 
1980 Kenya launches its first SAP with support from the IMF and the World 
Bank. 
1982  
 
Kenya becomes a de jure single-party state. 
A coup attempt against President Moi by members of the Air Force 
fails. 
1986 The government signals its commitment to reform in the Sessional 
Paper No. 1 of 1986 "Economic Management for Renewed Growth." 
1990-1993 The CBK and Kenya’s Ministry of Finance facilitate large-scale fraud 
in the Goldenberg Affair.  
1991 At a Consultative Group meeting in November donors decide to 
suspend balance of payments support. 
1992 Daniel Arap Moi is returned to power in the first multiparty elections 
since independence. 
1993 Donors begin to release frozen aid. 
1997 Daniel Arap Moi is returned to power in multiparty elections. 
2002 Multiparty elections bring Mwai Kibaki to power. 
2003 The government develops the Economic Recovery Strategy 2003-
2008, signalling its commitment to reform. 
2008 Vision 2030, Kenya’s development plan for the period 2008-2012, 
underscores the government’s commitment to private investment and 
financial deepening. 
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Table 5.A2: IMF Lending for Structural Adjustment to Kenya, 1978-1996 
Loan type Year Amount (millions 
of US$) 
Comments 
 
Standby 1979 122.5 Not drawn, cancelled 14 October 1980. 
Supplemental Facility 1979 70.7 Not drawn, cancelled 14 October 1980. 
Compensatory Facility 1979 69  
Standby 1980 241.5 Only SDR 90 million drawn, cancelled 7 
January 1982 
Supplemental Facility 1980 184.8 Only SDR 50.1 million drawn,  cancelled 7 
January 1982 
Standby 1982 151.5 Only SDR 90 million drawn, cancelled 7 
January 1983 
Supplemental Facility 1982 96.8  
Compensatory Facility 1982 60.4  
Standby 1983 175.9  
Standby 1985 85.2  
Compensatory Facility 1986 37.9  
Standby 1988 85 Only SDR 62.6 million drawn, cancelled 
15 May 1989 
Structural Adjustment 
Facility 
1988 99.4 Only SDR 28.4 million drawn, replaced by 
ESAF 15 May 1989 
Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility 
1989 261.4 SDR 216.2 million drawn prior to 
November 1991, was suspended January 
1992, expired March 1993. Balance 
renegotiated December 1993, drawn by 
December 1994. 
Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility 
1996 149.6 Only SDR 25.0 million drawn, suspended 
July 1997, expired April 1999 
 
Source:  O'Brien and Ryan (2001: 476)  
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Table 5.A3: World Bank Lending for Structural Adjustment to Kenya, 1978-1996 
Loan type Year Amount 
(millions of 
US$) 
Comments 
Structural Adjustment 
Loan I 
1980 55 IDA lending terms. 
Structural Adjustment 
Loan II 
1982 130.9 $70.0 million on IDA terms, $60.9 
million on IBRD terms. 
Agricultural Sector 
Adjustment Operation I 
1986 40 IDA terms. Also IDA reflows of $20.8 
million. 
Industrial Sector 
Adjustment 
1988 102 IDA terms. Also IDA reflows of $63.1 
million. 
Financial Sector 
Adjustment 
1989 120 IDA terms. Also IDA reflows of $114.6 
million. 
Export Development 
Programme 
1990 100 IDA terms. Also IDA reflows of $53.0 
million. 
Agricultural Sector 
Adjustment Operation II 
1991 75 IDA terms. Only $30.9 million of 
balance of payments support disbursed, 
balance cancelled December 1992. 
Education Sector 
Adjustment Credit 
1991 100 IDA terms. 2nd and 3rd tranches 
affected by November 1991 aid freeze, 
credit not fully disbursed until 1995. 
Also IDA reflows of $96.2 million. 
Structural Adjustment 
Credit I 
1996 90 IDA terms. Only $44.5 million of credit 
and $35.3 million of IDA reflows 
disbursed. Balance of credit and $42.1 
million of IDA reflows cancelled June 
1998 
 
Source:  O'Brien and Ryan (2001: 477) 
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6 Control over Investible Funds and Central Bank Policy: Statistical Analysis of 
Cross-National Patterns  
The case studies presented in the previous chapters have hopefully conveyed some 
impression of how those who control the sources of finance on which a country relies to 
finance investment may shape central bank policy stances by outlining and clarifying 
causal pathways. I have not yet broached the question of the extent to which the 
findings on the link between the key sources of finance and central bank policy for 
developing countries can be generalised. After all, the evidence presented so far is based 
on three country cases and the conclusions, with respect to each structural proposition, 
are based on only one case. Moreover, all three cases are African. Therefore, there is a 
significant risk of selection bias. To address this risk, this chapter presents a cross-
national statistical analysis of the relationship between a country’s key sources of 
investible funds and central bank policy stances. Thus, I continue the exercise of theory-
building and -testing using a larger sample of developing countries. However, now the 
focus will shift from examining causal pathways to examining the generalisability of the 
structuralist propositions for developing countries.  
There are at least two other ways in which the cross-national statistical analysis 
contributes to extending and probing the structuralist propositions. First, the statistical 
analysis can include rival explanatory factors as control variables. Second, the statistical 
analysis encourages the development of quantitative measures of key theoretical 
concepts, some of which may be difficult to operationalise but are important to measure 
for cross-country comparisons. The major challenge I faced concerned the 
conceptualisation and measurement of central bank policy stances. The structuralist 
literature dealing with finance offered limited guidance in this respect because it is 
mainly qualitative.119 There is a fairly large literature rooted in economics which is 
concerned with central bank policy but this research has made little effort to find 
adequate measures of the stance of central bank policy, except for the field of monetary 
policy. Given the lack of off-the-shelf quantitative measures which are adequate for the 
                                               
119
 An exception is Sylvia Maxfield’s research on the sources of central bank independence, which 
presents both case studies and statistical analysis (Maxfield, 1997). Yet her statistical analysis tests 
structuralist propositions at best indirectly and she does not develop measures of central bank policy. In 
Governing Finance, which is based on case study evidence from Latin America, Maxfield (1990) uses the 
concepts “stability-oriented“ and “growth-oriented” central bank policy, but she does not employ 
quantitative measures of the policy stances.  
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context of developing countries, a major contribution of this thesis thus relates to the 
conceptualisation and measurement of central bank policy stances.  
In designing the statistical analysis, I systematically used insights gained from the case 
studies of Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda. In particular, the case studies suggest that the 
period before the end of the 1980s is unlikely to exhibit enough variation in policy 
stances to be analysed statistically. Until the 1980s, central bank policies oriented 
towards financial deepening were pursued and considered legitimate in much of the 
developing world. We have seen, however, a greater variation in central bank roles from 
the late 1990s onwards: The international ideological climate changed during the 1980s 
and the idea that central banks should place greater importance on promoting price and 
financial stability gathered momentum. Beginning in the 1980s and throughout the 
1990s, a major wave of monetary and financial reform as part of structural adjustment 
programmes took place in developing countries. Yet, as the cases of Kenya, Nigeria and 
Uganda illustrate, the degree to which countries embraced reform varied 
substantially.120 Correspondingly, the statistical analysis that follows relates to the 
period from the late 1990s, the time by which most developing countries had already 
undertaken drastic monetary and financial reforms, until the global financial crisis in 
2008, which required many countries to deviate from policy paths and which re-
launched the debate about the role of central banks in governing finance.  
The evidence from the case study of Kenya also reinforced my decision to focus on 
examining the propositions related to aid and resource dependence in the statistical 
analysis. The Kenyan story suggests that, to account for the direction of policy in 
countries reliant on private investors, it is important to look at their policy preferences 
which in turn are shaped by private sector characteristics. However, taking into account 
private sector characteristics in the cross-national statistical analysis would have 
expanded the scope of this research significantly. Given that a key objective of this 
thesis has been to extend the structuralist theory to contexts of aid and resource 
dependence, and that I had to keep the scope of the research manageable, the focus on 
the role of aid and resource dependence rather than on the role of reliance on private 
investment as key explanatory variables of the statistical analysis appears appropriate. 
The focus of this chapter is thus on examining the following two propositions:  
                                               
120
 For an overview over variation in the timing, pace and scope of banking reform in Africa see for 
instance Boone (2005). 
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• First, in developing countries which are more dependent on aid, the central bank 
policy stance is more likely to be stability-oriented. The key underlying contention 
is that by providing a significant share of investible resources, donors gain political 
power over economic policy vis-à-vis other actors in aid dependent countries so that 
policymakers in these countries have strong incentives to be responsive to donors’ 
concerns that price and financial stability should be primary goals of central banks.  
• Second, in developing countries which are more dependent on natural resources, the 
central bank policy stance is more likely to be oriented towards financial deepening. 
The key underlying contention here is that access to and control over resource 
revenues widens the policy space for policymakers so that central bank policy in 
these countries reflects the concerns of governments in resource dependent countries 
that financial deepening should be a primary goal of central banks.  
Note that to account for the direction of policy I refer to the preferences of donors, as 
those who control capital in aid dependent countries, and of governments, as those who 
control capital in resource dependent countries. As Winters (1996: 141) points out, 
when the structural power of business is low, as is likely in contexts of aid and resource 
dependence, one can account for the direction of policy only by looking at additional 
information, which in this thesis are findings from research on the policy preferences of 
donors and of governments of resource dependent countries. Thus, a decline in the 
structural power of the private sector does not lead to clear predictions regarding the 
stance of policy and may, as the case studies of Uganda and Nigeria and the literature 
on aid and resource dependence suggest, be associated with distinct policy stances in 
aid and resource dependent countries. Therefore, I use aid and resource dependence as 
proxies for the degree to which donor and government preferences respectively are able 
to shape policy rather than as proxies for the structural power of the private sector.  
A major challenge I faced in the statistical analysis of central bank policy stances was 
that there is no natural metric capturing simultaneously the policy stance in relation to 
price stability, financial stability and financial deepening. Following the case studies, in 
which I base assessments of each central bank’s policy stance on the weight the central 
bank attaches to the promotion of each of the three goals – price stability, financial 
stability and financial deepening – I opted for three distinct measures of policy stances: 
First, measures of the promotion of access to finance in order to capture the policy 
stance in relation to financial deepening; second, measures of the stringency of banking 
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regulation to capture the policy stance in relation to financial stability; and third, a 
measure of the degree of aversion to inflation to capture the policy stance in relation to 
price stability. The more consistent my findings are in line with the structuralist 
propositions across these three measures, the greater the support is for my propositions.  
Correspondingly, this chapter has three substantive sections. The first explores the 
relationship between dependence on aid or natural resources and the policy stance in 
relation to financial deepening using cross-country logistic regression analysis. The 
second section explores the relationship between the dependence on aid or natural 
resources and the policy stance in relation to financial stability based on cross-country 
regression analysis. The third and final substantive section presents a pooled time-series 
cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis of the relationship between dependence on aid or 
natural resources and the policy stance in relation to price stability.  
On balance, the results suggest that the pattern of cross-country data is broadly 
consistent with the structuralist propositions I developed: Developing countries which 
are more reliant on natural resources are more likely to have a policy stance oriented 
towards financial deepening and less likely to have a stability-oriented policy stance, at 
least as policies to enhance price stability and financial access are concerned. Moreover, 
developing countries which are more reliant on aid are less likely to have a policy 
stance oriented towards financial deepening and more likely to have a stability-oriented 
policy stance, at least if aid dependence is measured by participation in IMF 
programmes.  
However, the results of the analysis of the policy stance in relation to price stability 
suggest that greater reliance on foreign financial assistance, as measured by volumes of 
ODA or IMF credit received, is associated with lower aversion to inflation. This 
finding, which contradicts my proposition that aid dependence induces a stability-
oriented policy stance, suggests that my model linking aid dependence and the stance of 
policy needs to be adapted. One such adaptation might be to take into account that the 
effects of aid dependence on the policy stance may differ, depending on the channel 
through which donors exert influence and, correspondingly, on the variables that are 
used to measure donors’ influence.  
The final section summarises the insights we have gained from the statistical analysis. It 
concludes by arguing that although each of the three sets of statistical analysis has 
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methodological limitations, which may mean that one set is not entirely convincing on 
its own, the three sets of analysis when considered together provide some support for 
the propositions and thus for future work to refine the structuralist arguments.     
6.1 Analysis of the Policy Stance in Relation to Financial Deepening 
Over the past few years, reforms that promote financial access have increasingly moved 
to “the core of the international development agenda for policy makers and development 
institutions” (Ardic et al., 2011: 2). Increasing financial access, also referred to as 
“access to financial services” or “access to finance”, is a key element of financial 
deepening in developing countries because in these countries a key constraint to 
increasing the volume of financial transactions is limited access to finance. However, 
despite the growing policy literature on the role of central banks and regulators in 
promoting financial deepening121 and donor funding to encourage such engagement, 
much less attention has been paid to developing indicators which capture the weight 
central banks attach to financial deepening and gathering the respective data. This 
section proposes exactly such measures and uses them to probe the relationship between 
dependence on aid or natural resources and the policy stance in relation to financial 
deepening. 
6.1.1 Conceptualising the Policy Stance in Relation to Financial Deepening 
An ideal measure of the policy stance in relation to financial deepening should have at 
least three features. First, it should capture whether and to what extent a central bank is 
committed to financial deepening, that is to increasing the volume of financial 
transactions through, for example, financial sector development and increasing access to 
finance. Second, the measure should be available for a wide range of countries and 
years. Third, it should capture commitment to financial deepening with a measure that it 
is comparable across countries.  
Unfortunately, existing scholarship offers no template to copy for capturing 
commitment to financial deepening in such a way. Many works on this subject are 
qualitative case studies, which tend to gather information on a variety of actions to 
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 See for instance De la Torre et al. (2007), Beck et al. (2011) and AFI (2014) . 
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enhance financial access in a particular country, often over time.122 Compiling a new 
dataset based on these case studies is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis.  
There are also a small number of quantitative studies, most of which can be grouped 
into two broad categories. One group of studies explores the use of a single policy such 
as the setup of credit information bureaus or of a small set of policies to promote 
financial access at one particular point in time.123 Using data from these studies as an 
indicator of the policy stance is, however, problematic because a very limited set of 
policies is incapable of capturing the stance of policy. In principle, I could have 
compiled data from various studies into one dataset covering a greater variety of 
financial deepening policies and constructed a composite indicator.124 In practice, 
however, I would have confronted the problem that there is only a weak analytical basis 
for selecting the policy measures to be included in a composite indicator because there 
is no agreement in the policy and academic literature on what the most relevant policies 
to deepen financial sectors are.125  
The second group of studies126 provides data on cross-country variation in financial 
“repression” and liberalisation (Bandiera et al., 2000; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2008; 
Abiad et al., 2010).127 While some studies (in particular Abiad et al., 2010) have 
collected datasets with a wide coverage of countries, years and financial repression 
policies, the validity of measures of financial repression as indicators of a policy stance 
oriented towards financial deepening in the 2000s is limited: A high degree of financial 
“repression” may indicate a strong commitment to financial deepening in the 1970s or 
1980s when ideology and policy were based on the idea that governments in developing 
countries may intervene heavily in financial markets to promote financial access; yet 
this is not the case for the 2000s. Financial deepening policies have changed over time 
and become more market-based. Similarly, a high degree of financial liberalisation 
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 See for instance Maxfield (1990), Haggard et al. (1993), Brownbridge et al. (1998) and Haber (2008).  
123
 See for instance Bruhn et al. (2013). 
124
 I follow the OECD (2008) in defining a composite indicator as a single index into which individual 
indicators are compiled to capture multidimensional concepts. 
125
 The headline conclusion of much recent work on financial access policies in developing countries is 
“no size fits all” (Beck et al., 2011). In fact, views on which policies are most effective to enhance 
financial deepening have changed significantly over time and are likely to vary from country to country. 
126
 See for instance Bandiera et al. (2000), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) and Abiad et al. (2010) 
127
 The term financial repression is often used to refer to government interventions in financial markets to 
deepen financial sectors which were common in the 1950s to1980s. Such interventions typically included 
interest rate ceilings, high reserve requirements, controls on credit allocation and restrictions on capital 
transactions with the rest of world. In the late 1970s, industrialised countries then led efforts to liberalise 
financial markets and many developing countries followed in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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today does not necessarily capture a strong commitment to financial deepening because, 
over the past decade, the view that minimising government intervention in financial 
markets has not been very effective in promoting financial access and development has 
spread (De la Torre et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2011).  
In sum, disagreement concerning the most relevant policies to deepen financial sectors 
and data limitations hint at the need to construct a new measure of the policy stance in 
relation to financial deepening for this research project. This measure should be 
sufficiently broad to comprise the variety of measures central banks take in order to 
promote financial deepening.  
6.1.2 Measuring the Policy Stance in Relation to Financial Deepening 
In light of the shortcomings of existing data and measures, I constructed a measure of 
the policy stance in relation to financial deepening based on data from the Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) Financial Access Survey 2010. This survey was 
conducted in 2009 and provides data on access to financial services and the engagement 
of central banks and regulators in promoting financial access (CGAP, 2010). The 
Financial Access 2010 survey, for instance, asked the main financial regulators which 
of the following topics relevant for financial access were under the purview of their 
agency: consumer protection, financial capability, regulation of microfinance, 
promotion of savings, promotion of access to finance for small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) and promotion of rural finance. The survey also explores each of these areas, 
and precisely whether the regulator has a team or unit that works on this area. In 
addition, regulators were asked whether there were reforms in the following ten areas in 
2009: consumer protection, financial literacy, basic accounts, government-to-person 
transfers, access to finance in rural areas, microfinance, know-your-customer (KYC) 
requirements, access to finance by SMEs, branchless banking and over-indebtedness.128 
Based on the CGAP data, I developed two different measures of the central bank policy 
stance in relation to financial deepening: 
• First, Team, a binary variable indicating whether regulators have a team or unit 
working on the promotion of savings, SME finance or rural finance in order to 
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 The survey also explores whether a country has a financial inclusion strategy in place. I did not use 
this information to develop an indicator because the measures I selected capture the devotion of resources 
and actions to promote financial access more directly and financial inclusion is a narrower concept than 
access to finance. 
160 
 
capture whether the regulator has actually devoted resources to promote financial 
deepening. The variable takes a value of 1 if a team working on one or several of 
these issues exists and 0 otherwise. The variable captures only the promotion of 
savings, SME finance or rural finance because the other categories - consumer 
protection, financial capability and regulation of microfinance – are less directly 
linked to the promotion of access to finance and may as well indicate a concern for 
financial stability. I opted for a binary variable as opposed to an index to avoid 
double-counting since the overlap between policies to promote savings, SME 
finance and rural finance may be large. 
• Second, Reform, a binary variable which takes a value of 1 if reforms took place to 
promote access to finance for SMEs and/or access to finance in rural areas in the 
year 2009 and 0 otherwise. Reform captures only reforms related to SME and rural 
finance because the other reform categories on which data is available – consumer 
protection, financial literacy, basic accounts, government-to-person transfers, 
microfinance, KYC requirements, branchless banking and over-indebtedness – are 
less broad-based and to a substantial extent covered by the reform categories of 
SME and rural finance.   
Using these measures has some drawbacks. First, data is only available for one year, 
2009. The reliance on data from a single year is problematic because it limits the 
number of observations. Moreover, there is the risk of not capturing commitment to 
reform where regulators implemented reforms before or after 2009. A second issue is 
that the focus on the devotion of human resources and implementation of financial 
access reforms only gives an indication of implementation capacity, but not of the 
quality of implementation, which may be a better proxy of commitment. A third issue is 
that the three variables only allow a binary distinction on whether an institution is 
committed to financial deepening or not whereas a measure of degree would mirror 
reality more closely. Finally, using data from the survey is problematic because the 
survey does not provide information on whether it was the central bank or another 
financial regulator which filled in the questionnaire and whether data on the promotion 
of financial access refers to actions of the central bank or another regulator.129  
That being said, superior alternatives are unfortunately not available for this study: 
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 According to CGAP (2010: 45-46), the “questionnaires were sent directly to the governors’ offices of 
central banks. When appropriate, they were also sent to monetary authorities or banking supervisory 
agencies.” This leaves open which agencies filled in the questionnaire. 
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• There is a dearth of cross-country data on the promotion of financial deepening, and 
a dataset tracking such engagement over multiple years does not exist. It is 
nonetheless plausible that Reform captures commitment to reform because financial 
reform processes usually take place over multiple years and reform needs in 
developing countries are large so that it seems reasonable to expect a central bank 
committed to financial deepening to have at least one reform to facilitate access to 
finance for SMEs or in rural areas ongoing in 2009.  
• By using relatively broad measures of commitment to financial deepening which are 
not based on particular policies, I can capture the diversity of policies pursued by 
governments to promote financial deepening, thereby ensuring the cross-country 
comparability of measures. Unfortunately, using these broad-based measures comes 
at the price of not being able to capture the degree of engagement. Still, both Team 
and Reform are conceptually meaningful indicators of the policy stance since they 
capture the devotion of resources and actions to enhance financial access. Moreover, 
among datasets with broad-based measures of engagement in financial deepening, 
the CGAP data covers the largest number of countries.  
• Cross-country data on the quality of implementation of financial deepening policies 
does not exist.  
• There is no easy solution for the problem that the CGAP database does not provide 
information on whether the financial deepening policies of interest have been 
pursued by the central bank or another financial regulator. Other datasets with 
similar data on engagement in financial deepening face this problem as well.130 
Using only those observations where the central bank is the main regulator is also 
problematic. First, because it implies losing the observations of those countries 
which have separate financial regulators outside the central bank but whose central 
banks promote financial deepening and filled in the questionnaire of the CGAP 
survey; second, because identifying those countries which have a separate, 
independent financial regulator is not straightforward. In the context of developing 
countries, such an identification often involves subjective judgement because there 
tend to be organisational and personnel overlaps between central banks and other 
regulatory agencies, and the hierarchy between central banks and other regulators is 
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 See for instance the World Bank survey on banking regulation and supervision (Čihák et al., 2012), 
which provides information on whether banking regulators have responsibility for financial market 
development and access, but leaves open whether the answers provided refer to central banks or separate 
regulatory agencies. 
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often not evident from formal statutes. With these challenges in mind, I made a 
decision to include all available observations and accept the limitation that the 
results of the statistical analysis would refer to the stance of financial policy or of 
financial regulators, which in the majority of countries are central banks but not in 
all of them. For the purposes of extending and probing the structuralist theory, this 
is not a major concern because employing the selected measures can shed light on 
the relationship between the key sources of finance and financial deepening policy, 
and the theory of the structural power of capital seeks to explain not only 
institutional behaviour but also the orientation of policy. 
6.1.3 Explanatory Variables 
At a general level, an important question related to the explanatory variables is whether 
an observation shall represent one year or an average of several years. In the analyses 
that follow, I use, unless otherwise stated, five-year averages of explanatory variables to 
reduce the effects of cyclical fluctuations. Specifically, values for explanatory variables 
are, unless otherwise stated, the average of the annual observations over the years 2005 
to 2009, which is the five-year period preceding the CGAP survey and including the 
survey year.131  
The key explanatory variables are a country’s dependence on aid and natural resources, 
which I defined in Chapter 2 as the degree to which aid and the sale of natural resources 
respectively are an important source of the funds needed to maintain a level of 
economic activity that permits financing of the state apparatus and maintaining the 
government’s popular support. The rationale behind using dependence for investible 
resources on aid and on natural resources as key explanatory variables is the argument 
that policy reflects the preferences of those who control a significant share of the 
resources on which a country relies to finance investment. This argument has its roots in 
the structural theory of the power of capital as outlined in Chapter 2. Thus, I use aid 
dependence as a proxy for the power of donors and resource dependence as a proxy for 
the power of governments to shape policy stances.  
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 Where data in the five-year period is missing, I calculated averages using available data if at least half 
of the observations of the five-year period (i.e. three or more observations) are available and one of these 
is from the year preceding the survey or the year in which the survey took place. Otherwise, I coded data 
as not available.  
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Aid dependence is a broad concept, of which different measures capture its different 
aspects. My first measure, ODA, follows most existing quantitative research in using net 
ODA as a percentage of GNI as an indicator of aid dependence (Knack, 2001; 
O'Connell and Soludo, 2001; Hayman, 2009).132 I decided to use a measure which 
captures the degree of dependence by scaling the value of ODA a country receives to its 
income rather than to government revenue because data for ODA as a share of GNI is 
available for a larger number of countries.133 Moreover, my primary interest is to 
capture the share of a country’s investible funds provided by donors rather than the 
share of a government’s investible funds provided by donors. Scaling aid to GNI comes 
closer to capturing the former concept than scaling aid to government revenue.  
As additional measures of aid dependence, I use two variables capturing reliance on the 
IMF. My focus is on the IMF because, among development institutions, the IMF is, as 
the case studies confirm, the institution whose assessments of monetary and financial 
policy are regarded as most authoritative and which has most leverage in the areas of 
monetary and financial policy because these areas are within the primary responsibility 
of the IMF.134 One indicator for reliance on the IMF is IMFcredit, a continuous variable 
capturing the use of IMF credit as a share of GDP.135 This measure also scales aid flows 
to the size of the economy. The other indicator is IMFprogr, which seeks to capture the 
influence the IMF may gain through conditionality, promoting new ideas and the signal 
which having an IMF programme in place sends to other donors and markets. The 
choice of this variable thus reflects the insight from the case studies presented in this 
thesis that often the IMF’s influence over policy rests particularly on its ability to 
encourage social learning and its signalling function rather than on the provision of 
funds. I constructed the variable IMFprogr as the sum of the annual number of IMF 
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 Net ODA is disbursement flows (net of repayment of principal) that meet the DAC definition of ODA 
and are made to countries and territories on the DAC list of aid recipients. 
133
 I replicated the analyses with aid as a share of government revenues. The results are qualitatively 
similar to those of the main specifications presented here but provide more consistent support for the 
proposition linking aid dependence and the policy stance in relation to financial deepening. The results 
are available upon request.  
134
 In fact, donors often provide ODA only under the condition that countries are under an IMF 
arrangement.  
135
 “Use of IMF credit” denotes members' drawings on the IMF other than amounts drawn against the 
country's reserve tranche position (World Bank, 2013c). The variable refers to purchases and drawings 
under Stand-By, Extended, Structural Adjustment, Enhanced Structural Adjustment, and Systemic 
Transformation Facility Arrangements as well as Trust Fund loans. I scaled IMF credit to GDP to provide 
an indication of the importance of IMF finance in relation to investible funds in the economy. 
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arrangements in effect over the five-year period from 2005 to 2009.136 While IMFcredit 
may also capture the intensity of IMF conditionality, conditionality and credit volumes 
need not be proportional (Boockmann and Dreher, 2003: 637). In fact, as Boockmann 
and Dreher (2003) point out, the number of arrangements as captured by IMFprogr may 
be a better measure for IMF conditionality than the flows of finances because each 
programme tends to include a set of standard conditions independent of the amount of 
credit. The number of IMF arrangements may also be a better measure for the intensity 
of knowledge exchange with the IMF and thus its contribution to social learning than 
the flows of finance because each programme negotiation, implementation and review 
intensifies the contact between recipient country and IMF and hence implies a learning 
process (Boockmann and Dreher, 2003; Gómez-Mera, 2011). Data for ODA and 
IMFcredit are from the World Bank (2013c) while Dreher (2006) provides data on IMF 
arrangements. 
The measurement of natural resource dependence also requires some clarification. On a 
conceptual level, researchers need to define what they subsume under the heading 
“natural resources”. As outlined in Chapter 2, I follow most existing literature to 
subsume under this heading the point-source non-renewable resources of oil, minerals 
and, where data is available, natural gas. Much of the resource curse literature posits 
that the significant amount of rents that can be generated from natural resource 
exploitation accounts for negative development outcomes and expansionary policies in 
resource dependent countries. Therefore I use ResRents, a variable constructed based on 
data from the World Bank (2013c), as the main resource dependence variable of 
interest. ResRents is the sum of rents from oil, minerals and gas as a percentage of GDP, 
whereby rents are the difference between the price of a commodity and the average cost 
of producing it.137 As an additional measure, the analyses that follow employ ResExp, 
which is the sum of the value of fuels, ores and metals exports as a share of GDP. This 
measure focuses more broadly on the revenues generated from natural resource exports. 
Data for ResExp is taken from the World Bank (2013c).  
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 To construct the variable I calculated the sum of the annual number of IMF Standby Arrangements, 
IMF Extended Fund Facility Arrangements, IMF Structural Adjustment Facility Arrangements and IMF 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Arrangements which have been in effect for at least five months 
in a particular year between 2005 and 2009.  
137
 The World Bank (2013c) calculates the estimates of natural resources rents by estimating the world 
price of units of specific commodities and subtracting estimates of average unit costs of extraction or 
harvesting costs (including a normal return on capital). These unit rents are then multiplied by the 
physical quantities countries extract or harvest to determine the rents for each commodity as a share of 
GDP.  
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I did not scale the resource rents and revenues to government revenue because available 
data on government revenues from the extractive sector is limited and for many 
countries unreliable. Instead, I capture the degree of resource dependence by scaling 
resource rents and revenues to a country’s economic output, the GDP, which allows 
capturing the share of a country’s investible funds deriving from the sale of natural 
resources. By scaling resource revenues to the size of all funds generated through 
economic activity in the economy ResExp also captures the lack of economic 
diversification in resource dependent countries which itself might increase the 
government’s incentives to promote access to finance as a means to develop the private 
sector, as explained in Chapter 2.  
Control Variables 
It may be that the aid and resource dependence variables pick up the effects of other 
variables. There are very few studies of the determinants of government commitment to 
financial deepening.138 The most robust findings from these studies are that levels of 
GDP per capita (Ardic et al., 2011), the quality of political institutions (Haber, 2008; 
Huang, 2010)139 and access to finance (Maxfield, 1994; Ardic et al., 2011) shape the 
policy stance in relation to financial deepening. Accordingly, I include the following 
political and economic control variables: The first control variable is lnGDPPC, the 
natural log of GDP per capita in constant 2005 US$ (World Bank, 2013c). The second 
control variable is Polity2, which measures regime types on a scale ranging from –10 
(strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic) and is taken from the Polity IV 
dataset (Marshall et al., 2011). The third control variable is PrCredit, which measures 
credit provided to the private sector by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions as a share of GDP. This variable is drawn from the World Bank (2013b).  
Like the aid and resource dependence variables, the control variables are averaged over 
the years 2005 to 2009. Section 6.5.1 of the appendix shows the summary statistics for 
the main variables in our sample. The sample includes only developing countries, which 
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 There are several of econometric studies which examine the drivers of government commitment to 
financial development using some measure of financial development as the dependent variable. These 
studies include for instance research which uses the openness of political institutions as explanatory 
variable such as Keefer (2007) and research which uses legal origin as explanatory variable such as Beck 
et al. (2003). These studies, however, capture commitment to financial deepening at best indirectly: 
Financial development is affected by a myriad of factors outside the control of governments, raising 
doubts about the validity of financial development as a proxy for commitment to financial development. 
139
 The case studies of Uganda, Nigeria and Kenya also suggest that greater political competition is 
associated with a policy stance oriented to financial deepening. 
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I define as the group of countries classified by the World Bank as low- and middle-
income economies in the time period 2005 to 2009. 
6.1.4 Model Specification and Caveats 
I use cross-country logistic regressions to examine the relationship between dependence 
on aid or natural resources and the policy stance in relation to financial deepening. This 
technique is widely applied to analyse cross-sectional data with binary dependent 
variables. For the analysis, I specify a model in which the log odds140 of my variable 
capturing the policy stance in relation to financial deepening, that is Team or Reform, 
are a function of an aid or resource dependence variable (Dependence), the log per 
capita GDP, the quality of political institutions and private credit: 
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ln = a+ b1 Dependencei + b2 lnGDPPCi+ b3 Polity2i + b4 PrCrediti  
whereby pi is the probability that yi , my variable capturing the policy stance in relation 
to financial deepening, = 1. 
The specification of the model follows directly from the conceptual framework and the 
data available for the analysis. Yet using the model implies limitations in establishing 
causation and even correlation. These limitations arise in particular from the small 
number of observations, which mainly results from data limitations.141 The analysis 
extends to a maximum of 75 developing countries, observed at one point or period in 
time.142 The small number of observations is problematic because it limits the degrees 
of freedom. Limited degrees of freedom generate large standard errors in the regression 
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 The odds are defined as the ratio of the probability of y, which here refers to Team or Reform, being 1, 
over the probability of y being 0. 
141
 Some observations were lost due to missing data. I did not include some countries in the sample from 
the outset because they have uniform financial policies due to regional regulatory and monetary 
authorities. Among developing countries the first group of excluded countries consists of Anguilla, 
Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, which form part of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). 
The second group consists of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal 
and Togo, which form part of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The third 
group consists of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon 
because they form part of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC). In 
addition, I followed existing research and excluded countries with less than 500,000 inhabitants from the 
outset because in very small economies, economic development strategies, including financial policies, 
are likely to be driven by different dynamics than in larger countries.  
142
 As already noted, observations of the dependent variable are from 2009 and observations of the 
explanatory variables are, in most cases, the average over the years 2005 to 2009.  
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analyses and make it difficult to estimate more fully specified models and to discover 
statistically significant relationships.  
Moreover, it is not possible to explore causal relationships with the models and data 
employed here because they are unable to address problems of endogeneity. The 
propositions I formulated in Chapter 2 were that dependence on aid and dependence on 
natural resources influence the policy stance. Yet causality may also run in the other 
direction. For instance, a stability-oriented policy stance in aid dependent countries may 
perpetuate aid dependence, and a policy stance oriented towards financial deepening in 
resource dependent countries may perpetuate resource dependence. In fact, existing 
research suggests that central bank policy both reflects and reinforces economic 
structures (Maxfield, 1994). In addition, endogeneity may arise from third variables, 
which affect both the dependence variables and the policy stance. To address 
endogeneity at least partly, I control for those variables which in previous research have 
been most robustly associated with commitment to financial deepening, namely GDP 
per capita, the quality of political institutions and private credit.  
Despite the inability of the analyses that follow to establish causal relationships, the 
value added by insights based on the data and methodology at hand is still high. This is 
an exploratory research project and the data and methods proposed here allow a first set 
of statistical explorations as to whether the pattern of cross-country data is broadly 
consistent with the structuralist propositions about the relationship between the sources 
of finance and the stance of policy and with the evidence found in the case studies. Is 
financial policy in countries that are more reliant on aid less likely to promote financial 
deepening? Is financial policy in countries that are more reliant on natural resources 
more likely to promote financial deepening? These are the broad questions that the data 
and model employed are able to answer. The combined results of the case studies and 
the statistical analysis will then help us to gain a more nuanced understanding of the 
relationship between the sources of finance and central bank policy. 
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6.1.5 Results 
With these methodological challenges in mind, the remainder of this section presents 
the results of the cross-national analysis of the relationship between the sources of 
finance and the policy stance in relation to financial deepening. I present specifications 
using several measures of dependence and of the policy stance owing to the exploratory 
character of this research and the aim of evaluating different conceptualisations of key 
elements of my theoretical framework.   
Aid Dependence and the Policy Stance in Relation to Financial Deepening   
In Chapter 2, I developed the proposition that central banks in developing countries 
which are more reliant on aid are more likely to have a stability-oriented policy stance, 
one indication of which may be a lower prioritisation of policies to promote financial 
deepening. The analyses that follow probe this proposition and explore whether there is 
a negative relationship between aid dependence and engagement in the area of financial 
deepening. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 6.1 report results on the relationship between aid 
dependence and the existence of a team of financial regulators working on financial 
access. Columns 4 to 6 of Table 6.1 report results on the relationship between aid 
dependence and the implementation of financial access reforms. 
Table 6.1: Aid Dependence and Policy Stance in Relation to Financial Deepening 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Team  Team  Team  Reform Reform Reform 
lnGDPPC -1.023* 
(0.442) 
-0.809* 
(0.339) 
-0.575+ 
(0.294) 
-0.0194 
(0.331) 
0.0783 
(0.294) 
-0.471 
(0.323) 
Polity2 -0.0209 
(0.0464) 
-0.0224 
(0.0478) 
-0.0189 
(0.0475) 
-0.107* 
(0.0522) 
-0.0983+ 
(0.0532) 
-0.0504 
(0.0565) 
PrCredit 0.00247 
(0.0117) 
0.00110 
(0.0117) 
0.00183 
(0.0114) 
-0.0147 
(0.0118) 
-0.0105 
(0.0112) 
-0.0237+ 
(0.0127) 
ODA -0.0840 
(0.0611) 
 
 
 
 
-0.00404 
(0.0247) 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit  
 
-23.96 
(17.26) 
 
 
 
 
0.837 
(3.220) 
 
 
IMFprogr  
 
 
 
-0.110 
(0.171) 
 
 
 
 
-0.679** 
(0.218) 
Constant 7.394* 
(3.340) 
5.854* 
(2.473) 
3.879+ 
(2.165) 
1.511 
(2.406) 
0.656 
(2.035) 
6.186* 
(2.567) 
Observations 69 71 75 69 71 75 
Pseudo R2 0.0908 0.1033 0.0562 0.0753 0.0523 0.1979 
Log-likelihood -41.56 -41.82 -46.25 -42.71 -44.69 -40.49 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results of logistic regression, dependent variable takes the values 0 or 1. 
+
 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The results in Table 6.1 are almost universally statistically insignificant. There is only 
one exception: The negative and significant coefficient for IMFprogr in column 6 
suggests that, in line with the structuralist propositions, countries which are more reliant 
on aid as measured by the number of IMF arrangements are less likely to have 
implemented financial access reforms. 
Why has there been a failure to find more evidence for a significant relationship 
between aid dependence and the policy stance in relation to financial deepening?  My 
hypothesis is that the results presented in Table 6.1 are driven by the African countries 
in the sample. As the case studies of Uganda and Kenya suggest, donors have changed 
their preferences and accept or even support a central bank policy stance in Africa 
which embraces financial deepening as an additional goal, partly because Africa lags 
behind in international comparison in financial development.143 In many developing 
countries outside Africa, financial development is less of a bottleneck, therefore donors 
may be less supportive of regulators pursuing a policy stance oriented towards financial 
deepening. As a consequence, the relationship between aid dependence and the policy 
stance in relation to financial deepening may differ in African countries and non-
African countries and we may observe a negative relationship between aid dependence 
and the policy stance in relation to financial deepening in non-African countries. To 
explore these hypotheses I re-examine the specifications presented in Table 6.1 but 
include in each specification an Africa dummy and an interaction term of the Africa 
dummy and the indicator for aid dependence. Table 6.A2 in the appendix presents the 
results. The evidence presented in columns 1, 4, 5 and 6 of Table 6.A2 provides support 
for these hypotheses: Significant and negative coefficients on the variables to capture 
aid dependence suggest that non-African developing countries which are more reliant 
on donors are, in line with the structuralist propositions, less likely to have a policy 
stance oriented towards financial deepening.  
Resource Dependence and the Policy Stance in Relation to Financial Deepening 
Where developing countries are reliant on natural resources, their regulatory authorities 
are more likely to promote financial deepening. This is the second structuralist 
proposition I developed in Chapter 2. I derive this proposition from the structuralist 
literature and literature on the political economy of natural resource dependence. The 
                                               
143
 See Allen et al. (2012) for an empirical analysis of why Africa lags behind in financial development. 
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former type of literature suggests that natural resource revenues, as untied replacement 
resources, increase the policy space of governments; the latter suggests that economic 
policy in resource dependent countries tends to be expansionary, and a financial 
deepening-oriented policy stance is in essence expansionary. 
Table 6.2 reports the results of the logistic regression analysis of the relationship 
between resource dependence and the policy stance in relation to financial deepening. 
Columns 1 and 2 report results on the relationship between resource dependence and the 
existence of a team working on financial access. Columns 3 and 4 report results on the 
relationship between resource dependence and the implementation of financial access 
reforms. 
 Table 6.2: Resource Dependence and Policy Stance in Relation to Financial 
Deepening 
 Standard errors in parentheses. Results of logistic regression, dependent variable takes the values 0 or 1. 
+
 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the regulatory authorities in developing countries which 
are more reliant on natural resources as measured by the ratio of resource export 
revenues and resource rents to GDP are more likely to have a team dedicated to 
promoting financial access, which is in line with my structuralist proposition. Although 
in columns 3 and 4 the signs of the coefficients on the indicators of resource 
dependence point, in line with the structuralist propositions, in a positive direction, it is 
not possible to establish a positive relationship confidently given the lack of statistically 
significant results.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Team Team Reform  Reform  
lnGDPPC -0.902* 
(0.354) 
-0.684* 
(0.297) 
-0.0656 
(0.305) 
-0.0962 
(0.275) 
Polity2 0.00367 
(0.0587) 
0.0148 
(0.0522) 
-0.0801 
(0.0615) 
-0.0781 
(0.0551) 
PrCredit 0.0124 
(0.0123) 
0.00911 
(0.0116) 
-0.00942 
(0.0116) 
-0.00874 
(0.0114) 
ResExp 5.047+ 
(2.635) 
 
 
1.107 
(2.708) 
 
 
ResRents  
 
0.0389+ 
(0.0207) 
 
 
0.0347 
(0.0250) 
Constant 5.170* 
(2.301) 
3.737+ 
(1.919) 
1.482 
(2.061) 
1.488 
(1.838) 
Observations 64 75 64 75 
Pseudo R2 0.1123 0.0724 0.0530 0.0903 
Log-likelihood -34.17 -42.84 -37.25 -42.39 
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6.1.6 Conclusion 
This section has contributed to the building and probing of structuralist theory by 
developing a measure of the policy stance in relation to financial deepening and 
analysing the relationship between the sources of finance and the policy stance in 
relation to financial deepening using logistic regression analysis. While there are 
caveats related to the analysis, owing to the inability to establish causal relationships 
with the available data and methods used here, it nonetheless provides some evidence 
that the pattern of cross-country data is broadly consistent with the structuralist 
propositions.  
The first set of results on the relationship between aid dependence and the policy stance 
in relation to financial deepening is almost universally insignificant. However, there is 
evidence that greater reliance on the IMF as indicated by the number of IMF 
arrangements in place is associated with a lower likelihood of having implemented 
financial access reforms.  
Moreover, the evidence suggests that in non-African developing countries which are 
more reliant on aid, the policy stance is less likely to be oriented towards financial 
deepening. This finding, which is in line with the structuralist propositions, suggests 
that the failure to find more significant relationships between aid dependence and the 
policy stance in relation to financial deepening is at least in part driven by African 
countries. Thus, the relationship between aid dependence and the policy stance in 
relation to financial deepening seems to differ in African and non-African countries.  
One possible explanation for why the relationship seems not to be consistently negative 
in African countries is that donors may be more supportive of a policy stance oriented 
towards financial deepening in Africa than elsewhere owing to Africa’s comparative lag 
in financial development. The case study of Uganda and flagship publications by the 
World Bank (Honohan and Beck, 2007; Beck et al., 2011) suggest that donors have, 
since the mid-2000s, embraced the idea that financial regulators in Africa should pursue 
policies aimed directly at financial deepening. While the promotion of greater 
government engagement in financial deepening is a global trend among donors (Dashi 
et al., 2013), they may place particular emphasis on this goal in Africa because of the 
limited success of stability-oriented policies in indirectly increasing financial access, 
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which has left many African countries with, by regional comparison, very shallow 
financial sectors in a context of well-capitalised banks. 
The second set of results also provides some support for the structuralist propositions: 
Regulatory authorities in developing countries which are more reliant on natural 
resources seem more likely to have a policy stance which promotes financial deepening, 
at least where this is measured by having a team working on financial access in place. 
There is, however, no significant evidence for a positive relationship between resource 
dependence and financial access reforms. The literature on the effects of resource 
dependence finds that, despite being less financially restrained, natural resource 
dependent countries have limited implementation capacity (Auty, 1994; Karl, 2004). 
Limited capacity to implement reforms may thus be a likely explanation for the failure 
to find a significant relationship between resource dependence and the implementation 
of financial access reforms.  
6.2 Analysis of the Policy Stance in Relation to Financial Stability 
The preceding section has provided a clearer picture of the cross-country patterns of the 
relationship between aid or resource dependence on the one hand and the policy stance 
in relation to financial deepening on the other. Another way to approach the question of 
whether the major sources of finance account for the stance of central bank policy is to 
examine policy stances with respect to stability-oriented policy goals. We therefore shift 
now to policy areas concerned with stability, analysing first the policy stance in relation 
to financial stability, before turning to the policy stance in relation to price stability in 
the next section.  
6.2.1 Conceptualising the Policy Stance in Relation to Financial Stability 
In order to capture the policy stance in relation to financial stability I use measures of 
the stringency of prudential financial regulation.144 I define “stringency” as the degree 
of strictness of regulatory frameworks and “prudential” as geared towards reducing the 
likelihood and/or costs of financial crisis.145 I decided to use the stringency of regulation 
as a proxy for the policy stance in relation to financial stability because stringent 
                                               
144
 More correctly would be the “stringency of regulation and supervision”. For ease of reference, 
however, I use “regulation” and “regulatory” interchangeably for “regulation and supervision” and 
“regulatory and supervisory”. 
145 This notion of regulatory stringency is thus distinct from the notion of comprehensiveness. In this 
study, a regulatory framework can be very stringent, even if it comprises only a few elements. 
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prudential regulation and supervision are widely regarded as cornerstones of regulators’ 
financial stability frameworks (Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 2000b; Barth et al., 
2005).146 My focus is on regulation and supervision in relation to the banking sector 
because financial systems in developing countries tend to be bank-based and non-bank 
financial institutions tend to be supervised and regulated by institutions other than the 
central bank. 
I use two main indicators to capture the stringency of regulation: First, I gathered data 
on minimum required regulatory capital ratios because they are the main regulatory 
instrument. Second, I look beyond capital ratios and construct a composite indicator. 
Employing a composite indicator has the advantage that it is able to capture the multiple 
components comprised in regulatory frameworks. The construction of the composite 
indicator posed, however, significant conceptual and measurement challenges because 
there is no unique way of selecting, quantifying, weighing and aggregating variables.  
A Composite Indicator of Regulatory Stringency 
Much of the existing research using measures of regulatory stringency has relied on 
composite indicators capturing the comprehensiveness of regulatory frameworks (Barth 
et al., 2005; Barth et al., 2012; Klomp and Haan, 2012). Yet in the context of this study, 
an ideal composite indicator would consist of a small number of components which 
capture only those elements of bank regulation and supervision in developing countries 
on which exists a consensus that they are important for safeguarding financial stability.  
There are two main reasons for this narrow focus: First, resource and skills shortages in 
developing countries warrant a slim, economical regulatory framework, reflecting the 
need for prioritising actions (Stiglitz, 2001; Brownbridge, 2002; Fuchs et al., 2012). 
Second, only those elements of regulation, for which there is a consensus that they are 
important for financial stability, can form a cross-country comparable indicator of 
commitment to financial stability.  
                                               
146
 Obviously, the stringency of regulation is only an imperfect proxy for the weight a central bank 
attaches to safeguarding financial stability. More stringent regulation may indicate the attachment of 
greater weight, but this is not necessarily the case. Interest rate caps, for instance, may indicate both an 
intention to deter risky lending (high interest rates serve to cover expected losses) and to increase access 
to credit. Moreover, there may be a difference between the proclaimed intention of a measure and the real 
intention. Whether interest rate caps, for instance, are intended to enhance financial stability or financial 
deepening is difficult to establish through quantitative analysis. The case studies, which provide a more 
nuanced picture of the objectives of particular regulatory policies, are thus an important complement to 
the quantitative analysis. 
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But which aspects of banking regulation are widely considered as important for 
financial stability in developing countries? Existing work offers little guidance here 
because there is a lack of agreement in the literature on this issue.147 Views regarding 
the necessary and sufficient components of prudential frameworks in developing 
countries or regarding the relative importance of components vary considerably – across 
countries, time and ideological perspective, often depending on what is considered as 
the major cause of financial instability. This lack of agreement in the literature 
complicates the selection of the components of the composite indicator and decisions on 
the weighting of variables. Moreover, even if it was possible to develop a composite 
indicator capturing the key elements of bank regulation in developing countries, 
exploring the relationship between the key sources of finance and regulatory stringency 
would still be hampered by data limitations. Data on prudential regulation is only 
available for a limited number of developing countries and years.  
Consequently, I opted for an approach which seeks to balance the need to capture 
complex concepts against practical data limitations and inconclusive evidence on the 
key elements of regulation in developing countries. Specifically, my strategy has been 
to select a parsimonious set of components for the composite indicator of regulatory 
stringency capturing only those elements which have been considered with great 
consistency as key elements of prudential frameworks in developing countries during 
the 1990s and the 2000s, in different strands of the literature, and in relation to different 
world regions. Employing the criterion of consistency should help to ensure that 
regulatory stringency is not measured by prudential policies which are not widely 
regarded as relevant for financial stability in a broad range of countries. In addition, I 
considered data availability throughout the conceptualisation phase. 
6.2.2 Measuring the Policy Stance in Relation to Financial Stability 
In order to capture the central bank policy stance in relation to financial stability I 
employ three measures, which serve as dependent variables in the analysis: HCapital, 
Capital and CIStr.  
                                               
147
 See for instance the diverging views on the importance of official supervisory authority of 
Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick (2000a) and Fuchs et al. (2012) on the one hand and Calomiris (1997) and 
Caprio and Honohan (2004) on the other. 
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The first two measures are capital adequacy ratios. HCapital is a binary variable which 
equals 1 if the minimum required risk-based regulatory capital ratio is high (exceeding 
10%) and 0 otherwise. Capital is a continuous measure of the minimum required risk-
based regulatory capital ratio. Capital requirements have long been considered and 
promoted as the main regulatory instruments to enhance financial stability, particularly 
in developing countries (Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 1999; Stiglitz, 2001; BIS, 2012; 
IMF, 2012a). Capital requirements, which force banks to maintain a certain level of net 
worth, both serve as a buffer in case of losses and provide incentives for prudent 
behaviour because higher capital requirements increase the funds owners have at risk.  
HCapital, which is a binary measure, is my main measure of capital adequacy ratios 
because IFIs and donors have long recommended developing countries to employ 
“high” capital ratios owing to the macroeconomic volatility they experience (Bossone 
and Promisel, 1998; Caprio and Honohan, 1999; Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 2000b; 
Stiglitz, 2001; Čihák et al., 2012; Fuchs et al., 2012; Klomp and Haan, 2012).148 What 
constitutes a “sufficiently high” level of capital requirements should then be decided on 
a country-by-country basis. Yet most donors and representatives from IFIs agree that 
minimum required capital ratios exceeding the Basel minimum of 8% may be 
appropriate given developing countries’ higher risk profile and their ability to offer 
some limited compensation for otherwise weak supervisory authority and capacity (BIS, 
2012; Fuchs et al., 2012). For this research, I choose a cut-off-point of 10% for capital 
ratios to be considered high because 10% constitutes the median among developing 
countries in the sample and substantially exceeds the Basel minimum required risk-
based regulatory capital ratio of 8%.  
The third measure is CIStr, a composite indicator capturing the stringency of micro-
prudential regulation and supervision in its two key areas: capital requirements and 
supervisory authority for bank intervention. Organisations like the IMF and the Bank 
for International Settlements, the main standard setting body for bank regulation and 
supervision, as well as research on prudential regulation and supervision in developing 
countries (Glaessner and Mas, 1995; Caprio and Honohan, 1999; Brownbridge and 
Kirkpatrick, 2000b; Fuchs et al., 2012; World Bank, 2012) have emphasised that 
supervisory authority to intervene in problem banks is as crucial as capital requirements 
                                               
148
 For a critical discussion of the pitfalls of overly relying on capital adequacy see for instance Caprio 
and Honohan (1999), Stiglitz (2001) or IMF (2012a: Chapter 4). 
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for fostering financial stability. Delayed intervention due to regulatory forbearance and 
limited authority of central banks to intervene in distressed banks have been major 
causes of banking distress and crises in developing countries and the recent global 
financial crisis has underlined the importance of supervisory capacity to intervene 
timely in problem banks (Glaessner and Mas, 1995; Caprio and Honohan, 1999; 
Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 2000b; Fuchs et al., 2012; World Bank, 2012). There is 
broad agreement in the literature that regulatory frameworks should comprise a variety 
of supervisory policies which vary with respect to their extent of bank intervention to 
address different degrees of banking distress (Brownbridge et al., 1998; Caprio and 
Honohan, 1999; Brownbridge, 2002; Čihák et al., 2012).149 Accordingly, I constructed a 
composite indicator of supervisory authority. This composite indicator consists of four 
subcomponents that I selected based on the literature on regulation and supervision in 
developing countries and data availability:  
• First, the power to require a bank to meet heightened regulatory standards, a 
relatively light form of bank intervention. Based on data availability, I selected 
the power to order banks to constitute higher provisions for covering potential or 
actual losses as a proxy. Inadequate provisioning has received much attention in 
the literature, partly because it was a major source of weakness in the East Asian 
countries that experienced a financial crisis at the end of the 1990s 
(Brownbridge, 2002).  
• Second, the power to change the organisational structure of a bank. This is a 
higher form of bank intervention than the requirement to meet heightened 
regulatory standards because it affects the rights and responsibilities of bank 
directors and managers and thus induces lasting organisational changes. The 
literature highlights the need for supervisory power to change the organisational 
structure of a bank in the context of discussions about bank resolution 
frameworks and about the role played by managerial failures in banking crises in 
developing countries (Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 2000b). 
• Third, the power to take measures of bank liquidation. This is the highest form 
of bank intervention because it affects the existence of a bank. Here the power to 
                                               
149
 Limiting the discretion of regulators through prompt corrective action rules is not uncontroversial 
(Caprio and Honohan, 1999: 58). Yet it is widely agreed that some basic rules limiting discretion are 
important for ensuring financial stability given the weak power of supervisors in many developing 
countries and the pressures from both the banking sector and politicians to delay action (Caprio and 
Honohan, 1999; Brownbridge and Maimbo, 2003). 
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declare a bank insolvent serves as a proxy. Adequate bank resolution is 
considered a key element of prudential frameworks because the lack of 
resolution frameworks has prolonged distress and exacerbated the costs of 
financial crises in many developing countries (Beck et al., 2011: 205-208). 
• Fourth, the existence of prompt corrective action rules. Such rules are 
considered important because they may help counterbalance pressures for 
regulatory forbearance which are considered a major challenge for financial 
stability in developing countries (Brownbridge, 2002).  
To form the composite indicator of regulatory stringency, CIStr, I combined the 
composite indicator of supervisory authority with an index of the stringency of capital 
requirements. The aggregation rule for the composite indicators is simple but 
transparent: I employ equal weighting and an additive aggregation of the components, 
following existing research (Barth et al., 2013). The sum of the values of the 
components of a composite indicator is then divided by the number of components so 
that a composite indicator has a range from 0 to 1. Section 6.5.2.1 of the appendix 
provides more details on the construction of the composite indicator.  
This research uses data on regulatory stringency from the World Bank surveys “Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Around the World” because the survey data covers a large 
number of developing countries and indicators. The surveys capture regulation and 
supervision “on the books” (de jure). The World Bank has gathered the data in four 
rounds of surveys, capturing the state of bank regulation and supervision in 1999 
((Barth et al., 2001, Survey I), 2002 (Barth et al., 2003, Survey II), 2005/2006 (Barth et 
al., 2007, Survey III) and 2008-2010 (Čihák et al., 2012, Survey IV). The analyses that 
follow are based on data on regulatory stringency from Survey II because this has 
allowed maximising the number of observations.150 While the limited variation of 
regulatory and supervisory frameworks over time precludes a pooled TSCS analysis 
                                               
150
 I did not use data from Survey I because the questionnaire and data collection process improved after 
the first survey and later surveys are more representative of prudential frameworks of the 2000s and thus 
the post-financial liberalisation reform phase. I also opted against the use of data from Survey IV on the 
grounds that it captures regulation during and after the global financial crisis and is hence not 
representative for the late 1990s and the 2000s before the financial crisis in 2008. The decision to use data 
from Survey II rather than Survey III in the analysis is due to the fact that the relevant data is available for 
a larger number of countries in Survey II than in Survey III. 
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(Kittel, 1999; Wilson and Butler, 2007), I have exploited the information provided by 
Survey III and used the data for robustness checks.151   
While I made considerable effort to balance data availability and conceptual 
considerations, there remain potentially intractable questions about the ability of my 
measures – HCapital, Capital and CIStr – to capture the central bank policy stance in 
relation to financial stability. In particular, there remains the concern that the 
construction of the composite indicator is subjective. To address this issue, I have tried 
to make educated choices in selecting, quantifying and aggregating variables based on 
the literature on regulation and supervision in developing countries and to be as 
systematic and transparent as possible in this process. Nonetheless, the indicators 
ultimately present my judgement of sensible ways to conceptualise and measure 
regulatory stringency in developing countries.  
Another concern is that data on regulation and supervision on the books might only give 
an incomplete picture of the commitment to promote financial stability because the 
measures of regulatory stringency leave open the degree to which rules are actually 
enforced and implemented. Yet using data which captures assessments of the 
implementation of regulation and supervision was not possible in this study because the 
only datasets with a wide coverage of the implementation of prudential policies are the 
assessments of compliance with the Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank 
Supervision and these are mostly classified information (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2010).  
Finally, as with measures of commitment to financial deepening, there is the caveat that 
we cannot be sure whether the data relate to the regulatory policies of the central bank, a 
separate regulatory agency or both.152 As outlined in more detail in the previous section 
on financial deepening policies, correcting for this problem is in practice problematic 
for several reasons. First, because of data availability – there are no alternative datasets 
with information on central bank regulation with a similarly wide coverage of countries. 
Second, using only those observations where the central bank is the main regulator 
would result in a considerable loss in the number of observations and identifying those 
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 The results for Survey III, which are not shown here, show broadly similar patterns.  
152
 The World Bank addressed the questionnaires generally to the head of banking supervision in the 
central bank or the head of a separate banking supervision agency. From the published dataset it is not 
always evident which institution ultimately filled in the questionnaires. Additional information I had 
requested from the World Bank was not able to solve this problem of attribution. 
179 
 
countries which have a separate, independent supervisory agency is not straightforward. 
Given these challenges, I decided to include all available observations and accept the 
limitation that the results of the statistical analysis do not refer to the central bank 
policy stance but to the stance of financial or regulatory policy or the policy stance of 
financial regulators, which in most, but not all, cases are central banks. 
6.2.3 Explanatory Variables 
Before shifting to the control variables, I should briefly describe the main explanatory 
variables, aid and resource dependence. I keep this short because Section 6.1.3 covering 
financial deepening policies outlined conceptual issues related to the measurement of 
aid and resource dependence already in greater detail. Generally, for all explanatory 
variables, if not stated otherwise, I use five-year averages to reduce the effects of 
cyclical fluctuations. For explanatory variables, a data point is thus the average of the 
annual observations over the years 1998 to 2002, the five-year period preceding the 
World Bank survey and including the survey year.153 Table 6.A3 in the appendix 
provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of the sample, which covers countries 
classified by the World Bank as low- or middle-income countries in the time period 
1998 to 2002. 
The three measures of aid dependence, which I introduced in Section 6.1.3, are already 
familiar from the analysis of financial deepening policies. The first measure is ODA, net 
ODA as a percentage of GNI.  The second measure is IMFcredit, a continuous variable 
capturing the use of IMF credit as a share of GDP. In an effort to capture the influence 
donors may have through conditionality, encouraging social learning and signalling, I 
use IMFprogr. I constructed IMFprogr by summing up the annual number of IMF 
arrangements in effect for at least five months in a particular year between 1998 and 
2002.  
In Section 6.1.3, I also introduced the measures of reliance on natural resources, 
ResRents and ResExp. ResRents is the sum of rents from oil, minerals and gas as a 
percentage of GDP, whereby rents are the difference between the price of a commodity 
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 Where data in the five-year period is missing, I calculated averages using available data if at least half 
of the observations of the five-year period (i.e. three or more observations) are available and one of these 
is from the year preceding the survey or the year in which the survey took place. Otherwise, I coded the 
data as not available.  
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and the average cost of producing it. I calculated ResExp by adding fuels, ores and 
metals exports and dividing the sum by the GDP.  
Control Variables 
The aid and natural resources variables may pick up the effects of other variables that 
influence regulatory stringency. Therefore I include several political and economic 
control variables in the analysis. The handful of econometric studies exploring the 
drivers of regulatory stringency have focused on the quality of political institutions as a 
key explanatory variable (Barth et al., 2005; Barth et al., 2012). Political competition 
also turned out to be an important driver of changes in central bank policy in the case 
studies presented in this thesis. Therefore, the analysis includes Polity2, which measures 
regime types on a scale ranging from –10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly 
democratic) and is taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2011). 
In addition, I employ two other control variables. First, the natural log of GDP per 
capita in constant 2005 US$ (lnGDPPC) (World Bank, 2013c) because it may affect 
both dependence on aid or resources and regulatory stringency. Second, Crisis, a 
variable capturing the number of years in the five-year period between 1998 and 2002 in 
which a systemic banking crisis occurred. I calculated Crisis based on Leaven’s and 
Valencia’s (2012) database on systemic banking crises. Crisis is only included in 
specifications where the main explanatory variable is aid dependence. The rationale 
here is that the prevalence of financial crises may increase both the level of reliance on 
international assistance, in order to deal with the immediate social and economic costs 
of the financial crisis and implement reforms to prevent future crises, and the level of 
regulatory stringency because financial crises usually catalyse actions to address 
regulatory failures (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2009; Čihák et al., 2012).154   
                                               
154 My preliminary analyses included a much wider set of control variables. As measures of economic 
conditions these analyses included GDP in constant 2005 US$, GDP growth, the inflation rate, banking 
sector concentration, the current account balance as a share of GDP, log reserves as a share of GDP, gross 
national savings as a share of GDP, external debt as a share of GDP. As measures of financial market 
development the analyses included credit to the private sector, liquid liabilities as a share of GDP and the 
ratio of bank credit to bank deposits. Some analyses also included a variable capturing the quality of 
government from the International Country Risk Guide. These variables are not included in the 
specifications shown here because they were either not significant or findings with respect to the main 
variables are qualitatively similar and model fit improved when they were excluded. 
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6.2.4 Model Specification and Caveats 
For the analysis I specify a model where regulatory stringency, which refers to the 
continuous variables Capital and CIStr, are a function of an aid or resource dependence 
variable, the log per capita GDP, the quality of political institutions, the prevalence of 
financial crises (only in specifications where aid dependence is the key explanatory 
variable) and an error term: 
Regulatory stringencyi = a+ b1 Aid Dependencei + b2 lnGDPPCi + b3 Polity2i + b4 
Crisisi + ui 
or 
Regulatory stringencyi = a+ b1 Resource Dependencei + b2 lnGDPPCi + b3 Polity2i + ui 
In addition, I specify for the analysis where the dependent variable is the binary variable 
HCapital a model in which the log odds of HCapital are a function of an aid or resource 
dependence variable, the log per capita GDP, the quality of political institutions, and, in 
specifications where aid dependence is the key explanatory variable, the prevalence of 
financial crises:  
=
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
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p
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1
ln a+ b1 Aid Dependencei + b2 lnGDPPCi + b3 Polity2i + b4 Crisisi  
or 
=





− i
i
p
p
1
ln  a+ b1 Resource Dependencei + b2 lnGDPPCi + b3 Polity2i 
whereby pi is the probability that HCapitali = 1. 
There are caveats related to the analysis based on these models. In particular, the 
analysis is based on a small number of observations, which reduces the degrees of 
freedom, increases the standard errors of the regression coefficients, and makes it 
difficult to estimate more fully specified models and to discover statistically significant 
relationships. Because of the limited variation of the stringency of regulation across the 
survey rounds, I was not able to employ a time-series analysis. Therefore, the analyses 
that follow employ simple cross-country logistic regression for specifications with the 
binary dependent variable HCapital and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression for 
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specifications with the continuous dependent variables Capital and CIStr. In addition, 
missing data has severely reduced the number of observations.155 While I made every 
effort to close data gaps, the analyses that follow only extend to a maximum of 74 
developing countries. Another limitation is that it is not possible to establish causal 
relationships with the model and data used here because they do not address problems 
of endogeneity. Despite efforts to control for those variables which previous research 
suggests are most consistently associated with the explanatory variables and regulatory 
stringency, such as the quality of institutions, these controls can only insufficiently 
address concerns of endogeneity. It was, however, not possible  to include a wide range 
of control variables, because the small number of observations poses limitations on the 
number of variables that can be included in the model and good instrumental variables 
are not readily available.  
That said the data and models I use are able to provide an answer to the question 
whether the cross-country pattern of the data is broadly consistent with the structuralist 
propositions and the evidence found in the case studies. While we have to refer to the 
case studies in the previous chapter to learn about causal pathways, the cross-national 
analysis of regulation does provide insights on the generalisability of the structuralist 
propositions. Thus, while the statistical analysis has some limitations, it helps us to 
make another incremental step in assessing the plausibility of the structuralist 
propositions.  
6.2.5 Results 
This section reports the results from the most econometrically robust specifications in 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4. These tables show only a subset of the total number of regressions I 
have run but do provide a representative sense of the results. We will first look at the 
results for specifications in which aid dependence is the main explanatory variable and 
then at the results for specifications in which resource dependence is the main 
explanatory variable. 
  
                                               
155
 Moreover, I excluded several countries from the sample at the outset. Some had to be excluded 
because they have uniform bank regulations and supervisory practices due to regional regulatory 
authorities, others because they have less than 500,000 inhabitants (see footnote 141). 
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Aid Dependence and the Policy Stance in Relation to Financial Stability 
The analysis presented in Table 6.3 explores the first proposition I formulated in 
Chapter 2, namely that the policy stance in developing countries which are more reliant 
on aid is more likely to be oriented towards financial stability. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 
6.3 report results from the logistic regression analysis of the relationship between aid 
dependence and the setting of high capital requirements (HCapital). Columns 4 to 6 of 
Table 6.3 report results of the OLS regression analysis of the relationship between aid 
dependence and the level of capital requirements (Capital). Columns 7 to 9 of Table 6.3 
report results of the OLS regression analysis of the relationship between aid dependence 
and the stringency of regulation as measured by the composite indicator CIStr.  
Table 6.3: Aid Dependence and Policy Stance in Relation to Financial Stability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 HCapital HCapital HCapital Capital Capital Capital CIStr CIStr CIStr 
lnGDPPC 0.0439 
(0.406) 
0.190 
(0.367) 
-0.0586 
(0.333) 
-0.454 
(0.392) 
-0.0637 
(0.406) 
-0.326 
(0.343) 
-0.0482 
(0.0343) 
-0.0156 
(0.0295) 
-0.0292 
(0.0258) 
Polity2 0.0278 
(0.0570) 
0.0215 
(0.0600) 
0.0225 
(0.0606) 
0.0705+ 
(0.0405) 
0.0447 
(0.0367) 
0.0537 
(0.0402) 
0.00642 
(0.00465) 
0.00411 
(0.00408) 
0.00347 
(0.00439) 
Crisis -0.231 
(0.316) 
-0.401 
(0.358) 
-0.351 
(0.326) 
-0.119 
(0.149) 
-0.210 
(0.138) 
-0.170 
(0.134) 
0.0122 
(0.0190) 
0.000910 
(0.0186) 
0.00511 
(0.0182) 
ODA 0.0641 
(0.0644) 
 
 
 
 
-0.00249 
(0.0557) 
 
 
 
 
0.00139 
(0.00634) 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit  
 
17.70** 
(6.855) 
 
 
 
 
7.892 
(5.878) 
 
 
 
 
1.024 
(0.693) 
 
 
IMFprogr  
 
 
 
0.294* 
(0.149) 
 
 
 
 
0.100 
(0.105) 
 
 
 
 
0.0241* 
(0.0117) 
Constant -1.762 
(3.127) 
-3.149 
(2.714) 
-1.562 
(2.524) 
12.77*** 
(3.029) 
9.856** 
(3.161) 
11.63*** 
(2.671) 
0.933*** 
(0.261) 
0.687** 
(0.221) 
0.749*** 
(0.195) 
Observations 66 69 74 66 69 74 66 69 74 
Pseudo R2 0.0363 0.1275 0.0809 
      
Log-
likelihood 
-35.23 -33.61 -36.66 
      
Adjusted R2    -0.006 -0.000 0.006 -0.002 0.011 0.046 
F    0.847 1.806 1.415 1.185 1.039 2.352 
df_m    4 4 4 4 4 4 
df_r    61 64 69 61 64 69 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
+
 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The results reported in Table 6.3 provide some support for the proposition that there is a 
positive relationship between aid dependence and the orientation of policy towards 
financial stability. In particular, in columns 2 and 3 there is some evidence that greater 
reliance on the IMF, whether measured in financial terms or by the number of IMF 
arrangements, is associated with high capital requirements. Where aid reliance is 
measured by ODA, however, the results are not significant, which may be due to the fact 
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that this category comprises a wide range of types of assistance (health, governance, 
etc.) which may be provided without conditions related to financial policy.  
Somewhat surprisingly, the results for specifications in which the dependent variable is 
Capital are universally statistically insignificant. Thus, while greater reliance on the 
IMF serves as a predictor of whether some countries exceed some threshold in capital 
adequacy, there is no linear relationship between reliance on the IMF and capital ratios. 
One reason why reliance on the IMF seems to be associated only with HCapital may be 
that donors have usually given the policy advice to adopt “high” capital ratios with their 
exact level to be decided on a country-by-country basis.  
The results for the relationship between aid dependence and the composite indicator of 
the stringency of regulation are almost universally statistically insignificant. Yet a 
positive and significant coefficient on IMFprogr suggests that a greater number of IMF 
programmes is associated with more stringent regulation.  
Resource Dependence and the Policy Stance in Relation to Financial Stability 
Developing countries which are more reliant on natural resources are more likely to 
have a policy stance oriented towards financial deepening, one indication of which may 
be a lower prioritisation of policies to enhance stability. This is the second proposition I 
formulated in Chapter 2. The analyses that follow probe this proposition and explore 
whether there is a negative relationship between resource dependence and the 
orientation of policy towards financial stability. From a purely economic perspective, 
such a negative relationship is counterintuitive because resource dependence, which is 
associated with greater economic volatility, would warrant more stringent regulation. 
However, from a political economy perspective, which I outline in Chapter 2, a negative 
relationship may be plausible because natural resource dependence may increase 
incentives for expansionary as opposed to stability-oriented policies. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.4 report results from the logistic regression analysis of the 
relationship between resource dependence and the setting of high capital requirements 
(HCapital). Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6.4 report results of the OLS regression analysis 
of the relationship between resource dependence and the level of capital requirements 
(Capital). Columns 5 and 6 of Table 6.4 report results of the OLS regression analysis of 
the relationship between resource dependence and the stringency of regulation as 
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measured by the composite indicator CIStr. The results in Table 6.4 are universally 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that there is no significant relationship between 
resource dependence and the policy stance in relation to financial stability. 
Table 6.4: Resource Dependence and Policy Stance in Relation to Financial 
Stability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 HCapital HCapital Capital Capital CIStr CIStr 
lnGDPPC -0.0660 
(0.294) 
-0.149 
(0.291) 
-0.166 
(0.315) 
-0.269 
(0.317) 
-0.0254 
(0.0274) 
-0.0309 
(0.0289) 
Polity2 -0.00586 
(0.0550) 
0.00243 
(0.0538) 
0.0168 
(0.0388) 
0.0297 
(0.0396) 
0.00126 
(0.00491) 
0.00228 
(0.00500) 
ResExp 3.453 
(2.858) 
 
 
1.036 
(2.417) 
 
 
0.419 
(0.329) 
 
 
ResRents  
 
0.00470 
(0.0231) 
 
 
-0.00346 
(0.0189) 
 
 
0.000165 
(0.00236) 
Constant -0.889 
(2.072) 
-0.101 
(2.030) 
10.76*** 
(2.406) 
11.52*** 
(2.363) 
0.779*** 
(0.199) 
0.837*** 
(0.206) 
Observations 62 66 62 66 62 66 
Pseudo R2 0.0216 0.0038     
Log-likelihood -37.96 -41.18     
Adjusted R2   -0.039 -0.021 -0.009 -0.024 
F   0.177 0.315 0.805 0.383 
df_m   3 3 3 3 
df_r   66 71 66 71 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
+
 p < 0.1,* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
How can we reconcile this finding, which fails to confirm my proposition that there is a 
negative relationship between resource dependence and regulatory stringency, with the 
finding of the case study of Nigeria, which suggests that such a negative relationship 
exists? One possibility is that, for some reason, the relationship between resource 
dependence and the policy stance in relation to financial stability differs in African and 
non-African resource dependent developing countries. To examine this hypothesis I 
employed some additional statistical tests, of which the results are reported in Table 
6.A4 in the appendix. Columns 1 to 4 of Table 6.A4 present a replication of the analysis 
shown in columns 3 to 6 of Table 6.4. However, each specification presented in Table 
6.A4 includes in addition an Africa dummy and an interaction term of the Africa 
dummy and the resource dependence variable in order to explore whether the 
relationship between resource dependence and the policy stance in relation to financial 
stability differs for developing countries in Africa and elsewhere.156  
                                               
156
 I do not include specifications in which the dependent variable is the binary variable HCapital, 
because interpreting interaction terms in logistic regression analysis is less straightforward. 
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The results reported in Table 6.A4 suggest that this relationship indeed differs: The 
coefficients on the interaction terms of the Africa dummy and resource dependence 
variables ResExp and ResRents are negative and significant compared to the main 
effects. There is thus some evidence that the relationship between resource dependence 
and the orientation of policy towards financial stability is significantly weaker in 
African countries. To give an example, while the estimated slope coefficient for the 
relationship between resource exports as a share of GDP and the level of regulatory 
stringency is 0.6, the estimated slope coefficient for African countries is 0.9 points 
lower and thus likely to be negative. In other words, as resource dependence in Africa 
increases, the orientation of policy towards financial stability seems to decrease. Why 
the relationship between resource dependence and the policy stance in relation to 
financial stability differs for developing countries in Africa and elsewhere is, 
unfortunately, not clear. Examining the causes of the distinct relationships may be an 
issue for investigation in future research. 
6.2.6 Conclusion 
If the structuralist propositions were accurate, the pattern of cross-country data should 
be minimally consistent with them. In this section, I explored the pattern of cross-
country data by developing a measure of the policy stance in relation to financial 
stability, capturing the stringency of regulation, and by using regression analysis.  
While many of the results lack statistical significance, some patterns emerge from the 
analysis. In particular, the results suggest that greater reliance on IMF assistance is 
associated with more stringent regulatory standards in developing countries. As in the 
analysis of policies to promote financial access, reliance on the IMF as captured by 
IMFprogr performs well as a predictor. The relative consistency of results using 
IMFprogr as an explanatory variable may reflect that IMF assistance, rather than donor 
assistance in general, shapes financial policy in developing countries. Moreover, while 
both IMFcredit and IMFprogr may capture the influence the IMF potentially gains 
through conditionality, encouraging social learning and sending a signal to markets and 
donors, conditionality, social learning and signalling are more likely to be proportional 
to the number of IMF arrangements than to financial flows. This may explain why 
IMFprogr performs somewhat better as an explanatory variable than IMFcredit.  
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The results for the relationship between resource dependence and the policy stance in 
relation to financial stability are insignificant. These results thus fail to confirm the 
proposition I had formulated and the findings obtained from my case study of Nigeria. 
However, additional tests suggest that in African countries positive relationships 
between resource dependence and the policy stance in relation to financial stability are 
significantly weaker and likely to be negative. The structuralist theory cannot explain 
why results for African countries differ. The causes of the distinct relationships may 
thus be a subject for future research.  
6.3 Analysis of the Policy Stance in Relation to Price Stability 
The last two sections offered some supportive evidence that in developing countries 
which are more dependent on aid, the stance of financial policy is more likely to be 
oriented towards stability and in developing countries which are more dependent on 
natural resources, the stance of financial policy is more likely to be oriented towards 
financial deepening.  These results are also in line with the findings of the case studies 
of Uganda and Nigeria. This section now shifts to monetary policy to explore the 
relationship between the sources of finance and the central bank policy stance, using a 
pooled TSCS analysis. 
6.3.1 Conceptualising the Policy Stance in Relation to Price Stability 
Monetary policy is the most appropriate policy area for analysing the policy stance in 
relation to price stability because it is the single most important type of policy to 
enhance price stability and to signal the policy stance in relation to price stability. In the 
context of this research, a good measure of the policy stance in relation to price stability 
should have at least two attributes: First, it should capture the commitment to price 
stability or, in other words, how averse the central bank is to inflation. This is for 
instance evident in the degree to which it reacts to changes in the price level. Second, 
the measure should be based on an indicator which is under the control of the central 
bank. Inflation rates, for instance, would not constitute an ideal measure, because they 
are not fully under the control of central banks and may be influenced by various factors 
other than central bank policy or a commitment to price stability, particularly in the 
context of developing countries.  
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While there is no natural metric for measuring the policy stance in relation to price 
stability, the measurement of monetary policy and of the central bank’s reaction to 
inflation have been the subject of a substantial body of work in economics which can 
inform the selection of an appropriate measure of the central bank policy stance in 
relation to price stability. For the purposes of this thesis, studies which estimate 
monetary policy reaction functions are most informative. These studies usually use 
regression analysis to examine how monetary policy or some monetary policy 
instrument reacts to changes in the macroeconomic situation. A typical estimation 
equation then has the following form: 
MPInsit = ai + βXit+ uit  
The index i refers to the N observational units, and t indexes the T time periods. MPIns 
is a proxy for the monetary policy instrument. The ai term signifies a unit-specific 
contribution to the dependent variable, the unit fixed effect. The vector of independent 
variables, Xit, is a set of observed macroeconomic variables (e.g. inflation or GDP 
growth) and may contain lagged values of X or MPIns. uit is the error term associated 
with unit i at time t. The level of the monetary policy instrument is thus specified as a 
linear function of certain macroeconomic variables whereby the βs are the coefficients 
of interest because they capture the strength of the reaction to changes in the 
macroeconomic variables.  
There appears to be agreement in the empirical literature on monetary policy that 
quarterly data is preferable to annual data, and that, in this case, contemporaneous 
correlations or one period lags of the explanatory variables are appropriate.157 Much less 
agreement, however, is on the monetary policy instrument to be employed on the left 
side of the equation. In fact, one of the major messages emerging from the literature is 
that different measures are appropriate for different types of countries and different time 
periods (Bernanke and Mihov, 1998; Taylor, 2000; Xiong, 2012). Two types of 
indicators, however, stand out and have commonly been used as measures of monetary 
                                               
157
 For several reasons, notably the time-lag in the response of the price level to changes in monetary 
policy, it is widely agreed that central banks should react timely to inflationary pressures.  For many 
countries, inflation data is available on a monthly or at least quarterly basis and changes in inflation and 
monetary policy tend to occur on the same basis. Given the frequency of changes in both variables, the 
use of annual data would induce an aggregation bias. Therefore, studies usually use quarterly data. 
However, quarterly data is often not available for developing countries, so that some analyses of 
monetary policy based on global or developing country samples, such as Dreher (2006), use annual data. 
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policy in the cross-national estimation of monetary policy reaction functions: the growth 
of monetary aggregates such as M1158 and interest rates.159  
Until the 1990s, central banks in developed countries targeted money supply growth, so 
that empirical research widely used the growth of monetary aggregates or the monetary 
base as a measure of the policy stance in relation to price stability. This was before 
central banks in developed countries shifted their focus to inflation targeting. Many 
central banks in developing countries continue to target monetary aggregates, thus some 
literature on monetary policy in developing countries still considers the monetary base 
and money supply growth as adequate measures of the policy stance (Dreher, 2005; 
Kasekende and Brownbridge, 2011; Xiong, 2012). Measures of monetary policy based 
on the growth of monetary aggregates or the monetary base are not related to one 
particular policy instrument. This characteristic is valuable for studies which examine 
monetary policy in settings where central banks employ several instruments so that a 
single instrument only partly captures the central bank’s policy stance (Gerlach and 
Svensson, 2003; He and Pauwels, 2008; Xiong, 2012).160 Moreover, a measure which is 
not based on one particular policy instrument is less sensitive to changes in monetary 
policy operating procedures over time and thus to the time frame chosen for an analysis. 
However, a broad body of work in economics has severely criticised the use of the 
growth of monetary aggregates as indicators for monetary policy on the grounds that 
money growth depends, in practice, on a variety of factors outside the control of the 
central bank, most notably shifts in the demand for money (Bernanke and Mihov, 1998; 
Xiong, 2012). In light of these criticisms researchers began to look for alternative 
measures of monetary policy. 
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 M1 typically includes currency and checkable deposits. Yet definitions of monetary aggregates vary 
by country. 
159
 I do not discuss measures of monetary policy instruments which are less commonly used such as 
magnitudes of open market operations and reserve requirement ratios because for these measures cross-
national datasets covering developing countries typically do not exist. In fact, most studies of monetary 
policy are either time series analyses covering a single country or contain only a small set of countries 
due to the lack of cross-national comparable data on monetary policy instruments.  
160
 A more recent, creative approach has therefore been to construct monetary policy stance indices which 
account for several policy instruments. See for instance Gerlach and Svensson (2003), He and Pauwels 
(2008) and Xiong (2012). However, the construction of a monetary policy stance index is not without 
challenges, owing particularly to limitations in the availability of cross-country data on policy 
instruments. Moreover, the construction of indices requires researchers to identify the appropriate policy 
instruments that should be included in the index and to assign them appropriate weights, which is likely to 
be difficult in a cross-national setting.  
190 
 
Short-term interest rates have thus become the second type of commonly used measure 
of monetary policy. The inherent logic of the focus on interest rates is that central banks 
affect spending and hence inflation mainly through interest rates.161 A typical monetary 
policy reaction function would then explore the relationship between the interest rate 
and some macroeconomic variable (e.g. inflation).162 Which type of interest rate studies 
use as measures of monetary policy varies: Measures like the federal funds rate in the 
United States and the Bank Rate in the United Kingdom have been used as indicators of 
monetary policy instruments in developed countries since their central banks shifted 
from targeting monetary aggregates to inflation-targeting in the early 1990s. Studies of 
monetary policy in developing countries often use discount rates, which are the interest 
rates at which central banks lend or discount eligible paper for deposit money banks 
(Mishra et al., 2010: 22). While developed countries no longer use discount rates as 
monetary policy instruments but rather as signals of their policy stance, some 
developing countries still use them as monetary policy instruments (Buzeneca and 
Maino, 2007; Mishra et al., 2010).  
Interest rates have as measures of monetary policy, in contrast to monetary aggregates, 
the advantage that central banks can effectively influence them. A drawback, however, 
is that while a large number of developing countries provide data on discount rates, not 
all of them use discount rates as monetary policy instruments and it is difficult to 
identify those countries in which discount rates are among the major monetary policy 
instruments. In a simple inspection of discount rate data for developing countries from 
the IMF, I discovered that in many countries, changes of discount rates over time are 
very rare, raising doubts about the extent to which discount rates are able to capture the 
policy stance in relation to price stability. 
6.3.2 Measuring the Policy Stance in Relation to Price Stability 
In light of the criticism that the growth of monetary aggregates may not necessarily 
reflect central bank policy actions but rather non-policy influences I decided to employ 
an interest rates based measure of monetary policy, namely the central bank policy rate 
                                               
161
 Central banks can influence interest rates through a variety of instruments such as reserve 
requirements, lending to banks, and open market operations. 
162
 Taylor (1993) has developed the most famous model using interest rates as a measure of the policy 
stance, namely the Taylor rule. The Taylor rule indicates that the federal funds rate should respond to 
changes in the price level and deviations in real GDP from a target, so that the federal funds rate becomes 
an important signal of the monetary policy stance. 
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(PRate) from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), line 60 (IMF, 2013a). 
Central bank policy rates (CBPRs) are monetary policy related interest rates which are 
available from the IMF as monthly, quarterly and annual data. My main specifications 
are based on quarterly data from the time period 2000 to 2007. The focus is on the 
2000s because most monetary policy reforms related to structural adjustment 
programmes were implemented in the 1990s, so that variations in monetary policy 
across countries with different sources of finance should be visible by the 2000s. 
Moreover, the use of interest rates as monetary instruments in developing countries has 
gained ground in the 2000s. Before, many developing countries used more direct 
interventions such as reserve requirement ratios or credit ceilings. The time period 
considered here ends in 2007 because the global financial crisis introduced a disruptive 
element to monetary policy.   
Using CBPRs as the dependent variable has the advantage that these rates capture 
movements of a monetary policy instrument fully under the control of the central bank 
because the data central banks provide to the IMF under this heading refers to the 
interest rates determined by central banks to increase and decrease liquidity in the 
economy. Moreover, CBPRs are by definition the main signals of the central bank’s 
policy stance, even in cases in which central banks use additional policy tools. Yet high 
construct validity comes at a price. A major disadvantage is that the number of 
eligible163 developing countries for which data on CBPRs is available is limited. In fact, 
in some of the analyses that follow, only seven countries are included owing to 
limitations in the availability of quarterly data relating to CBPRs and the control 
variables.164 Another drawback is that the definitions of CBPRs may vary across 
countries, which may limit cross-country comparability.165  
As troubling as the limited number of observations and the cross-national variation in 
definitions of CBPRs are, there are significant advantages in using CBPRs as a measure 
of monetary policy and it is doubtful that other commonly used measures are more 
appropriate for this research. Data availability for monetary aggregates such as M1 and 
                                               
163
 In the context of this study, only countries which are not part of a monetary union are eligible because 
they do not have uniform monetary policies. Uniform monetary policies preclude the influence of 
national-level political economy factors such as the sources of investible funds on monetary policy. 
Following much of existing research, I also exclude countries with less than 500,000 inhabitants from the 
group of potential country cases.  
164
 These seven countries are: Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Thailand and Turkey. 
165
 Table 6.A5 in Section 6.5.3.1 of the appendix provides an overview of the definitions of CBPRs for 
the countries included in the main specifications. 
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M2 is, at least on a quarterly basis, even more limited for developing countries than data 
on CBPRs. Moreover, as already noted, the growth of monetary aggregates is 
influenced by a variety of factors outside the control of central banks and is thus a poor 
measure of the policy stance.  
The most promising alternative to the use of CBPRs is the use of discount rates (line 
60a in the IFS), which are the rates at which central banks lend or discount eligible 
paper for deposit money banks. Conceptually discount rates are similar to CBPRs, 
which in many countries are as well defined as the rates at which central banks lend or 
discount eligible paper for deposit money banks.166 Like CBPRs, discount rates are not 
fully comparable across countries because their definitions may vary slightly from 
country to country. With respect to data availability, however, discount rates outperform 
CBPRs because discount rate data is available from the IMF’s IFS for a large number of 
developing countries and several decades. 
In spite of this, discount rates perform worse with respect to construct validity because 
cross-country data on the employment of discount rates as monetary policy instruments 
is limited. In fact, many central banks in developing countries provide data on both 
discount rates and CBPRs, suggesting that in these countries discount rates have, at 
best, only minor importance as instruments of monetary policy.  
In order to deal with the trade-off between construct validity and data availability I 
decided to rely on PRate, the CBPRs, as main indicators of monetary policy but to 
experiment with a variety of alternative specifications as robustness checks.  
• First, I use additional specifications with the differenced policy rate (PRate_d) as a 
dependent variable.167 These specifications explore how changes in inflation affect 
changes in interest rates.  
• Second, I use specifications based on annual observations. Using annual data allows 
increasing the number of observations because data on growth, which as we will see 
below serves as a control variable, is for many developing countries only available 
on an annual basis.  
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 However, the terms associated with credit provided at discount rates and credit provided at central 
bank policy rates are usually different. In fact, many countries provide data for both discount and central 
bank policy rates and the two sets of rates usually differ.  
167
 A differenced variable, var,
 
is the variable that results from subtracting vart-1 from vart. It thus refers to 
the change in var that takes place in the time between t-1 and t. 
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• Third, I use specifications where the dependent variable is DRate. DRate refers to 
quarterly discount rates (line 60A of the IMF’s IFS) where quarterly data on CBPRs 
(line 60 of the IMF’s IFS) is not available and to CBPRs otherwise. Specifications 
where DRate is the dependent variable include a larger number of countries than 
those where PRate is the dependent variable. Yet specifications with DRate have the 
drawback that our confidence that discount rates are actually used as monetary 
policy instruments is lower because the central banks providing the respective data 
have not categorised the discount rate data as CBPRs. To increase this confidence, 
however, I include in the analysis only data on discount rates from countries which 
used these rates as a monetary policy instrument between 2000 and 2007 according 
to the IMF’s database on monetary policy instruments.168 Section 6.5.3.2 of the 
appendix presents the tables with results of these additional specifications.  
6.3.3 Explanatory Variables 
As in the analysis of financial deepening and regulatory policies, the main explanatory 
variables are aid and resource dependence. I limit the discussion of these variables to a 
definition of the indicators and their transformation to quarterly data because I already 
outlined conceptual considerations in Section 6.1.3.  
With respect to aid dependence, I use three already familiar measures: First, ODA, net 
ODA as a share of GNI. Second, IMFcredit, a continuous variable capturing the use of 
IMF credit as a share of GDP. Third, IMFprogr, a variable capturing the number of IMF 
programmes in effect. Data for ODA and IMFcredit is from the World Bank (2013c) 
and is available on an annual basis. Dreher (2006) provides annual data on the IMF 
arrangements a country has had in effect for at least five months in a particular year. I 
constructed IMFprogr by summing up the number of IMF arrangements (IMF Standby 
Arrangements, IMF Extended Fund Facility Arrangements, IMF Structural Adjustment 
Facility Arrangements and IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Arrangements) 
in effect in a particular year.  
The two measures I employ to capture resource dependence are also familiar: First, 
ResRents, which is the sum of rents from oil and minerals as a share of GDP, whereby 
                                               
168
 The only exception is Botswana, which I included in the regression analysis despite not being covered 
by the IMF’s database because the quarterly discount rate varies significantly. Specifically, there were 
nine changes during the 28 quarters between 2000 and 2007.   
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rents are the difference between the price of a commodity and the average cost of 
producing it.  Second, ResExp, which is the sum of fuels, ores and metals exports as a 
percentage of GDP. Annual data for both variables is available from the World Bank 
(2013c). As data for all aid and resource dependence measures is only available on an 
annual basis, I divided each data point simply by four to transform it to quarterly data 
or, more correctly, to obtain quarterly averages, as needed for the main specifications.169 
In addition, I employ two other explanatory variables: Inflation and GDP growth.170 As 
noted before, I consider the strength of the reaction of monetary policy (which is 
captured by movements in the interest rate) to inflation as the proxy for the policy 
stance in relation to price stability. Since my aim is to explore whether aid and resource 
dependent countries differ in the reaction to inflation from other countries, I include not 
only inflation but also an interaction term of inflation and the main explanatory variable 
in the analyses that follow. Following existing research (Xiong, 2012; Neuenkirch and 
Neumeier, 2013), I calculated data on inflation as the four-quarter percentage change in 
the consumer price index.171 The data is available from the IMF’s IFS (line 64) on a 
quarterly basis. Similarly, I calculated GDP growth as the four-quarter percentage 
change in the GDP volume indices. Quarterly data is available from line 99bvp of the 
IMF’s IFS. The rationale for including GDP growth is that central banks tend to adjust 
interest rates not only in response to inflation but also in response to changes in growth. 
Not controlling for growth might lead to biased results because growth may affect both 
inflation and interest rate setting.172 All explanatory variables cover the time period 
2000 to 2007. Section 6.5.3.1 of the appendix provides the summary statistics for all the 
variables. 
                                               
169
 There are various methods such as linear extrapolation to transform annual to quarterly data. I used the 
simple but widely applied transformation of dividing annual data by four because of its transparency and 
to keep the scope of this research manageable.   
170
 Initial specifications included nominal effective exchange rates as additional control variable (line nec 
in the IMF’s IFS). In conducting monetary policy, developing countries are likely to consider movements 
in the exchange rate so that these may be included in monetary policy reaction functions (Taylor, 2000; 
Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). However, limitations in the availability of quarterly data on nominal effective 
exchange rates reduced the number of countries in the estimated regressions to only three countries so 
that I decided to exclude nominal effective exchange rates from the estimation of monetary policy 
reaction functions, a limitation which may be considered by future research.  
171
 The four-quarter percentage change in prices is the price change relative to the same quarter one year 
earlier. 
172
 For the specifications based on annual data, I use annual data on inflation and GDP growth from the 
World Bank (2013c). 
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6.3.4 Model Specifications and Caveats 
The preceding discussion of the monetary policy instrument and explanatory variables 
sets the stage for setting up a model for exploring the relationship between the sources 
of finance and aversion to inflation, which is the proxy for the policy stance in relation 
to price stability. Following existing research (Neuenkirch and Neumeier, 2013), I 
specify a relatively simple model where the interest rate in country i at time t is a 
function of inflation, GDP growth, the main explanatory variable (which in this study is 
Dependence, an indicator of aid or resource dependence), an interaction effect between 
inflation and the main explanatory variable, a country fixed-effect ai and the error term 
uit: 
Interest Ratei,t = a+ ai+ β1 Inflationi,t+ β2 Growthi,t + β3 Dependencei,t + β4 
Dependencei,t*Inflationi,t +ui,t 
 
The specification is similar to the original Taylor rule but deviates from it by including 
GDP growth instead of deviations of real GDP from a target, the dependence variable, 
the interaction term and fixed-effects. Following other studies of monetary policy 
reaction functions in developing countries (Dreher, 2005; Xiong, 2012), I include GDP 
growth as an explanatory variable because the availability of output gap data for 
developing countries is severely limited, in particular at a quarterly basis. Dependence is 
included to explore whether the key sources of finance shape a central bank’s reaction 
to inflation. In the model, β4 then becomes the main parameter of interest because it 
indicates whether the reaction to inflation in aid dependent countries is stronger and in 
resource dependent countries weaker than in other types of countries, as implied by the 
structuralist propositions. Put differently, β4 reflects the difference in the slope for aid or 
resource dependent countries
. 
Accordingly, β1 indicates the reaction to inflation where 
Dependence has a value of 0 and β3 the effect of Dependence on monetary policy where 
inflation is 0.  
I include fixed-effects to account for the possibility that countries may differ in ways 
not explained by observed independent variables, which is also referred to as unit 
heterogeneity. Fixed-effects serve to capture country-specific constant factors, which, if 
not included in the model, would give rise to omitted variable bias (Wilson and Butler, 
2007). In accounting for unit heterogeneity, the introduction of fixed-effects may also 
196 
 
reduce concerns related to the cross-national comparability of central bank policy and 
discount rates: Fixed-effects models are “within” models in the sense that introducing 
fixed-effects removes the cross-sectional variation and leaves only longitudinal 
variation within countries, where definitions of monetary policy rates are coherent. 
Differences in the definitions of policy or discount rates across countries may thus be 
captured by country-specific intercepts, the fixed-effects. For the interpretation of 
results, however, using fixed-effects has the drawback that my model cannot shed light 
on the question whether cross-national variation in the sources of finance can account 
for cross-national variation in aversion to inflation. Nonetheless this restriction is 
worthwhile because the inclusion of fixed-effects reduces the risk of biased results 
arising from unit heterogeneity and can help with probing the structuralist propositions 
by exploring whether longitudinal variation in the key sources of finance within 
countries can account for longitudinal variation in aversion to inflation within countries. 
Alternative Specifications 
Using a TSCS model, as specified above, has advantages but is not without challenges. 
There are two major advantages associated with pooling as compared to a pure cross-
section of units or a pure time series: First, it allows increasing the number of 
observations. Second, pooling permits to control for exogenous shocks common to all 
countries (by including time fixed-effects) and to reduce omitted variable bias (by 
including country fixed-effects) (Plümper et al., 2005: 329). However, as Plümper et al. 
(2005: 329) outline, there are four major ways in which OLS standard assumptions 
could be violated in panel data and thus raise the risk of biased estimates: 
• errors tend to be autocorrelated (referred to as serial correlation of errors), that is, 
they are not independent from one time period to another; 
• errors tend to be heteroscedastic, that is, they tend to have different variances across 
units (referred to as panel heteroscedasticity); 
•  errors tend to be correlated across units due to common exogenous shocks (that is 
contemporaneously correlated errors); and 
• errors may be non-spherical in both the serial and the cross-sectional dimension 
(that is autocorrelated and heteroscedastic at the same time). 
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To address these risks, I follow much of existing work, which has been strongly 
influenced by Beck and Katz (1995; 1996), by using two major types of models to work 
with the TSCS data:   
• First, the so-called an AR1 error model. It employs panel-corrected standard errors 
(PCSE), country fixed-effects and a Prais-Winston transformation.173 This is the 
basic model presented above: 
Interest Ratei,t = a+ ai+ β1 Inflationi,t+ β2 Growthi,t + β3 Dependencei,t + β4 
Dependence*Inflationi,t +ui,t 
• Second, the so-called a lagged dependent variable (LDV) model. It employs panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSE), country fixed-effects, time fixed-effects and a 
LDV. In this case the model becomes 
Interest Ratei,t = a+ ai+ at+β0 Interest Ratei,t-1 + β1 Inflationi,t+ β2 Growthi,t + β3 
Dependencei,t + β4 Dependence*Inflationi,t +ui,t 
The first model uses PCSE to address panel heteroscedasticity and country fixed-effects 
to address unit heterogeneity. To address any serial correlation of errors, this model 
relies on Prais-Winston regressions, which involve a transformation of the data based on 
an estimate of the autocorrelation of the error terms.174  
The second model relies as well on employing PCSE to address panel 
heteroscedasticity. It employs unit and time fixed-effects to control for the possibility of 
non-spherical errors in the time and cross-sectional dimensions and a LDV to address 
serial correlation. The LDV is included because it is a relatively effective measure to 
remove the serial correlation of the errors. Moreover, the inclusion of the LDV may be 
justified on theoretical grounds: Existing research (Clarida et al., 2000; Neuenkirch and 
Neumeier, 2013) has included a LDV measuring the level of the monetary policy 
instrument to capture inertia in monetary policy making, owing to central banks’ desire 
for interest rate smoothing which may stand in the way of an immediate adjustment of 
interest rates in the event of a change in the macroeconomic situation.175  
                                               
173
 Regression analysis with PCSE adopts heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
174
 I employed the Wooldridge test for serial correlation which revealed the presence of serial correlation 
of the errors. 
175
 Rudebusch (1995) provides evidence on the serial correlation of interest rate changes. The literature on 
monetary policy provides several explanations for central banks’ efforts to smooth interest rates, 
including fear of disruption of financial markets (Goodfriend, 1991) or uncertainty about the effects of 
interest rate changes (Sack and Wieland, 2000). 
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There are, however, disadvantages related to including a LDV, most notably the 
absorption of time-series variance by the LDV (Plümper et al., 2005). The LDV may 
capture large parts of the trend in the dependent variable, leaving little variance to be 
explained by the independent variables of interest. In the presence of a persistent effect 
of at least one of the independent variables and a trend-ridden dependent variable the 
coefficient of a lagged dependent variable is likely to be biased upwards (Plümper et al., 
2005). Thus, if fixed-effects are included, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable 
renders estimates inconsistent, with the bias being large for the coefficient on the LDV 
but quite small on the other explanatory variables of interest (Wilson and Butler, 2007: 
107-108). Given that the coefficient on the LDV is of little direct interest in this study 
and that the bias of the βs is likely to be small, I follow existing research in employing 
an LDV model with country fixed-effects but comparing the results with those of the 
AR1 error model which tends to absorb less time-series dynamics. 
In addition to the AR1 error model and LDV model, I employ a generalised methods of 
moments (GMM) estimator designed by Arellano and Bond (1991), although only in the 
analysis using annual data because GMM estimators are designed for situations with 
large N (the number of countries) and small T (the number of time periods). The 
advantage of this estimator is that it accounts for the issue that the unit fixed-effect is by 
construction correlated with a lagged dependent variable and for any endogeneity of 
explanatory variables by using their lagged values as instruments. 
Caveats 
While my model specifications build on existing work in political sciences using TSCS 
data and existing studies of monetary policy reaction functions, there remain some 
important methodological concerns. The most serious concerns refer to the number of 
countries included in the analysis and the establishment of causal relationships. 
Although the number of observations is higher than in the statistical analysis of 
financial deepening or regulatory policies, the coverage of countries remains fairly 
limited, owing notably to the lack of quarterly data on GDP growth in developing 
countries. In particular, the specifications based on quarterly data in which the 
dependent variable is PRate cover a maximum of seven developing countries in the time 
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period from 2000-2007 and include a maximum of 192 observations.176 The limited 
number of countries and hence observations both limits the power of statistical tests and 
the generalisability of the results. In addition, it is not clear how the AR1 error model 
and LDV model specified above can address potential reverse causality and endogeneity 
and thus establish a causal relationship between the sources of finance and the central 
bank’s aversion to inflation. 
My strategy to deal with these limitations relies essentially on the use of a wide variety 
of models. To address limitations related to the number of countries included in the 
analysis, I employ specifications based on annual data and specifications using discount 
rates where central bank policy rate data is not available as robustness checks. Both 
types of specifications use data which is available for a greater number of countries. 
Specifications based on annual data extend to a maximum of 19 developing countries 
and a maximum of 128 observations; specifications using discount rates where central 
bank policy rate data is not available extend to a maximum of 19 developing countries 
and a maximum of 503 observations. Table 6.A9 in Section 6.5.3.1 of the appendix 
provides an overview of the countries included in the TSCS analysis. In addition, I 
employ specifications using different lag structures to address concerns related to 
causality. While questions related to the establishment of causality remain ultimately 
intractable, much of the existing research has, at a minimum, sought to ensure that 
changes in the explanatory variable precede changes in the dependent variable by using 
lags of explanatory variables.177 This research employs lags of one and two quarters in 
addition to exploring contemporaneous relationships.178 Obviously, employing lags is 
                                               
176
 Similar to the preceding sections, I define countries as “developing” if the World Bank classifies them 
as low- or middle-income countries in the time period from 2000 to 2007.  
177
 Lags of explanatory variables are employed to establish causality in a Granger sense (Granger, 1969). 
Granger testing allows evaluating the null hypothesis that x does not Granger cause y by estimating an 
equation in which y is regressed on lagged values of y and lagged values of an explanatory variable x. If 
one or more of the lagged values of x is statistically significant, the null hypothesis that x does not 
Granger cause y can be rejected, while the evidence suggests that x Granger causes y. 
178
 Higher lag structures seem not appropriate for both theoretical and statistical reasons. Theoretically, 
lags of a maximum of 2 quarters seem appropriate because central banks take decisions on interest rate 
setting at a relatively high frequency (monthly or quarterly) in order to react timely to inflationary 
pressures. The use of a maximum of two quarters seems also appropriate from a statistical perspective 
because the use of higher lag structures reduces the number of observations and hence the degrees of 
freedom. In specifications using annual data, I employ one-year lags of the dependent variable in addition 
to exploring contemporaneous relationships. I did not consider higher lag structures because interest rate 
responses with a lag of two or more years are unlikely given that interest rate setting occurs at relatively 
high frequency in order to react timely to inflationary pressures. 
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an imperfect solution because it does not address the risks of endogeneity179 arising 
from omitted variables and causal heterogeneity (Hood et al., 2008).180 I use the lags 
nonetheless because their use constitutes an improvement over much of existing 
research on monetary policy which only examines contemporaneous relationships.  
6.3.5 Results 
Given the methodological challenges of the statistical analysis of TSCS data, the next 
section presents a relatively wide array of TSCS regression analyses, using different 
measures of aid and resource dependence and different model specifications. The tables 
presented below report results from the main specifications. Tables with results from 
specifications serving as robustness tests are in Section 6.5.3.2 of the appendix. While I 
present in this thesis only a subset of all the TSCS analyses employed, the findings 
presented below do give a representative sense of the results.181 I do not report estimates 
for country and time fixed-effects because they are not of direct interest for an 
assessment of the structuralist propositions. I first present results on the relationship 
between the commitment to price stability and aid dependence before turning to the 
relationship between the commitment to price stability and resource dependence.  
Aid Dependence and the Policy Stance in Relation to Price Stability   
Greater reliance on aid is associated with greater aversion to inflation – this is a variant 
of the structuralist proposition that central banks in aid dependent countries are more 
likely to be stability-oriented than central banks in other countries. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 
explore this proposition, using the AR(1) error model and the LDV model respectively. 
In both tables, columns 1, 4, and 7 refer to contemporaneous relationships; columns 2, 5 
and 8 use one-quarter lags and columns 3, 6, and 9 use two-quarter lags. 
  
                                               
179
 Researchers usually address endogeneity through an instrumental variables framework, but for the 
main explanatory variable of interest here, the interaction of Dependence and Inflation, a good instrument 
is not readily available. 
180
 If causal heterogeneity is not taken into account, there is the risk of inferring a causal relationship in all 
cross-sections when it is only present in a subset of cross-sections and of rejecting the presence of a 
causal relationship for an entire group of observations when a subset of the sample actually does manifest 
the hypothesised causal relationship (Hood et al., 2008). 
181
 I experimented for instance with a wider range of lag structures than is shown in the tables below. 
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Table 6.5: Aid Dependence and Policy Stance in Relation to Price Stability – Fixed-
Effects with PCSE and AR(1) Correction Using Different Lag Structures  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate 
GDP growth 0.104 
(0.157) 
 
 
 
 
-0.00135 
(0.194) 
 
 
 
 
0.182 
(0.145) 
 
 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
1.049*** 
(0.132) 
 
 
 
 
0.887*** 
(0.133) 
 
 
 
 
0.990*** 
(0.128) 
 
 
L2.GDP growth  
 
 
 
0.624*** 
(0.0890) 
 
 
 
 
0.336*** 
(0.100) 
 
 
 
 
0.548*** 
(0.0833) 
Inflation 0.122 
(0.0977) 
 
 
 
 
0.653*** 
(0.138) 
 
 
 
 
0.241*** 
(0.0584) 
 
 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.868*** 
(0.0657) 
 
 
 
 
0.974*** 
(0.0828) 
 
 
 
 
0.246** 
(0.0910) 
 
 
L2.Inflation  
 
 
 
0.977*** 
(0.0433) 
 
 
 
 
1.205*** 
(0.0586) 
 
 
 
 
0.251** 
(0.0791) 
ODA -7.177+ 
(3.811) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA  
 
20.70*** 
(4.385) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ODA  
 
 
 
20.15*** 
(4.100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ODA*Inflation 2.506*** 
(0.614) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA*Inflation  
 
-2.362*** 
(0.610) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ODA*Inflation  
 
 
 
-2.111*** 
(0.638) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
-346.5 
(215.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
394.9** 
(125.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
550.9*** 
(102.6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
-30.13*** 
(7.984) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-19.90*** 
(5.073) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-30.80*** 
(3.642) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.146+ 
(2.402) 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-6.611+ 
(3.452) 
 
 
L2.IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-8.310** 
(2.684) 
IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.372 
(0.396) 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.156*** 
(0.428) 
 
 
L2.IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.576*** 
(0.342) 
Constant 15.74*** 
(1.295) 
7.080*** 
(1.087) 
7.789*** 
(0.678) 
15.20*** 
(1.926) 
5.977*** 
(1.277) 
5.922*** 
(0.895) 
14.48*** 
(1.139) 
9.914*** 
(1.161) 
11.11*** 
(0.809) 
Observations 192 188 183 192 188 183 192 188 183 
R2 0.1027 0.2782 0.3644 0.1540 0.2634 0.3456 0.0771 0.2681 0.3419 
Number of countries 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6.6: Aid Dependence and Policy Stance in Relation to Price Stability – Fixed-
Effects with PCSE and LDV Using Different Lag Structures  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate 
L.PRate 0.320*** 
(0.0250) 
0.284*** 
(0.0282) 
 
 
0.377*** 
(0.0271) 
0.274*** 
(0.0255) 
 
 
0.316*** 
(0.0255) 
0.282*** 
(0.0279) 
 
 
L2.PRate  
 
 
 
0.0732** 
(0.0235) 
 
 
 
 
0.0455* 
(0.0232) 
 
 
 
 
0.0636* 
(0.0256) 
GDP growth 0.577*** 
(0.116) 
 
 
 
 
0.360** 
(0.125) 
 
 
 
 
0.518*** 
(0.114) 
 
 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
1.322*** 
(0.146) 
 
 
 
 
0.896*** 
(0.121) 
 
 
 
 
1.133*** 
(0.129) 
 
 
L2.GDP growth  
 
 
 
1.250*** 
(0.130) 
 
 
 
 
0.674*** 
(0.126) 
 
 
 
 
1.159*** 
(0.123) 
Inflation 0.693*** 
(0.0438) 
 
 
 
 
1.147*** 
(0.0656) 
 
 
 
 
0.226** 
(0.0727) 
 
 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.864*** 
(0.0535) 
 
 
 
 
1.097*** 
(0.0578) 
 
 
 
 
0.267*** 
(0.0745) 
 
 
L2.Inflation  
 
 
 
1.089*** 
(0.0501) 
 
 
 
 
1.661*** 
(0.0559) 
 
 
 
 
0.124 
(0.0845) 
ODA -0.770 
(3.283) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA  
 
13.47** 
(4.425) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ODA  
 
 
 
7.235 
(5.503) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ODA*Inflation -0.259 
(0.428) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA*Inflation  
 
-2.187*** 
(0.600) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ODA*Inflation  
 
 
 
-0.539 
(0.872) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
195.1* 
(86.40) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
286.1*** 
(81.50) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
615.8*** 
(106.7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
-33.01*** 
(3.778) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-24.91*** 
(3.454) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-46.60*** 
(3.236) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-21.47*** 
(3.578) 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-17.70*** 
(3.693) 
 
 
L2.IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-26.42*** 
(3.992) 
IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.830*** 
(0.346) 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.074*** 
(0.356) 
 
 
L2.IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.936*** 
(0.381) 
Constant 1.905 
(1.512) 
-5.512** 
(1.771) 
-4.936** 
(1.590) 
0.0293 
(1.794) 
-3.165* 
(1.552) 
-4.042* 
(1.615) 
6.861*** 
(1.514) 
0.285 
(1.489) 
0.876 
(1.467) 
Observations 185 185 178 185 185 178 185 185 178 
R2 0.7420 0.7653 0.7714 0.7639 0.7765 0.8133 0.7446 0.7659 0.7774 
Number of countries 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The results presented in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 contradict the structuralist proposition, at 
least where aid dependence is measured by reliance on donor and IMF financing. 
Negative and significant interaction terms suggest that the positive relationship between 
inflation and central bank policy rates (CBPRs) is significantly weaker in countries with 
greater reliance on aid in the form of ODA or IMF credit than in other countries. The 
only exception is the contemporaneous, positive and significant relationship between 
inflation and the central bank policy rate in countries reliant on ODA in the AR(1) error 
model. I assign this finding, however, a low weight in the overall consideration because 
in specifications with quarterly data the focus of this thesis is on the role of lagged 
explanatory variables, in line with the Granger framework. Where aid dependence is 
measured by the number of IMF arrangements, Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show, however, that 
the relationship is conform with structuralist propositions: The positive slope of the 
relationship between inflation and CBPRs is significantly higher in countries with 
greater participation in IMF arrangements than in other countries, suggesting that in 
countries which have more IMF arrangements in place, there is a higher degree of 
aversion to inflation.  
Overall, the findings from the main specifications can be confirmed in the robustness 
checks based on alternative specifications (see Tables 6.A10 through 6.A16 in the 
appendix). In the specifications where the dependent variable is PRate_d, results are 
qualitatively similar to those in Tables 6.5 and 6.6. Using annual data, the conclusion is, 
again, that in countries reliant on aid as measured by ODA and IMFcredit the slope of 
the relationship between inflation and the policy rate is significantly lower than in other 
countries. This suggests that with increasing volumes of ODA and IMF credit, the 
reaction to inflation becomes weaker. In contrast, where aid dependence is measured by 
IMFprogr, the interaction term is positive and significant: Having a higher number of 
IMF arrangements in place is associated with a stronger reaction to inflation.  
In the Arellano-Bond LDV model, the interaction terms of interest are universally 
insignificant. Arellano-Bond estimators are usually considered more robust than the 
simple AR(1) error model or the LDV model where datasets have asymptotics in N and 
small T.  In this study, however, N extends to a maximum of 19 countries and can thus 
not be considered large, raising doubts about the robustness of the results (Wilson and 
Butler, 2007: 107-108). Moreover, the number of instruments employed by the 
estimator is very large relative to the number of countries. This raises the risk of 
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overfitting endogenous variables and failing to remove their endogenous components as 
well as weakening the Hansen J-test of instrument validity (Roodman, 2009). In light of 
the limitations of the Arrelano-Bond estimation here, its results should be interpreted 
with caution and I give them less weight in the final consideration of the results.  
The last type of robustness check is based on TSCS regressions using quarterly data and 
DRate as the dependent variable. The results are qualitatively similar to those of Tables 
6.5 and 6.6. The results suggest that receiving greater volumes of ODA and IMF credit 
is associated with a weaker reaction to inflation, whereas participation in a larger 
number of IMF programmes is, although only in the LDV model, associated with a 
stronger reaction to inflation. 
The headline conclusion from these results is thus that where aid dependence is 
measured by volumes of ODA and IMF credit received, aid dependence is, 
contradicting the structuralist propositions, associated with a weaker reaction to 
inflation. However, greater participation in IMF programmes appears to be associated 
with a stronger reaction to inflation, a finding which is in line with my proposition. 
Resource Dependence and the Policy Stance in Relation to Price Stability   
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 explore whether greater reliance on natural resources is associated 
with lower aversion to inflation, using the AR(1) error model and the LDV model 
respectively. In both tables, columns 1, 4, and 7 refer to contemporaneous relationships; 
columns 2, 5 and 8 use one-quarter lags and columns 3, 6, and 9 use two-quarter lags. 
The evidence from the analysis of the TSCS data provides some support for the 
structuralist propositions related to resource dependence. Whether resource dependence 
is measured as reliance on revenue from resource exports or on natural resource rents: 
An increase in the reliance on natural resources is associated with a decrease in the 
slope of the relationship between inflation and CBPRs. This finding holds for 
specifications using both the AR(1) error model and the LDV model. The only 
exception is the contemporaneous relationship between the interaction term of ResRents 
and inflation on the one hand and PRate on the other in the AR(1) model, which is 
positive and significant. However, I attach less weight to this finding in the overall 
consideration because in specifications with quarterly data the focus is on the role of the 
lagged explanatory variables, in line with the Granger framework.  
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Tables 6.A17 through 6.A23 in the appendix suggest that these findings are relatively 
robust to alternative specifications. Results from specifications where the dependent 
variable is PRate_d are qualitatively similar to those in Tables 6.7 and 6.8. Results 
based on the AR(1) error model and the LDV model using annual data also show some 
negative, statistically significant relationships between the interaction term and annual 
PRates, although in the AR (1) model only contemporary relationships are 
significant.182 The Arellano-Bond estimation, which we should consider with caution 
due to the small number of countries included in the analysis, provides also some 
evidence in support of structuralist propositions: Inflation aversion is lower in resource 
dependent countries, at least where resource dependence is measured by resource rents 
and contemporaneous correlations are considered. Specifications using quarterly data 
and DRate as dependent variable confirm the results from Tables 6.7 and 6.8 as well: 
The reaction to inflation in resource dependent countries – regardless of whether 
resource dependence is measured by ResExp or ResRents – is significantly weaker than 
in other countries, at least where lagged explanatory variables are considered.  
  
                                               
182
 This finding does not point to causality in the granger sense. Yet it is an important finding because, in 
the use of annual data, contemporaneous relationships are more plausible because it is more likely that 
monetary policy responds in the same year than that monetary policy corresponds with a one-year lag. 
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Table 6.7: Resource Dependence and Policy Stance in Relation to Price Stability – 
Fixed-Effects with PCSE and AR(1) Correction Using Different Lag Structures  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate 
GDP growth 0.177 
(0.153) 
 
 
 
 
0.189 
(0.148) 
 
 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
1.005*** 
(0.130) 
 
 
 
 
1.004*** 
(0.128) 
 
 
L2.GDP growth  
 
 
 
0.433*** 
(0.0821) 
 
 
 
 
0.399*** 
(0.0818) 
Inflation 0.176+ 
(0.0947) 
 
 
 
 
0.225* 
(0.0918) 
 
 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.754*** 
(0.0650) 
 
 
 
 
0.740*** 
(0.0667) 
 
 
L2.Inflation  
 
 
 
0.859*** 
(0.0392) 
 
 
 
 
0.836*** 
(0.0416) 
ResRents -0.331 
(0.332) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents  
 
0.0410 
(0.596) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ResRents  
 
 
 
1.339*** 
(0.322) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ResRents*Inflation 0.104+ 
(0.0624) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents*Inflation  
 
-0.235*** 
(0.0633) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ResRents*Inflation  
 
 
 
-0.387*** 
(0.0477) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
-72.58* 
(36.56) 
 
 
 
 
L.ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43.31 
(59.45) 
 
 
L2.ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
155.2*** 
(31.43) 
ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
-2.479 
(4.193) 
 
 
 
 
L.ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-18.98*** 
(4.532) 
 
 
L2.ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-28.52*** 
(3.518) 
Constant 29.25*** 
(4.088) 
-3.766** 
(1.433) 
-2.212** 
(0.752) 
4.157*** 
(1.215) 
-4.730* 
(2.231) 
9.828*** 
(1.693) 
Observations 192 188 183 192 188 183 
R2 0.0895 0.2247 0.2712 0.0939 0.2057 0.2431 
Number of countries 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6.8: Resource Dependence and Policy Stance in Relation to Price Stability – 
Fixed-Effects with PCSE and LDV Using Different Lag Structures  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate 
L.PRate 0.319*** 
(0.0249) 
0.284*** 
(0.0274) 
 
 
0.318*** 
(0.0261) 
0.278*** 
(0.0289) 
 
 
L2.PRate  
 
 
 
0.0663** 
(0.0245) 
 
 
 
 
0.0585* 
(0.0261) 
GDP growth 0.577*** 
(0.116) 
 
 
 
 
0.620*** 
(0.121) 
 
 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
1.224*** 
(0.131) 
 
 
 
 
1.249*** 
(0.140) 
 
 
L2.GDP growth  
 
 
 
1.282*** 
(0.124) 
 
 
 
 
1.311*** 
(0.134) 
Inflation 0.722*** 
(0.0412) 
 
 
 
 
0.746*** 
(0.0438) 
 
 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.834*** 
(0.0442) 
 
 
 
 
0.852*** 
(0.0479) 
 
 
L2.Inflation  
 
 
 
1.150*** 
(0.0405) 
 
 
 
 
1.169*** 
(0.0449) 
ResRents 0.326 
(0.301) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents  
 
-0.503 
(0.461) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ResRents  
 
 
 
-0.499 
(0.526) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ResRents*Inflation -0.216*** 
(0.0326) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents*Inflation  
 
-0.293*** 
(0.0410) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ResRents*Inflation  
 
 
 
-0.403*** 
(0.0500) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
-41.76 
(35.37) 
 
 
 
 
L.ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-94.20* 
(46.00) 
 
 
L2.ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-87.27 
(53.50) 
ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
-22.94*** 
(2.856) 
 
 
 
 
L.ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-27.07*** 
(3.537) 
 
 
L2.ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-34.74*** 
(4.311) 
Constant 1.471 
(1.446) 
-4.522** 
(1.515) 
-6.215*** 
(1.431) 
1.480 
(1.452) 
-4.259** 
(1.584) 
-5.954*** 
(1.532) 
Observations 185 185 178 185 185 178 
R2 0.7432 0.7665 0.7761 0.7447 0.7681 0.7779 
Number of countries 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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6.3.6 Conclusion 
The pooled TSCS regression analysis constitutes the third of three sets of cross-national 
statistical analyses to build and probe structuralist theory. In this final set of analyses, I 
develop an estimation strategy to explore whether the policy stance in relation to price 
stability in countries dependent on aid or natural resources is different from the policy 
stance in other types of countries.  
The analysis has provided some evidence that the pattern of cross-country data is 
broadly consistent with the structuralist propositions related to the effects of natural 
resource dependence: The greater the reliance on natural resources is, the weaker the 
relationship between changes in prices and changes in CBPRs becomes – regardless of 
whether resource dependence is measured by ResExp or ResRents. In other words, the 
evidence suggests that resource dependence reduces aversion to inflation. Results 
related to aid dependence, however, are less clear: Greater participation in IMF 
arrangements is associated with a stronger reaction to inflation than in other countries. 
This finding is in line with the proposition that central bank policy in aid dependent 
countries is more likely to be stability-oriented than in other countries. However, where 
aid dependence is measured by volumes of ODA and IMF credit received, the findings 
contradict the structuralist propositions: The relationship between aversion to inflation 
and reliance on donor and IMF financing is negative.  
It is difficult to know precisely why the findings of specifications in which I measure 
reliance on donors by IMFprogr are in line with my propositions whereas the findings 
of those specifications in which I measure reliance on donors by IMFcredit or ODA 
contradict my proposition. One explanation may be that greater reliance on aid simply 
does not induce a policy stance oriented towards stability and may even induce a policy 
stance oriented towards financial deepening. This, however, raises the question of why 
the evidence presented in the analyses of the policy stance in relation to financial 
deepening, and of the policy stance in relation to financial stability, suggests that aid 
dependence is associated with a policy stance oriented towards stability. Another 
explanation may be that the variables capturing financial flows to developing countries 
are less appropriate to test propositions about donors as external constraints on policy 
because these variables capture, quite directly, the extent to which aid increases 
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government revenues and hence the policy space for expansionary policies by easing the 
budget constraint.183  
In general, the number of IMF arrangements may better capture the influence the IMF 
gains through its signalling function, conditionality and contribution to social learning 
than the amount of financial assistance the IMF provides because conditions, social 
learning and the signalling function are more likely to be proportional to the number of 
IMF programmes than to credit volumes. The consistency with which, in the entire 
chapter, specifications using IMFprogr support the proposition related to aid 
dependence also suggests that IMFprogr is an appropriate variable to explore a 
hypothesis about donors as an external restraint. 
6.4 Summary of the Statistical Analysis and Avenues for Further Research 
This chapter has continued the exercise of extending and testing the theory of the 
structural power of capital to the context of developing countries by employing cross-
national statistical analyses of financial deepening, regulatory and monetary policies. 
The statistical analysis has helped to develop and probe the structuralist theory in 
several ways but has also limitations that open up avenues for future research. Before 
turning to the scope for future research, I will offer a brief summary of the ways in 
which the statistical analysis has helped to develop and probe the structuralist theory. 
One way in which the statistical analysis has helped to develop and probe structuralist 
theory is by requiring the development of quantitative measures of key structuralist 
concepts. Cross-national statistical analysis has not been the method of choice for 
researchers who follow the structuralist tradition. Instead, most of this research uses 
qualitative case study methodologies. Employing statistical methods, however, can help 
theory-building and -testing by dictating the development of clear measures of some of 
the key theoretical concepts which can then be used in more formal models and for 
comparative purposes.  
                                               
183
 Boockman and Dreher (2003) present similar results in a study of the contribution of the IMF and the 
World Bank to economic freedom. They use indicators of market-friendly and stability-oriented economic 
policies to measure economic freedom. Specifically, Boockmann and Dreher find that the number of 
World Bank projects increases economic freedom, while the volume of World Bank credits reduces 
freedom. The interpretation of the results that Bookmann and Dreher (2003: 647) offer is that “the 
number of programs increases freedom because it increases both the conditions imposed by the IFIs and 
the number of contacts between them and national politicians, which raises the transfer of knowledge.  
However, if the level of financing associated with the programs rises, this eases policy constraints for 
governments, which has a negative impact on governments’ willingness to undertake reforms.” 
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In this research, the main theoretical concepts to be explained are the stability-oriented 
and financial deepening-oriented central bank policy stance. For this purpose, I 
developed three different measures based on theory and data availability: a measure of 
the policy stance in relation to financial deepening, as captured by the devotion of 
human resources to the promotion of financial access and the implementation of 
financial access reforms; a measure of the policy stance in relation to financial stability, 
as captured by the stringency of prudential regulation; and a measure of the policy 
stance in relation to price stability, as captured by the reaction of central bank interest 
rates to inflation, which serves as a proxy for aversion to inflation.  
The main theoretical concepts to explain central bank policy in my framework are the 
structural dependence on donors or IFIs and on natural resources. To measure aid 
dependence, I have used variables capturing ODA and IMF credit flows, serving 
primarily as proxies for the influence gained by donors through the provision of 
financing, and a variable capturing the participation in IMF arrangements, serving 
primarily as a proxy for the influence the IMF gains through its signalling function, 
conditionality and contribution to social learning. To measure resource dependence, I 
have constructed indicators of reliance on resource export revenues and natural resource 
rents as proxies for the reliance of the economy on natural resource exploitation.  
Another way in which the statistical analysis has contributed to developing and probing 
structuralist propositions is by facilitating a comparative assessment of the explanatory 
power of the variables to capture aid and resource dependence. Which 
conceptualisations of aid and resource dependence perform best in explaining central 
bank policy stances? Is it possible that effects attributed to aid and resource dependence 
simply capture the level of economic or political development? The statistical analysis 
employed here provides an answer to the first question by using a variety of measures of 
aid and resource dependence and by comparing their statistical significance. The 
analysis reveals, for instance, that the participation in IMF programmes performed 
particularly well in predicting the central bank policy stance. The analysis also provides 
an answer to the second question by including some control variables. Yet, as stressed 
from the outset, the aim of this thesis is not to discover the myriad of factors that 
explain central bank policy. Instead, its aim is to further develop and probe structuralist 
explanations for central bank policy. For this reason, and because the number of control 
variables that could be included in the analyses was restricted by the limited number of 
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observations and hence limited degrees of freedom, I considered rival explanations only 
when excluding them from the analysis would have posed significant risks of omitted 
variable bias.  
A third way in which the statistical analysis has contributed to developing and probing 
structuralist propositions is by generating evidence on the relationship between the 
sources of finance and the central bank policy stance based on a relatively large number 
of developing countries. While the case studies provided some supportive evidence that 
those who control the sources of finance on which a country relies to finance investment 
shape central bank policy stances for a sample of African countries, the statistical 
analysis was intended to explore the generalisability of this evidence beyond Africa. 
The statistical analysis thus sheds light on the contexts to which the structuralist 
propositions may apply, on their so-called scope conditions.  
Turning to financial deepening policies, the pattern of the data is broadly consistent 
with the structuralist propositions. The logistic regression analysis suggests that greater 
reliance on aid, whether measured by reliance on ODA, IMF credit or IMF 
arrangements, is associated with less engagement in financial deepening, at least in 
developing countries outside Africa. In the analysis that does not distinguish between 
African and non-African countries, the only relevant significant relationship I find is 
that as participation in IMF programmes increases, the implementation of financial 
access reforms becomes less likely. Why is there more evidence for non-African 
countries suggesting that there is a negative relationship between aid dependence and a 
policy stance oriented towards financial deepening? A possible explanation is that 
Africa’s weakly developed financial sector may have induced donors to support, or at 
least to not discourage, African regulators to employ a policy stance oriented towards 
financial deepening. For resource dependent developing countries, I find some 
supportive evidence that these countries are more likely to have a policy stance oriented 
towards financial deepening. 
The cross-country regression analysis of prudential regulation provides some additional 
evidence for the generalisability of the structuralist propositions. Countries which are 
more dependent on aid are, at least where aid dependence is measured by reliance on 
IMF assistance, more likely to be committed to financial stability. With respect to 
resource dependence, the analysis has failed to establish a significant relationship and 
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thus to reaffirm the findings of the case study of Nigeria. However, additional tests 
suggest that in African countries, any positive relationships between resource 
dependence and the policy stance in relation to financial stability are significantly 
weaker and are likely to be negative. For a better understanding of the relationship 
between resource dependence and the policy stance in relation to financial stability it 
would be helpful to know why results for African and non-African countries differ. This 
question, which the theory of the structural power of capital is not able to answer, might 
be an issue for further research. 
The final pieces of statistical evidence come from the TSCS analysis of monetary 
policy. The conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis on the generalisability of 
the propositions are mixed. In particular, greater reliance on aid as measured by the 
volume of ODA or IMF credit received is correlated with less commitment to price 
stability as indicated by a weaker reaction to inflation. This finding contradicts the 
structuralist propositions. However, where aid dependence is measured by participation 
in IMF arrangements, it is associated with a greater aversion to inflation, in line with the 
proposition. For resource dependent countries, the pattern of cross-country data appears 
to be broadly consistent with the structuralist propositions: Resource dependence is 
associated with lower aversion to inflation.   
Table 6.9 compares these findings and the structuralist propositions. Obviously, the 
statistical results are not fully consistent with the structuralist propositions and case 
study results. Notably, the results related to aid dependence in the analysis of monetary 
policy contradict my proposition. However, for the areas of financial deepening policy, 
prudential regulation and in part also monetary policy, there is evidence suggesting that 
the pattern of cross-national data is broadly in line with the structuralist propositions. 
Each of the three sets of statistical analysis has – largely due to data availability – 
methodological limitations, rendering each not entirely convincing on its own. The 
evidence taken together, however, suggests that we must at least not reject the 
possibility that the propositions can be generalised beyond Nigeria and Uganda. 
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Table 6.9: Comparison of Structuralist Propositions and Statistical Findings 
Policy field 
Expected 
influence of 
aid 
dependence 
Expected 
influence of 
resource 
dependence 
Significant 
evidence that 
supports the 
proposition 
related to aid 
dependence? 
Significant 
evidence that 
contradicts the 
proposition 
related to aid 
dependence? 
Significant 
evidence that 
supports the 
proposition 
related to 
resource 
dependence? 
Significant 
evidence that 
contradicts the 
proposition 
related to 
resource 
dependence? 
Financial 
deepening 
policies 
– + 
Yes 
(IMFprogr; 
for non-
African 
countries: 
ODA; 
IMFprogr; 
IMFcredit) 
No Yes (ResExp; ResRents) No 
Prudential 
regulation + – 
Yes 
(IMFprogr; 
IMFcredit) 
No 
No (Yes for 
African 
countries) 
No 
Monetary 
policy + – 
Yesa 
(IMFprogr) 
Yes (ODA; 
IMFcredit) 
Yes (ResExp; 
ResRents) No
b
 
Note: “+” denotes positive relationship and “–“ negative relationship. Significant variables in parentheses. 
aContemporaneous significant relationship in three specifications but no granger causality (ODA). 
bContemporaneous significant relationship in one specification but no granger causality (ResRents). 
 
What do the insights we have gained through the statistical analysis imply for the 
development of structuralist theory? Given that there is some supportive statistical 
evidence for the structuralist propositions but that some methodological and some 
substantive questions remain unresolved, a key conclusion is that there is an added 
value of adapting, refining and additional testing of the structuralist propositions.  
The unresolved substantive questions relate primarily to the role of aid dependence in 
shaping central bank policy. The finding of a negative relationship between aid 
dependence as measured by the volume of donor financing received and inflation-
aversion may indicate that the variables capturing the volume of donor or IMF financing 
received may be less appropriate to test a proposition about donors as an external 
restraint because they may also capture the extent to which aid eases the budget 
constraint and facilitates expansionary policies. More appropriate for testing a 
proposition about the IMF as an external restraint seems to be the variable which 
captures the number of IMF arrangements in place. This variable, which turned out to 
have the expected effect across a wide range of specifications, appears to be particularly 
appropriate to measure the power of the IMF over central bank policy and its role as a 
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gatekeeper because it is likely to capture the influence the IMF may gain through 
conditionality, encouraging social learning and the signal which having an IMF 
programme in place sends to other donors and markets.  
Moreover, the finding of a negative relationship between aid dependence and the 
orientation of policy towards price stability, which contradicts my proposition, points to 
the need to adapt and refine my model linking aid dependence to central bank policy. 
What could such an adaptation look like? I see two major issues which should receive 
consideration regarding such adaptations.  
One issue is the need to incorporate the possibility of changes in donors’ policy 
preferences. Paradigms of foreign assistance changed substantially between the 1990s, 
when promoting macroeconomic stability was a key goal of aid, and the 2000s, when 
financial deepening became an increasingly important goal. In countries where donors 
have political power, this change in preferences should, as structuralist theory 
hypothesises and the analysis of central bank policy in contemporary Uganda suggests, 
translate into a policy stance which places emphasis on both stability and financial 
deepening. This chapter has presented statistical evidence indicating that in African 
countries, donors are supportive of a policy stance oriented towards financial deepening. 
This suggests that in adapting the model which links aid dependence to the orientation 
of central bank policy, it is important to acknowledge that donors not only continue to 
prefer a stability-oriented central bank policy stance but that, in recent years, they also 
prefer policies to deepen financial sectors.   
Another issue which should be considered in a refinement of the model linking aid 
dependence to the stance of central bank policy is that the effects of aid dependence on 
the orientation of policy may differ, depending on the channels through which donors 
exert influence and, correspondingly, depending on the variables used to measure 
donors’ influence. In this chapter, I presented evidence suggesting that larger volumes 
of donor financing are associated with less central bank commitment to guarding price 
stability whereas greater participation in IMF programmes is associated with more 
central bank commitment to guarding price stability. These results provide indications 
that where donors influence central bank policy through revenue incentives (as captured 
particularly by the indicators of aid volumes received), this may be associated with 
expansionary policy, whereas where donors influence central bank policy through 
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conditionality, encouraging social learning or signalling (as captured particularly by the 
indicator of participation in IMF programmes), this may be associated with a greater 
orientation of policy towards price stability.  
Future research may also be able to address some of the methodological limitations of 
the statistical analysis presented here. The main problem I faced concerned data 
availability: Due to the lack of data, finding measures which are both meaningful and 
comparable across countries and conducting powerful statistical tests was difficult. 
There also remain unresolved questions related to causality in the statistical analysis 
presented in this thesis. There appears to be scope for alternative, creative econometric 
approaches, in particular as the quality of available data improves. That said, the 
potential of case studies to reveal more about the relationship between the sources of 
finance and central bank policy is substantial, not least because case studies are less 
limited in temporal scope and may shed light on causal pathways. Thus, complementing 
cross-national statistical with case study analysis seems to be a promising route to build 
and probe structuralist theory. The next and final chapter of the thesis correspondingly 
reviews the combined evidence from the statistical and case study analysis. 
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6.5 Appendix 
6.5.1 Analysis of the Policy Stance in Relation to Financial Deepening 
Table 6.A1: Analysis of Financial Deepening Policies: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Team 87 0.3678161 0.4850064 0 1 
Reform 87 0.6321839 0.4850064 0 1 
ODA 91 5.735134 11.22162 -0.1211605 93.17417 
IMFcredit 90 0.0260721 0.0798883 0.0005329 0.7522758 
IMFprogr 97 1.494845 1.780237 0 7 
ResExp 80 0.105098 0.1324426 0.0006544 0.528942 
ResRents  98 12.42313 19.20122 0 88.9287 
GDPPC (ln) 96 7.455463 1.129401 4.995622 9.553375 
Polity2 95 3.427368 5.862583 -9 10 
PrCredit 87 32.02252 25.04043 3.891362 142.8013 
  
Table 6.A2: Aid Dependence and Policy Stance in Relation to Financial Deepening: 
Interaction of Africa Dummy and Aid Dependence Variable 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results of logistic regression, dependent variable takes the values 0 or 1. 
+
 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Team  Team  Team  Reform Reform Reform 
lnGDPPC -1.251** 
(0.486) 
-0.458 
(0.373) 
-0.259 
(0.338) 
-0.266 
(0.390) 
0.177 
(0.346) 
-0.281 
(0.368) 
Polity2 -0.0113 
(0.0502) 
-0.0248 
(0.0492) 
-0.00604 
(0.0486) 
-0.102+ 
(0.0535) 
-0.0809 
(0.0547) 
-0.0332 
(0.0582) 
PrCredit 0.00174 
(0.0114) 
-0.000852 
(0.0113) 
0.000309 
(0.0111) 
-0.0146 
(0.0121) 
-0.0138 
(0.0115) 
-0.0240+ 
(0.0128) 
Africa 0.763 
(0.892) 
0.606 
(0.859) 
0.265 
(0.802) 
-0.479 
(0.844) 
-0.346 
(0.790) 
-0.436 
(1.023) 
ODA -0.441* 
(0.197) 
 
 
 
 
-0.264+ 
(0.142) 
 
 
 
 
Africa*ODA 0.301 
(0.185) 
 
 
 
 
0.255+ 
(0.139) 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit  
 
-65.23 
(40.59) 
 
 
 
 
-57.03* 
(27.05) 
 
 
Africa*IMFcredit  
 
53.51 
(45.15) 
 
 
 
 
59.22* 
(27.39) 
 
 
IMFprogr  
 
 
 
-0.358 
(0.258) 
 
 
 
 
-0.875** 
(0.281) 
Africa*IMFprogr  
 
 
 
0.465 
(0.345) 
 
 
 
 
0.448 
(0.374) 
Constant 9.480* 
(3.781) 
3.367 
(2.763) 
1.503 
(2.539) 
3.864 
(3.058) 
0.600 
(2.517) 
4.817+ 
(2.916) 
Observations 69 69 70 70 69 103 
Pseudo R2 0.1861 0.1625 0.1005 0.1184 0.1313 0.2164 
Log-likelihood -37.20 -39.06 -44.08 -40.72 -40.97 -39.55 
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6.5.2 Analysis of the Policy Stance in Relation to Financial Stability 
6.5.2.1 The Construction of the Composite Indicator Regulatory Stringency: 
Measurement and Aggregation 
With respect to the selection of the measurement level and coding, I follow Barth et al. 
(2013), who were engaged in conducting the first three rounds of the World Bank 
surveys on “Bank Regulation and Supervision Around the World” and have published a 
dataset with coded184 data from the four rounds.185 I constructed the composite indicator 
supervisory authority based on that dataset, both because it helped to keep the scope of 
the research manageable and because Barth et al. (2013) devoted substantial effort to 
identifying and resolving inconsistencies and missing values by reviewing each of the 
four surveys individually and by considering the time-series of answers for each country 
to raise the data quality. Most of the relevant survey questions are in a yes/no format so 
that, following Barth, Caprio and Levine (2013), I assigned indicators in most cases 
binary values of 0 or 1.  
The aggregation rule used here is simple but transparent. It has two elements:  
• First, the employment of equal weighting and additive aggregation for the 
components. In employing equal weighting and adding the components my process 
of aggregation follows existing research (Barth et al., 2013). The employment of 
equal weighting also reflects the lack of conclusive evidence on the relative 
importance of different components of regulatory and supervisory frameworks: 
Assigning different weights suggests a theoretical and empirical knowledge about 
the relative importance of the components which does not exist and equal weighting 
of the different components of composite indicators allows to give equal 
consideration to the diverging views on what constitute key elements of developing 
                                               
184
 In the coding process Barth et al. (2013) converted raw data into quantitative measures. They applied 
four major coding rules: First, to fill in blanks, if there are responses to a question in at least two surveys 
and these responses are the same, the missing two (or one) is filled in as the same (except in Survey IV, 
see second rule). Second, missing responses for Survey IV are never filled in based on responses to earlier 
surveys, since the financial crisis that emerged in 2007 may have led to many regulatory changes in 
countries. Third, missing responses from countries of three groups with uniform bank regulations and 
supervisory practices (Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, West African Monetary Union, and Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community) are filled in based on responses from other countries in the 
same groups. Fourth, in all other ambiguous cases in which changes were made, additional information 
from published sources, online documents, and official releases were used to make those changes. 
185
 Barth et al. (see for instance 2001; 2005; 2013) also constructed composite indicators based on their 
available data. I decided not to use these indicators as a template for the main composite indicators of this 
study because in constructing the composite indicators Barth et al. placed emphasis on 
comprehensiveness, rather than on relevance for enhancing financial stability. 
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countries’ prudential framework. Additive aggregation reflects the assumption that 
compensation between different components of regulation is to some extent 
possible. In other words, the aggregation rule is based on the assumption that low 
scorings in one component of a composite indicator can be compensated by a higher 
scoring in another component because the components are substitutes. Obviously, 
there are limits to compensation with some policies in regulatory frameworks being 
to some degree dependent on other policies working well. However, the assumption 
of compensability is in line with research highlighting that high levels of capital can 
to some extent compensate for lower supervisory authority (Fuchs et al., 2012), 
justifying the additive aggregation of supervisory authority and capital stringency. 
Besides this theoretical argument, multiplying instead of summing up the values 
assigned to the components to express complementarities would have been 
problematic due to the binary coding (0 and 1) of the indicators. Multiplication 
increases the number of cases where the composite indicator has a value of 0, 
resulting in a loss of variation in stringency measures.  
• Second, the calculation of an average scaled index in the case of supervisory 
authority in order to maximise the number of cases, following Barth et al. (2013). In 
general, a composite indicator is created by adding together the values assigned to 
the indicators at the preceding hierarchical level and dividing the result by the 
number of these indicators, so that a composite indicator ranges from 0 to 1, 
whereby higher values indicate greater stringency. I only considered an index value 
as “not available” if less than 50% of the answers to the corresponding questions 
were available and less than three questions were used in any particular index. 
Otherwise, i.e. if at least 50% of the answers are available and at least three or more 
questions are used in any particular index (as is only the case for supervisory 
authority), I would first calculate the index as an average of the available question 
responses multiplied by the total number of questions asked for in the index.186 The 
result is then divided by the total number of questions asked for in the index (i.e. 4 
in the case of supervisory authority) so that it ranges from 0 to 1.  
 
                                               
186
  For example, if two of the four questions related to supervisory authority were not answered, I 
calculated an average of the available two responses and multiplied it by four. If three of four questions 
were not answered I assigned “not available”. 
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I created the composite indicator stringency by adding the values assigned to the two 
components, capital stringency and supervisory authority, together and dividing the 
result by two. The composite indicator thus ranges from 0 to 1. The remainder of this 
section explains how I assigned values to the two components with reference to the 
survey questions. 
Indicator Capital Stringency 
The indicator relies on the following survey question:  
What is the minimum required risk-based regulatory capital ratio? 
I assigned the following values to the minimum required risk-based regulatory capital 
ratio  (r): If r ≤8% I assigned a value of 0 because 8 % is the minimum required risk-
based regulatory capital ratio by Basel I and II; if 8<r ≤10 I assigned a value of 0.5; if 
10<r I assigned  a value of 1.187  
Composite Indicator Supervisory Authority to Intervene  
The composite indicator relies on the following survey questions: 
Indicator/Survey question Sub-component 
Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or 
management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential 
losses? 
Power to require a bank to 
meet regulatory standards 
which are above the 
minimum standards as a 
preventative measure 
Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal 
organisational structure? 
Power to take measures 
where banks are still 
solvent but preventative 
measures have failed 
Can the supervisory agency supersede bank shareholder rights and 
declare bank insolvent? 
Power to take measures 
where banks become 
insolvent 
Does the law establish pre-determined levels of solvency 
deterioration which forces automatic actions such as intervention? 
Existence of prompt 
corrective action rules 
 
To each of the answers I assigned a value of 1 if the answer was “yes” and 0 otherwise. 
I created the index by adding these four values together and dividing the result by four. 
  
                                               
187
 These thresholds are chosen to create three groups with an equal size of observations. They capture the 
distance from the Basel minimum required capital ratio of 8%.   
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6.5.2.2 Data and Results 
Table 6.A3: Analysis of Prudential Regulation and Supervision: Summary 
Statistics  
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
HiCapital 79 0.2658228 0.4445932 0 1 
Capital 79 9.696203 2.091524 6 20 
CIStr 79 0.6292194 0.2298305 0.25 1 
ODA 81 5.570249 6.552461 0.0082461 29.40801 
IMFcredit 83 0.0442653 0.0616397 0.0002007 0.3477598 
IMFprogr 92 2.456522 2.269787 0 8 
ResExp  80 0.0688871 0.0970497 0.0000163 0.3985044 
ResRents 91 8.639846 20.75939 0 142.38 
GDPPC (ln) 90 7.264908 1.090474 4.917824 9.383806 
Polity2 88 2.618182 5.933938 -10 10 
Crisis 88 0.5113636 1.050389 0 5 
 
Table 6.A4: Resource Dependence, Capital and CIStr: Interaction of Developing 
Country Dummy and Resource Dependence Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Capital Capital CIStr CIStr 
lnGDPPC -0.395 
(0.416) 
-0.442 
(0.388) 
-0.0538+ 
(0.0313) 
-0.0507 
(0.0313) 
Polity2 0.0216 
(0.0385) 
0.0324 
(0.0370) 
0.00215 
(0.00482) 
0.00253 
(0.00467) 
Africa -0.631 
(1.050) 
-0.769 
(0.932) 
-0.0646 
(0.0879) 
-0.0903 
(0.0795) 
ResExp 2.323 
(2.619) 
 
 
0.616+ 
(0.347) 
 
 
Africa*ResExp -6.564+ 
(3.511) 
 
 
-0.963* 
(0.465) 
 
 
ResRents  
 
0.0195 
(0.0171) 
 
 
0.00260 
(0.00308) 
Africa*ResRents  
 
-0.0539* 
(0.0257) 
 
 
-0.00571+ 
(0.00342) 
Constant 12.60*** 
(3.404) 
12.92*** 
(3.102) 
1.002*** 
(0.244) 
0.998*** 
(0.237) 
Observations 70 75 70 75 
Adjusted R2 -0.021 0.031 0.028 0.033 
F 2.341 22.55 1.841 19.17 
df_m 5 5 5 5 
df_r 64 69 64 69 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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6.5.3 Analysis of the Policy Stance in Relation to Price Stability 
6.5.3.1 Data 
Table 6.A5: Definitions of Central Bank Policy Rates of the Countries Included in 
the Main Specifications  
Country Definitions of central bank policy rates  
Brazil Target rate for overnight interbank loans collateralised by 
government bonds, registered with and traded on the Sistema 
Especial de Liquidaçao e Custodia (SELIC). The actual SELIC rate 
is used to determine the discount rate charged by the CBB. 
Colombia Intervention rate determined by the Bank of the Republic to either 
increase or decrease liquidity in the economy. 
Indonesia Refers to the Bank Indonesia rate, which is the policy rate reflecting 
the monetary policy stance adopted by Bank Indonesia and 
announced to the public. 
Malaysia Refers to the overnight policy rate, which is set by Bank Negara 
Malaysia (BNM) for monetary policy direction. It is the target rate 
for the day-today liquidity operations of the BNM. 
Peru  Reference rate determined by Central Reserve Bank of Peru to 
establish a benchmark interest rate for interbank transactions, 
impacting operations of the financial institutions with the public. 
Thailand Policy rate is the rate announced by the Monetary Policy Committee 
in conducting monetary policy under the inflation-targeting 
framework. The monetary policy stance is signalled through the 
policy interest rate. Beginning on May 23, 2000, the 14-day 
repurchase rate was used as the policy interest rate. Beginning on 
January 16, 2007, the one-day repurchase rate was used.  
Turkey Interbank rate at which funds can be lent and borrowed for one day 
(overnight). The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey uses this 
base rate for monetary policy purposes. The level of the overnight 
rate has a direct effect on the level of interest rates for products such 
as savings, loans and mortgages. 
Source: IMF (2013b) 
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Table 6.A6: Analysis of Monetary Policy: Summary Statistics, Quarterly Data 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
PRate 501 10.83436 11.99693 1.25 183.2 
DRate 1516 15.05421 22.04478 1.25 316.01 
Inflation 1520 9.851089 22.52757 -11.44118 405.7238 
GDP growth 520 5.174525 3.162861 -9.848425 24.31127 
ODA 1456 1.370963 1.801961 -0.1723793 16.80005 
IMFcredit 1408 0.0079035 0.0124476 0.0001037 0.0942807 
IMFprogr 1568 0.1256378 0.1360378 0 0.5 
ResRents 1500 2.098584 4.736041 0 34.78637 
ResExp 1360 0.0214855 0.0347676 3.95E-06 0.1935185 
 
 
 
Table 6.A7: Analysis of Monetary Policy: Summary Statistics, Quarterly Data for 
the Seven Countries Included in the Main Specifications 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
PRate 192 13.24755 17.65432 1.25 183.2 
DRate 207 12.91391 17.1083 1.25 183.2 
Inflation 224 8.136803 11.86496 -1.010103 70.32743 
GDP growth 224 4.852085 2.809209 -9.848425 11.93874 
ODA 224 0.0736677 0.088919 -0.1723793 0.2749182 
IMFcredit 224 0.0041919 0.0059973 0.0001037 0.0239093 
IMFprogr 224 0.1517857 0.1312118 0 0.5 
ResRents 224 1.078309 0.7898431 0.039008 3.261337 
ResExp 224 0.0155668 0.011956 0.000946 0.044412 
 
 
 
Table 6.A8: Analysis of Monetary Policy: Summary Statistics, Annual Data 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
PRate 128 11.28789 17.22873 1.25 183.2 
Inflation 391 9.882127 20.98902 -10.06781 324.9959 
GDP growth 299 5.282936 4.414652 -8.388323 55.55552 
ODA 364 5.48385 7.215287 -0.6895173 67.20018 
IMFcredit 352 0.0316141 0.0498436 0.0004147 0.3771229 
IMFprogr 392 0.502551 0.544673 0 2 
ResRents 375 8.394334 18.96315 0 139.1455 
ResExp 340 0.0859422 0.139224 0.0000158 0.7740741 
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Table 6.A9: Analysis of Monetary Policy: Countries Included in the Analysis 
Main specification 
(dependent variable PRate, 
quarterly data) 
Alternative specification 1 
(dependent variable DRate, 
quarterly data) 
Alternative specification 2 
(dependent variable PRate, 
annual data) 
Brazil Bolivia Albania 
Colombia Botswana Armenia 
Indonesia Brazil Brazil 
Malaysia Colombia Colombia 
Peru Costa Rica Dominican Republic 
Thailand Croatia Gambia 
Turkey Egypt Guyana 
 India Indonesia 
 Indonesia Iraq 
 Macedonia Jordan 
 Malaysia Malaysia 
 Morocco Moldova 
 Peru Nepal 
 Philippines Papua New Guinea 
 Romania Peru 
 Rwanda South Africa 
 Thailand Thailand 
 Turkey Turkey 
 Uruguay Vietnam 
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6.5.3.2 Results 
This section presents tables with further results of the analysis of the relationship 
between the sources of finance and the policy stance in relation to price stability. While 
tables with results from the main specifications and the related discussion are in the 
main part of the thesis, the tables shown in the appendix present results from model 
specifications serving as robustness checks. A brief discussion of the results from the 
robustness checks can be found in the main part of the thesis. Note that I do not report 
estimates for country and time fixed-effects. This section first describes the 
specifications used in the tables and then presents the actual tables. 
Aid Dependence and the Policy Stance in Relation to Price Stability   
Tables 6.A10 through 6.A16 report results for a variety of specifications exploring the 
relationship between aid dependence and the aversion to inflation, which is the proxy 
for the policy stance in relation to price stability. In particular: 
• Tables 6.A10 and 6.A11 report results for regressions where the dependent variable 
is the differenced central bank policy rate, PRate_d. The main relationship of 
interest is thus how changes in the consumer price index (i.e. inflation) in a context 
of aid dependence affect changes in the central bank policy rate.  
• Tables 6.A12 through 6.A14 report results from specifications using PRate as the 
dependent variable based on annual data. Table 6.A12 uses the AR1 error model and 
Table 6.A13 the LDV model. Table 6.A14 reports results from an Arellano-Bond 
LDV model, a two step difference GMM.188 I implemented the estimator using 
State’s xtabond2 command. I used forward orthogonal deviations as an alternative 
to differencing that preserves sample size in panels with gaps, and the Windmeijer 
finite sample correction to the reported standard errors in two step estimation 
without which those standard errors tend to be severely downward biased 
(Roodman, 2006).189 I implemented time fixed-effects, whose estimates are not 
reported here, to reduce the risk of a contemporaneous correlation of errors. Note, 
that some standard errors in Table 6.A14, model 2, are missing, due to a non-
symmetric or highly singular variance matrix. 
                                               
188
 I did not employ System GMM because it uses more instruments than system GMM, which is 
problematic when the number of countries in the dataset is small. 
189
 I implemented two-step GMM because two-step standard errors, with the Windmeijer correction, are 
considered quite accurate and seem modestly superior to robust one-step (Roodman, 2006). 
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• Tables 6.A15 and 6.A16 report results for regressions where the dependent variable 
is DRate, i.e. the central bank policy rate (IFS, line 60), or, where it is not available, 
the discount rate (IFS, line 60A).  
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Table 6.A10: Differenced Dependent Variable: Fixed-Effects with PCSE and 
AR(1) Correction Using Different Lag Structures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d 
GDP growth 0.619*** 
(0.0683) 
 
 
 
 
0.249** 
(0.0783) 
 
 
 
 
0.717*** 
(0.0756) 
 
 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
0.959*** 
(0.106) 
 
 
 
 
0.815*** 
(0.0989) 
 
 
 
 
0.888*** 
(0.0977) 
 
 
L2.GDP growth  
 
 
 
-0.117* 
(0.0588) 
 
 
 
 
-0.442*** 
(0.0596) 
 
 
 
 
-0.207*** 
(0.0586) 
Inflation -0.0123 
(0.0312) 
 
 
 
 
0.517*** 
(0.0376) 
 
 
 
 
0.155** 
(0.0525) 
 
 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.311*** 
(0.0460) 
 
 
 
 
0.339*** 
(0.0490) 
 
 
 
 
0.0242 
(0.0575) 
 
 
L2.Inflation  
 
 
 
0.0792** 
(0.0257) 
 
 
 
 
0.176*** 
(0.0322) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0170 
(0.0497) 
ODA -3.808 
(3.144) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA  
 
16.78*** 
(2.444) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ODA  
 
 
 
1.240 
(1.686) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ODA*Inflation 2.986*** 
(0.456) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA*Inflation  
 
-1.909*** 
(0.397) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ODA*Inflation  
 
 
 
0.0285 
(0.271) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
-414.6*** 
(111.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
204.2*** 
(59.52) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
137.7** 
(49.69) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
-30.91*** 
(2.627) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-9.611*** 
(2.900) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-10.94*** 
(1.939) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.971* 
(1.988) 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.434 
(2.123) 
 
 
L2.IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.969 
(1.540) 
IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.265 
(0.223) 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.887*** 
(0.261) 
 
 
L2.IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.354 
(0.216) 
Constant -3.629*** 
(0.508) 
-13.76*** 
(1.777) 
0.504 
(0.394) 
-2.607*** 
(0.493) 
-5.635*** 
(0.677) 
-0.874 
(1.101) 
-9.655*** 
(1.125) 
-11.85*** 
(1.496) 
-1.322 
(0.987) 
Observations 189 185 181 189 185 181 189 185 181 
R2 0.0122 0.0174 0.0025 0.0723 0.0182 0.0049 0.0094 0.0151 0.0025 
Number of countries 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6.A11: Differenced Dependent Variable: Fixed-Effects with PCSE and LDV 
Using Different Lag Structures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d 
L.PRate_d -0.394*** 
(0.0240) 
-0.392*** 
(0.0305) 
 
 
-0.379*** 
(0.0191) 
-0.444*** 
(0.0220) 
 
 
-0.395*** 
(0.0300) 
-0.392*** 
(0.0317) 
 
 
L2.PRate_d  
 
 
 
-0.0740*** 
(0.0176) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0937*** 
(0.0166) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0682*** 
(0.0157) 
GDP growth 1.159*** 
(0.141) 
 
 
 
 
1.049*** 
(0.118) 
 
 
 
 
1.290*** 
(0.170) 
 
 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
1.395*** 
(0.181) 
 
 
 
 
1.122*** 
(0.127) 
 
 
 
 
1.387*** 
(0.174) 
 
 
L2.GDP growth  
 
 
 
-0.158 
(0.0969) 
 
 
 
 
-0.195* 
(0.0863) 
 
 
 
 
0.0147 
(0.0870) 
Inflation 0.0251 
(0.0439) 
 
 
 
 
0.746*** 
(0.0536) 
 
 
 
 
0.00342 
(0.0845) 
 
 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.225*** 
(0.0573) 
 
 
 
 
0.565*** 
(0.0496) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0741 
(0.0751) 
 
 
L2.Inflation  
 
 
 
0.00477 
(0.0337) 
 
 
 
 
0.346*** 
(0.0344) 
 
 
 
 
0.0323 
(0.0803) 
ODA -10.24*** 
(2.981) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA  
 
6.957+ 
(3.586) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ODA  
 
 
 
-0.550 
(4.119) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ODA*Inflation 2.521*** 
(0.387) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA*Inflation  
 
0.282 
(0.539) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ODA*Inflation  
 
 
 
2.488*** 
(0.625) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
-62.72 
(78.77) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38.28 
(60.97) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
332.7*** 
(53.69) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
-39.13*** 
(3.029) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-25.88*** 
(2.975) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-20.40*** 
(2.024) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-9.787* 
(4.059) 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-5.560+ 
(3.115) 
 
 
L2.IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.24*** 
(2.715) 
IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.366 
(0.425) 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.278*** 
(0.377) 
 
 
L2.IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.371 
(0.342) 
Constant -11.09*** 
(1.773) 
-15.97*** 
(2.240) 
-1.174 
(1.162) 
-12.87*** 
(1.415) 
-14.29*** 
(1.422) 
-4.312*** 
(1.041) 
-10.97*** 
(1.857) 
-15.03*** 
(1.906) 
-5.768*** 
(1.135) 
Observations 182 182 175 182 182 175 182 182 175 
Adjusted R2 0.3466 0.3534 0.2468 0.4335 0.3923 0.2546 0.3443 0.3535 0.2442 
Number of countries 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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Table 6.A12: Annual Data: Fixed-Effects with PCSE and AR(1) Correction Using 
Different Lag Structures 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate 
GDP growth 0.00686 
(0.231) 
 
 
1.347*** 
(0.339) 
 
 
0.185 
(0.398) 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
-0.0419 
(0.0700) 
 
 
0.119 
(0.217) 
 
 
0.0231 
(0.0539) 
Inflation 1.004*** 
(0.222) 
 
 
1.793*** 
(0.326) 
 
 
0.333 
(0.311) 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.395*** 
(0.0860) 
 
 
0.522*** 
(0.117) 
 
 
0.244* 
(0.0972) 
ODA 1.868** 
(0.615) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA  
 
0.287+ 
(0.167) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ODA*Inflation -0.0589*** 
(0.0173) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA*Inflation  
 
-0.00650 
(0.00496) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit  
 
 
 
108.0*** 
(31.73) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
39.39* 
(16.80) 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
-8.384*** 
(2.199) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
-2.464** 
(0.895) 
 
 
 
 
IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.477 
(1.827) 
 
 
L.IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.384 
(0.689) 
IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.429 
(0.353) 
 
 
L.IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.162+ 
(0.0871) 
Constant -4.659 
(4.132) 
4.028*** 
(1.179) 
-7.804** 
(2.602) 
3.368* 
(1.483) 
6.731* 
(2.689) 
5.514*** 
(0.830) 
Observations 128 115 124 112 128 116 
R2 0.4987 0.7468 0.6328 0.7651 0.4495 0.7508 
Number of countries 19 19 18 18 19 19 
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Table 6.A13: Annual Data: Fixed-Effects with PCSE and LDV Using Different Lag 
Structures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate PRate 
L.PRate 0.156*** 
(0.0238) 
0.235*** 
(0.0209) 
0.119*** 
(0.0226) 
0.228*** 
(0.0253) 
0.236*** 
(0.0327) 
0.230*** 
(0.0205) 
GDP growth -0.0319 
(0.102) 
 
 
0.150+ 
(0.0904) 
 
 
0.133 
(0.0897) 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
-0.270*** 
(0.0430) 
 
 
-0.386** 
(0.121) 
 
 
-0.184*** 
(0.0421) 
Inflation 0.373*** 
(0.0597) 
 
 
0.482*** 
(0.0552) 
 
 
0.0786 
(0.138) 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.0867* 
(0.0373) 
 
 
0.112* 
(0.0495) 
 
 
-0.00541 
(0.0553) 
ODA 0.627*** 
(0.102) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA  
 
0.181 
(0.111) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ODA*Inflation -0.0239*** 
(0.00359) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA*Inflation  
 
-0.00706* 
(0.00333) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit  
 
 
 
15.20* 
(7.019) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
4.249 
(9.605) 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
0.434 
(0.780) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.767* 
(0.360) 
 
 
 
 
IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.792 
(0.900) 
 
 
L.IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00861 
(0.541) 
IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0520 
(0.154) 
 
 
L.IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.110* 
(0.0429) 
Constant 2.236** 
(0.861) 
5.392*** 
(0.808) 
4.296*** 
(0.451) 
7.153*** 
(0.975) 
3.074* 
(1.207) 
6.032*** 
(0.639) 
Observations 109 109 106 106 109 109 
Adjusted R2 0.9408 0.9269 0.9526 0.9270 0.9129 0.9287 
Number of countries 19 19 18 18 19 19 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6.A14: Annual Data: Arellano-Bond LDV Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 PRate PRate PRate 
L.PRate 0.101 
(0.0598) 
0.0825 
(.) 
0.203 
(0.124) 
GDP growth -0.0964 
(0.325) 
-0.720 
(.) 
0.0794 
(0.543) 
L.GDP growth -0.198 
(0.313) 
-0.570* 
(0.222) 
-0.178 
(0.773) 
Inflation 0.514** 
(0.145) 
0.591 
(0.418) 
0.253 
(0.976) 
L.Inflation 0.0378 
(0.0560) 
-0.0995 
(0.133) 
-0.0941 
(0.336) 
ODA 0.559 
(0.504) 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA -0.0468 
(0.496) 
 
 
 
 
ODA*Inflation -0.0222 
(0.0142) 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA*Inflation -0.00894 
(0.0159) 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit  
 
99.39 
(85.95) 
 
 
L.IMFcredit  
 
-14.40 
(.) 
 
 
IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
-2.017 
(6.068) 
 
 
L.IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
0.788 
(1.924) 
 
 
IMFprogr  
 
 
 
2.932 
(13.07) 
L.IMFprogr  
 
 
 
0.714 
(4.122) 
IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
-0.149 
(1.045) 
L.IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
0.187 
(0.225) 
Observations 90 88 90 
Number of countries 19 18 19 
Number of instruments 41 41 41 
Standard errors in parentheses. Missing values for standard errors are due to a non-symmetric or highly 
singular variance matrix. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6.A15: DRate as Dependent Variable: Fixed-Effects with PCSE and AR(1) 
Correction Using Different Lag Structures 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 DRate DRate DRate DRate DRate DRate DRate DRate DRate 
GDP growth 0.0109 
(0.0316) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0359 
(0.0374) 
 
 
 
 
0.0225 
(0.0301) 
 
 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
0.188*** 
(0.0273) 
 
 
 
 
0.160*** 
(0.0246) 
 
 
 
 
0.170*** 
(0.0262) 
 
 
L2.GDP growth  
 
 
 
0.0532+ 
(0.0273) 
 
 
 
 
0.0165 
(0.0266) 
 
 
 
 
0.0320 
(0.0254) 
Inflation 0.276*** 
(0.0685) 
 
 
 
 
0.642*** 
(0.0961) 
 
 
 
 
0.314*** 
(0.0636) 
 
 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.403*** 
(0.0481) 
 
 
 
 
0.606*** 
(0.0484) 
 
 
 
 
0.372*** 
(0.0448) 
 
 
L2.Inflation  
 
 
 
0.526*** 
(0.0491) 
 
 
 
 
0.694*** 
(0.0388) 
 
 
 
 
0.472*** 
(0.0411) 
ODA 1.246*** 
(0.362) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA  
 
0.782+ 
(0.415) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ODA  
 
 
 
1.820*** 
(0.312) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ODA*Inflation -0.0834+ 
(0.0487) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA*Inflation  
 
-0.334*** 
(0.0781) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ODA*Inflation  
 
 
 
-0.349*** 
(0.105) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
-119.9 
(198.0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
285.2** 
(98.90) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
369.9*** 
(76.43) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
-31.07*** 
(6.800) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-17.29*** 
(3.225) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-16.94*** 
(2.991) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.137* 
(1.392) 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.417 
(1.683) 
 
 
L2.IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.120 
(1.664) 
IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0513 
(0.210) 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.147 
(0.138) 
 
 
L2.IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0633 
(0.102) 
Constant 4.909*** 
(0.726) 
6.484*** 
(0.878) 
4.516*** 
(0.563) 
6.579*** 
(1.878) 
3.368** 
(1.128) 
3.085*** 
(0.606) 
5.911*** 
(0.719) 
5.384*** 
(0.834) 
5.654*** 
(0.605) 
Observations 471 454 437 471 454 437 503 485 467 
R2 0.1783 0.1438 0.1753 0.2202 0.1804 0.2117 0.1749 0.1530 0.1701 
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 19 19 19 
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Table 6.A16: DRate as Dependent Variable: Fixed-Effects with PCSE and LDV 
Using Different Lag Structures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 DRate DRate DRate DRate DRate DRate DRate DRate DRate 
L.DRate 0.335*** 
(0.0150) 
0.319*** 
(0.00968) 
 
 
0.407*** 
(0.0292) 
0.337*** 
(0.0254) 
 
 
0.357*** 
(0.0153) 
0.344*** 
(0.0133) 
 
 
L2.DRate  
 
 
 
0.113*** 
(0.00999) 
 
 
 
 
0.133** 
(0.0411) 
 
 
 
 
0.142*** 
(0.0167) 
GDP growth 0.0900** 
(0.0287) 
 
 
 
 
0.214*** 
(0.0511) 
 
 
 
 
0.146*** 
(0.0304) 
 
 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
0.143*** 
(0.0339) 
 
 
 
 
0.214*** 
(0.0447) 
 
 
 
 
0.161*** 
(0.0305) 
 
 
L2.GDP growth  
 
 
 
0.132** 
(0.0462) 
 
 
 
 
0.125+ 
(0.0732) 
 
 
 
 
0.127** 
(0.0391) 
Inflation 0.603*** 
(0.0193) 
 
 
 
 
0.698*** 
(0.0346) 
 
 
 
 
0.436*** 
(0.0211) 
 
 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.636*** 
(0.0129) 
 
 
 
 
0.679*** 
(0.0301) 
 
 
 
 
0.453*** 
(0.0216) 
 
 
L2.Inflation  
 
 
 
0.888*** 
(0.0145) 
 
 
 
 
0.998*** 
(0.0521) 
 
 
 
 
0.618*** 
(0.0366) 
ODA 2.739*** 
(0.175) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA  
 
2.752*** 
(0.265) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ODA  
 
 
 
4.171*** 
(0.498) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ODA*Inflation -0.414*** 
(0.0535) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ODA*Inflation  
 
-0.545*** 
(0.0693) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ODA*Inflation  
 
 
 
-0.787*** 
(0.112) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
-78.22 
(82.84) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.506 
(66.76) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.IMFcredit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56.63 
(91.41) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
-15.53*** 
(2.864) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-12.85*** 
(2.331) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.IMFcredit*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-23.71*** 
(4.002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.408** 
(1.136) 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.926 
(1.308) 
 
 
L2.IMFprogr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.393 
(1.641) 
IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.415*** 
(0.0844) 
 
 
 
 
L.IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.363*** 
(0.0727) 
 
 
L2.IMFprogr*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.540*** 
(0.130) 
Constant 1.729*** 
(0.356) 
1.912*** 
(0.399) 
2.644*** 
(0.510) 
-0.423 
(0.597) 
1.046+ 
(0.558) 
2.043** 
(0.786) 
2.419*** 
(0.411) 
2.796*** 
(0.408) 
4.136*** 
(0.477) 
Observations 458 453 435 458 453 435 489 484 465 
R2   0.7549 0.7633 0.7605 0.7757 0.7788 0.7817 0.7669 0.7730 0.7625 
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 19 19 19 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Resource Dependence and the Policy Stance in Relation to Price Stability   
Tables 6.A17 through 6.A23 report results for a variety of specifications exploring the 
relationship between resource dependence and the aversion to inflation, which is the 
proxy for the policy stance in relation to price stability. In particular: 
• Tables 6.A17 and 6.A18 report results for regressions where the dependent variable 
is the differenced central bank policy rate, PRate_d. The main relationship of 
interest is thus how changes in the consumer price index (i.e. inflation) in a context 
of resource dependence affect changes in the central bank policy rate.  
• Tables 6.A19 through 6.A21 report results from specifications using PRate as the 
dependent variable based on annual data. Table 6.A19 uses the AR1 error model and 
Table 6.A19 the LDV model. Note, that some standard errors in Table 6.A20, 
models 3 and 4, are missing, due to a non-symmetric or highly singular variance 
matrix. Table 6.A21 reports results from an Arellano-Bond LDV model, a two step 
difference GMM.190 I implemented the estimator using Stata’s xtabond2 command. 
I also used forward orthogonal deviations as an alternative to differencing that 
preserves sample size in panels with gaps and the Windmeijer finite sample 
correction to the reported standard errors in two step estimation without which those 
standard errors tend to be severely downward biased (Roodman, 2006).191 I 
implemented time fixed-effects, whose estimates are not reported here, to reduce the 
risk of a contemporaneous correlation of errors.  
• Tables 6.A22 and 6.A23 report results for regressions where the dependent variable 
is DRate, i.e. the central bank policy rate (IFS, line 60), or, where it is not available, 
the discount rate (IFS, line 60A).  
  
                                               
190I did not employ System GMM because it uses more instruments than system GMM, which is 
problematic when the number of countries in the dataset is small. 
191
 I implemented two-step GMM because two-step standard errors, with the Windmeijer correction, are 
considered quite accurate and seem modestly superior to robust one-step (Roodman, 2006). 
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Table 6.A17: Differenced Dependent Variable: Fixed-Effects with PCSE and 
AR(1) Correction Using Different Lag Structures 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d 
GDP growth 0.749*** 
(0.0781) 
 
 
 
 
0.723*** 
(0.0817) 
 
 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
0.925*** 
(0.105) 
 
 
 
 
0.877*** 
(0.101) 
 
 
L2.GDP growth  
 
 
 
-0.205** 
(0.0652) 
 
 
 
 
-0.244*** 
(0.0630) 
Inflation 0.0874** 
(0.0304) 
 
 
 
 
0.105** 
(0.0334) 
 
 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.263*** 
(0.0408) 
 
 
 
 
0.262*** 
(0.0414) 
 
 
L2.Inflation  
 
 
 
0.0915*** 
(0.0262) 
 
 
 
 
0.0907*** 
(0.0260) 
ResRents -1.118*** 
(0.336) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents  
 
-0.849* 
(0.387) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ResRents  
 
 
 
0.830*** 
(0.191) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ResRents*Inflation 0.0301 
(0.0292) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents*Inflation  
 
-0.152*** 
(0.0363) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ResRents*Inflation  
 
 
 
-0.140*** 
(0.0297) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
-100.5** 
(35.33) 
 
 
 
 
L.ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-30.17 
(39.44) 
 
 
L2.ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94.43*** 
(22.07) 
ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
-4.785+ 
(2.520) 
 
 
 
 
L.ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-9.439*** 
(2.657) 
 
 
L2.ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-10.05*** 
(2.118) 
Constant -2.402*** 
(0.705) 
-12.89*** 
(1.680) 
0.0969 
(0.399) 
-8.523*** 
(1.334) 
-12.41*** 
(1.671) 
-1.913+ 
(1.040) 
Observations 189 185 181 189 185 181 
R2 0.0100 0.0166 0.0032 0.0092 0.0145 0.0032 
Number of countries 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6.A18: Differenced Dependent Variable: Fixed-Effects with PCSE and LDV 
Using Different Lag Structures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d PRate_d 
L.PRate_d -0.395*** 
(0.0292) 
-0.399*** 
(0.0320) 
 
 
-0.394*** 
(0.0311) 
-0.397*** 
(0.0340) 
 
 
L2.PRate_d  
 
 
 
-0.0726*** 
(0.0176) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0711*** 
(0.0182) 
GDP growth 1.456*** 
(0.165) 
 
 
 
 
1.413*** 
(0.180) 
 
 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
1.562*** 
(0.180) 
 
 
 
 
1.514*** 
(0.194) 
 
 
L2.GDP growth  
 
 
 
0.0572 
(0.0939) 
 
 
 
 
0.0266 
(0.0974) 
Inflation 0.156** 
(0.0503) 
 
 
 
 
0.140* 
(0.0547) 
 
 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.290*** 
(0.0525) 
 
 
 
 
0.267*** 
(0.0568) 
 
 
L2.Inflation  
 
 
 
0.104*** 
(0.0286) 
 
 
 
 
0.0865** 
(0.0293) 
ResRents -3.607*** 
(0.722) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents  
 
-3.542*** 
(0.711) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ResRents  
 
 
 
-1.147*** 
(0.320) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ResRents*Inflation -0.0380 
(0.0508) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents*Inflation  
 
-0.171*** 
(0.0513) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ResRents*Inflation  
 
 
 
-0.00939 
(0.0359) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
-354.1*** 
(69.67) 
 
 
 
 
L.ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-298.0*** 
(59.30) 
 
 
L2.ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-68.24+ 
(35.78) 
ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
-7.323+ 
(4.415) 
 
 
 
 
L.ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-12.66** 
(4.171) 
 
 
L2.ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.903 
(2.994) 
Constant -13.70*** 
(1.936) 
-16.88*** 
(2.067) 
-3.601** 
(1.098) 
-12.80*** 
(2.054) 
-16.05*** 
(2.195) 
-3.239** 
(1.112) 
Observations 182 182 175 182 182 175 
R2 0.3491 0.3604 0.2415 0.3477 0.3573 0.2412 
Number of countries 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6.A19: Annual Data: Fixed-Effects with PCSE and AR(1) Correction Using 
Different Lag Structures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 PRate PRate PRate PRate 
GDP growth 0.212 
(0.143) 
 
 
0.361 
(0.292) 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
-0.0593 
(0.0921) 
 
 
-0.127 
(0.110) 
Inflation 1.149*** 
(0.221) 
 
 
1.248** 
(0.434) 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.370*** 
(0.0793) 
 
 
0.375*** 
(0.113) 
ResRents -0.0584 
(0.0966) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents  
 
-0.00696 
(0.0373) 
 
 
 
 
ResRents*Inflation -0.0135*** 
(0.00306) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents*Inflation  
 
-0.000444 
(0.00259) 
 
 
 
 
ResExp  
 
 
 
8.057 
(36.84) 
 
 
L.ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
8.230 
(12.88) 
ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
-2.899** 
(1.006) 
 
 
L.ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.773 
(0.723) 
Constant 2.858* 
(1.395) 
5.706*** 
(0.676) 
1.531 
(2.482) 
5.984*** 
(0.871) 
Observations 128 115 119 108 
R2 0.5272 0.7396 0.5517 0.7334 
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6.A20: Annual Data: Fixed-Effects with PCSE and LDV Using Different Lag 
Structures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 PRate PRate PRate PRate 
L.PRate 0.125*** 
(0.0242) 
0.237*** 
(0.0215) 
0.111 
(.) 
0.235 
(.) 
GDP growth 0.256*** 
(0.0715) 
 
 
0.198 
(.) 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
-0.291*** 
(0.0657) 
 
 
-0.251 
(.) 
Inflation 0.540*** 
(0.0497) 
 
 
0.573 
(.) 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.0781* 
(0.0314) 
 
 
0.0890 
(.) 
ResRents -0.162*** 
(0.0228) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents  
 
-0.141* 
(0.0586) 
 
 
 
 
ResRents*Inflation -0.00639*** 
(0.000645) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents*Inflation  
 
-0.00256+ 
(0.00149) 
 
 
 
 
ResExp  
 
 
 
18.26 
(.) 
 
 
L.ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
2.556 
(.) 
ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
-1.391 
(.) 
 
 
L.ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.516 
(.) 
Constant 2.414*** 
(0.539) 
6.702*** 
(0.616) 
1.914 
(.) 
5.995 
(.) 
Observations 109 109 100 102 
R2 0.9503 0.9265 0.9491 0.9264 
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6.A21: Annual Data: Arellano-Bond LDV Model 
 (1) (2) 
 PRate PRate 
L.PRate 0.0927+ 
(0.0482) 
0.128* 
(0.0518) 
GDP growth -0.00380 
(0.289) 
-0.0948 
(0.564) 
L.GDP growth -0.153 
(0.198) 
-0.546 
(0.635) 
Inflation 0.578** 
(0.158) 
0.448** 
(0.131) 
L.Inflation -0.00138 
(0.0848) 
-0.0162 
(0.274) 
ResRents -0.0980 
(0.208) 
 
 
L.ResRents 0.00259 
(0.250) 
 
 
ResRents*Inflation -0.00703** 
(0.00191) 
 
 
L.ResRents*Inflation -0.00174 
(0.00389) 
 
 
ResExp  
 
54.24 
(143.9) 
L.ResExp  
 
23.80 
(114.7) 
ResExp*Inflation  
 
-1.317 
(0.795) 
L.ResExp*Inflation  
 
-2.333 
(2.158) 
Observations 90 81 
Number of countries 19 18 
Number of instruments 41 41 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6.A22: DRate as Dependent Variable: Fixed-Effects with PCSE and AR(1) 
Correction Using Different Lag Structures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DRate DRate DRate DRate DRate DRate 
GDP growth 0.0279 
(0.0283) 
 
 
 
 
0.0288 
(0.0288) 
 
 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
0.173*** 
(0.0251) 
 
 
 
 
0.171*** 
(0.0245) 
 
 
L2.GDP growth  
 
 
 
0.0375 
(0.0256) 
 
 
 
 
0.0352 
(0.0281) 
Inflation 0.260*** 
(0.0756) 
 
 
 
 
0.269*** 
(0.0742) 
 
 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.429*** 
(0.0505) 
 
 
 
 
0.431*** 
(0.0506) 
 
 
L2.Inflation  
 
 
 
0.586*** 
(0.0470) 
 
 
 
 
0.591*** 
(0.0482) 
ResRents -1.158*** 
(0.234) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents  
 
-0.443** 
(0.162) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ResRents  
 
 
 
0.188 
(0.168) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ResRents*Inflation 0.0582 
(0.0402) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents*Inflation  
 
-0.0880** 
(0.0283) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ResRents*Inflation  
 
 
 
-0.212*** 
(0.0291) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
-130.8*** 
(18.76) 
 
 
 
 
L.ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-53.96** 
(17.78) 
 
 
L2.ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.259 
(28.66) 
ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
2.709 
(2.641) 
 
 
 
 
L.ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-6.556** 
(2.135) 
 
 
L2.ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-17.08*** 
(2.518) 
Constant 9.787*** 
(0.879) 
5.881*** 
(0.810) 
5.746*** 
(0.730) 
10.26*** 
(0.864) 
6.083*** 
(0.798) 
6.999*** 
(1.567) 
Observations 503 485 467 503 485 467 
R2 0.1630 0.1466 0.1856 0.1646 0.1470 0.1817 
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6.A23: DRate as Dependent Variable: Fixed-Effects with PCSE and LDV 
Using Different Lag Structures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DRate DRate DRate DRate DRate DRate 
L.DRate 0.349*** 
(0.0123) 
0.329*** 
(0.00785) 
 
 
0.349*** 
(0.0119) 
0.327*** 
(0.00747) 
 
 
L2.DRate  
 
 
 
0.121*** 
(0.00815) 
 
 
 
 
0.116*** 
(0.00733) 
GDP growth 0.116*** 
(0.0320) 
 
 
 
 
0.127*** 
(0.0315) 
 
 
 
 
L.GDP growth  
 
0.142*** 
(0.0356) 
 
 
 
 
0.152*** 
(0.0358) 
 
 
L2.GDP growth  
 
 
 
0.0973+ 
(0.0510) 
 
 
 
 
0.111* 
(0.0526) 
Inflation 0.595*** 
(0.0166) 
 
 
 
 
0.613*** 
(0.0163) 
 
 
 
 
L.Inflation  
 
0.628*** 
(0.0121) 
 
 
 
 
0.653*** 
(0.0138) 
 
 
L2.Inflation  
 
 
 
0.887*** 
(0.0180) 
 
 
 
 
0.934*** 
(0.0219) 
ResRents 0.974*** 
(0.134) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents  
 
1.114*** 
(0.134) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ResRents  
 
 
 
1.644*** 
(0.136) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ResRents*Inflation -0.212*** 
(0.0119) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.ResRents*Inflation  
 
-0.268*** 
(0.0125) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L2.ResRents*Inflation  
 
 
 
-0.424*** 
(0.0215) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
80.34*** 
(18.37) 
 
 
 
 
L.ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97.86*** 
(18.06) 
 
 
L2.ResExp  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
155.2*** 
(24.70) 
ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
-17.57*** 
(1.301) 
 
 
 
 
L.ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-22.90*** 
(1.582) 
 
 
L2.ResExp*Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-38.42*** 
(2.365) 
Constant 1.592*** 
(0.347) 
1.929*** 
(0.379) 
2.685*** 
(0.457) 
1.618*** 
(0.361) 
1.973*** 
(0.406) 
2.552*** 
(0.447) 
Observations 489 484 465 489 484 465 
R2 0.7692 0.7773 0.7730 0.7699 0.7784 0.7763 
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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7 Structural Power and Central Bank Policy: Conclusions 
Why countries differ in the orientation of economic policy is a central question for 
students of political economy. I have approached this question through the lens of 
theory of the structural power of capital and by examining one particular type of 
economic policy, namely central bank policy. Understanding the sources of central bank 
policy is important because central banks influence many of the variables which 
determine a country’s level of economic prosperity, such as the stability of prices, the 
stability of the financial sector and access to finance. Moreover, the analysis of central 
bank policy is well suited for an approach which examines how the choices of 
policymakers may be constrained by structural power, which Winters (1996: x) defines 
as power derived from the capacity to deploy scarce investment resources. The stance of 
central bank policy sends important signals to private investors and donors about a 
country’s investment climate and creditworthiness, so that central bankers are likely to 
face pressures to pursue policies that are responsive to the policy concerns of major 
providers of investment funds.  
I have built upon the work of earlier scholars of structural power. Few such scholars, 
however, have applied the theory to the realm of finance in developing countries. 
Moreover, despite the variation across developing countries in the sources of investment 
finance on which they rely to finance investment, existing work on structural power has 
largely focused on examining how structural dependence on private investors shapes 
policy. This study begins to address these gaps in the research. In an effort to further 
develop the theory of the structural power of capital, I have examined central bank 
policy with an approach focused on structural power in developing countries that vary 
with respect to the sources of finance on which they rely.  
As I summarised at the end of each chapter the key points that emerged from the 
preceding analysis, the main task that remains is to review the combined evidence. This 
is the subject of the next section. Following this review, the remainder of the concluding 
chapter turns to the contributions of the thesis, its limitations and implications for the 
debate on central bank mandates in developing countries. 
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7.1 Review of the Combined Evidence 
I opted for a broad and exploratory research design as my focus was on theory-building. 
In particular, I employed case studies of Uganda, Nigeria and Kenya and cross-national 
statistical analyses to examine the relationship between the control over investment 
funds and central bank policy stances. Each of the preceding empirical chapters 
presented one set of analyses to tell part of a larger story of the power deriving from the 
control of capital. While each analysis has methodological limitations and is not entirely 
convincing on its own, the sets of analysis in combination provide some evidence that 
patterns of capital control do influence the orientation of central bank policy. This 
section reviews the evidence for this claim. 
Do Those Who Control Investment Funds Shape Central Bank Policy Stances? 
The first and main question posed by this research has been whether those who control 
the sources of finance on which a country relies to finance investment shape central 
bank policy stances. This question was the subject of the case studies of Uganda, 
Nigeria and Kenya. The evidence I have presented suggests that the accounts of central 
bank policy in these three countries can be meaningfully enhanced by considering the 
pattern of control of investment resources as an explanatory factor.  
The material presented in the case study of Uganda suggests that donors have 
influenced the stance of central bank policy in Uganda since becoming major providers 
of investible funds. More specifically, the policy concerns of donors began to pose 
constraints on the options policymakers could consider in the field of central bank 
policy when Uganda became reliant on aid. 
 The evidence I have presented in the case study of Nigeria suggests that when access 
to, and control of, resource revenues increases, the policy space for the government in 
the area of central bank policy increases as well. In particular, as the Nigerian 
government’s oil revenues increase, they provide the government with a material basis 
to pursue a wider range of policy options than would be possible under resource scarcity 
and the influence of non-state actors over central bank policy, notably donors, is 
increasingly undermined. 
The evidence presented in the case study of Kenya is less conclusive. The material 
suggests that in the period from independence until the late 1970s and in the period 
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from 2003 onwards, investors wielded structural power which derived from the 
resources they controlled and their decisions about the volume of investment and the 
areas in which to invest. Central bank policy was designed with a view to inducing 
business to supply investment resources. However, particularly in the period from 1989 
to 2002 policymakers failed to satisfy some important policy concerns of business and 
donors, the second major source of investible funds, despite declining levels of growth. 
The case study suggests that one reason for this was the patronage network 
underpinning Moi’s regime, which exerted pressures to pursue policies that violated 
some of the policy concerns of major suppliers of investible funds. Thus, the theory of 
structural power cannot explain central bank policy during that period.  
There were additional ambiguities in the case studies because the processes through 
which donors and private investors exerted influence were not always observable. In 
Uganda, for instance, donors and policymakers developed a common understanding of 
policy priorities over time, which sometimes made it difficult to distinguish whether 
policies were pursued because of “faith” or because donors were able to demand 
responsive policies. In the analysis of the Kenyan case, I had difficulties distinguishing 
whether policies to improve the business environment were, as official rhetoric held, 
intended to address the policy concerns of private investors, or of donors because for the 
latter improving the business environment was also a major policy concern. That said, I 
have made considerable effort to trace the ways through which the constraints posed by 
those who control investment funds get expressed in policies.  
Through Which Mechanisms Do Investors and Donors Shape Central Bank Policy 
Stances? 
The particular ways through which the constraints posed by those who control 
investment funds get expressed in policies were the subject of the second research 
question, namely: Through which mechanisms – exit, voice or encouraging social 
learning – do those who control the sources of finance on which a country relies to 
finance investment shape central bank policy stances? The case studies of Uganda, 
Nigeria and Kenya have provided the basis upon which to examine these mechanisms. 
In examining mechanisms, I focused on those through which donors and investors 
influence policy because governments do not have to rely on exit, voice and social 
learning to exercise power, they merely implement their preferred policies.  
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The evidence suggests that donors used all three mechanisms – exit, voice, and 
encouraging social learning – to influence policy. Exit and voice appear to assume 
greater importance when relationships with donors are strained. The IMF, however, 
often appeared to shape central bank policy through the mere threat of exit, both when 
relationships with recipient countries were good and when they were difficult. Social 
learning, in contrast, appears to become more important when relations with donors 
improve or when donors and recipient governments have a common understanding of 
reform needs in specific policy areas. The material suggests that private investors 
mostly shaped policy silently, through exit and the threat of exit. In examining how 
business’s control over investment translated into influence over policy, I thus had to 
pay considerable attention to issues of perception and anticipation.  
Propositions 
I also developed two propositions. The first is that in developing countries which are 
more dependent on aid, the central bank policy stance is more likely to be stability-
oriented. The second proposition is that in developing countries which are more 
dependent on natural resources, the central bank policy stance is more likely to be 
oriented towards financial deepening.  
The empirical investigation of whether aid dependence is associated with a policy 
stance oriented towards stability began with the case study of Uganda. The evidence I 
have presented in this case study suggests that increasing reliance on donors has indeed 
induced a central bank policy stance oriented towards stability. It is significant, 
however, that since the mid-2000s, the Central Bank of Uganda has embraced financial 
deepening as an additional policy goal, a development which has in part been driven by 
donors, whose policy concerns in the realm of central banking have changed to include 
both stability and financial deepening. 
Is it possible to strengthen these findings and establish a relationship between aid 
dependence and the stance of central bank policy through cross-country comparison? 
One way to approach this question is by comparing the stance of policy in Uganda with 
the stance of policy in Nigeria and Kenya. As Figure 7.A1 shows, reliance on ODA 
was, from 1990 onwards, consistently higher in Uganda than in Nigeria and Kenya. Has 
central bank policy in Uganda also exhibited a greater orientation towards stability after 
1990? Answering this question is not straightforward owing to data limitations and the 
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conceptual challenges in measuring the orientation of central bank policy. The 
orientation of central bank policy towards price stability, for instance, cannot be 
captured by a readily available indicator, as I explained in the last chapter. It is 
significant, however, that among the three country cases, Uganda is the only one which 
officially introduced an inflation-targeting framework, which is used to signal a 
prioritisation of price stability over other central bank policy goals and is unusual for 
countries in the low-income category. As regards the policy stances in relation to 
financial stability and financial deepening, it is useful to turn to the quantitative 
measures developed in this thesis.192 Data on the policy stance in relation to financial 
stability in Table 7.A1 reveals that Uganda achieves higher scores on all three measures 
of regulatory stringency developed in the thesis than Nigeria and Kenya. As stated in 
the introduction, another facet of a policy stance oriented towards stability might be that 
less emphasis is placed on financial deepening. As Table 7.A1 shows, Uganda has, like 
Nigeria and Kenya, implemented reforms to promote financial access. However, in 
contrast to Nigeria and Kenya, Uganda has no designated team to promote financial 
access reforms. In short, the limited, illustrative data supports the view that policy in 
Uganda was more oriented towards stability than in Nigeria and Kenya in the 2000s. 
In the last chapter, I used another, more robust form of cross-country comparison to 
establish whether there is a relationship between aid dependence and the stance of 
central bank policy, namely cross-national statistical analysis. Specifically, I employed 
three distinct sets of analysis: logistic regression analysis of financial deepening 
policies, ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression analyses of prudential 
regulation; and pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis of monetary policy. 
One set of analyses, the TSCS of monetary policy, contradicts the proposition, 
suggesting that higher volumes of financial assistance received from donors are 
associated with less emphasis on price stability. On balance, however, the evidence 
from the three sets of analysis suggests that aid dependence is associated with a policy 
stance oriented towards stability, at least where such dependence is measured by 
participation in IMF programmes. The evidence presented in the case studies of 
Uganda, Nigeria and Kenya supports the claim that the IMF has, compared to other 
                                               
192
 The data on regulatory stringency is from 2002 and the data on the policy stance in relation to financial 
deepening from 2008. During both years, aid dependence was higher in Uganda than in Nigeria and 
Kenya. 
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donors, exerted particularly high influence in orienting the stance of central bank policy 
towards stability.  
I began to examine whether resource dependence is associated with a policy stance 
oriented towards financial deepening by analysing the case of Nigeria. The evidence 
presented in the case study suggests that increasing access to oil revenues has indeed 
encouraged a central bank policy stance oriented towards financial deepening, broadly 
defined as a stance oriented towards increasing the volume of financial transactions. 
This raises the question of whether we can also establish a relationship between 
resource dependence and the stance of central bank policy through cross-country 
comparison.  
As Figure 7.A2 shows, reliance on resource rents was higher in Nigeria than in Kenya 
and Uganda between the 1970s and the 2000s.193 Was central bank policy also more 
orientated towards financial deepening in Nigeria than in Uganda and Kenya? With 
respect to price stability, it is significant that in the late 2000s, when it was 
internationally agreed that price stability should be a primary objective of central banks 
and with Uganda and Kenya having inflation targets of 5%, the inflation objective of 
Nigeria’s central bank was merely to aim for “single-digit inflation”. Moreover, like the 
CBK, the CBN has used monetary policy not only with a view to promote price stability 
but also to reduce the cost of credit by maintaining low interest rates (IMF, 2008a; IMF, 
2011). The quantitative measures developed in this thesis allow a comparison of the 
policy stances in relation to financial stability and financial deepening. Based on these 
measures, central bank policy in Nigeria seems to be as much oriented towards financial 
stability as in Kenya but less so than in Uganda. Similarly, central bank policy in 
Nigeria seems to be as much oriented towards deepening financial sectors by promoting 
financial access as in Kenya and more so than in Uganda.  
That said, it is noteworthy that until the mid-1980s, Nigeria’s system of credit allocation 
was more pervasive than in Kenya and Uganda (Brownbridge et al., 1998). In fact, 
according to the World Bank, Nigeria had “one of the most rigid and comprehensive 
credit allocation schemes” in capitalist economies at a time when it was part of the 
predominant economic thinking that central banks may pursue a policy stance oriented 
                                               
193
 Data on resource rents in Figure 7.A2 is the sum of rents from oil and minerals as a percentage of 
GDP. While the quality of the underlying data is poor, the figure allows conveying that resource 
dependence in Nigeria has been higher than in Uganda and Kenya. 
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towards financial deepening (World Bank, 1983a: 43). Moreover, among the three 
central banks, the Nigerian central bank is the only one which continues to have a 
department dedicated to development financing and to operate development financing 
schemes. In sum, the limited, illustrative data suggests that central bank policy in 
Nigeria has been at least as oriented towards financial deepening as in Kenya and more 
so than in Uganda.  
To compare the relationship between resource dependence and the stance of central 
bank policy across countries in a more robust and systematic way, I also employed 
cross-national statistical analysis. There is no evidence of a significant relationship 
between resource dependence and the policy stance in relation to financial stability. 
However, there is some evidence suggesting that in countries which are more dependent 
on natural resources, the central bank policy stance is less oriented towards price 
stability and more oriented towards deepening financial sectors by promoting financial 
access. These two sets of evidence together with the case study provide support for the 
claim that access to resource revenues encourages a policy stance oriented towards 
financial deepening. 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, the approach that focused on structural power has not always been able to 
explain variation in the orientation of central bank policy. In particular, the case studies 
indicate that other variables may also affect outcomes and mediate structural power. 
That said, on balance the combined evidence from the case studies and the statistical 
analyses does suggest that structural forces rooted in the control over investment 
resources influence the likelihood of certain central bank policy stances as expected.  
7.2 Contributions  
This thesis has made four major research contributions. First, it contributes to the 
literature on structural power by extending its arguments to contexts of dependence for 
investible resources on aid and natural resource rents. Structuralist arguments have 
mainly been examined in countries where the structural power of business is high 
because it provides a significant share of investment resources. However, to further 
develop and probe the theory of the structural power of capital it is important to also 
examine the power deriving from the control of capital in contexts where the structural 
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power of business is constrained. This thesis took advantage of the variation across 
developing countries in the sources of finance on which they rely by examining and 
comparing how power deriving from the control of capital shapes the orientation of 
central bank policy in contexts characterised by resource dependence, aid dependence 
and reliance on private investors.  
Second, in order to develop empirically testable propositions I have combined insights 
from three distinct sets of literature, namely literature on structural power, the political 
economy of aid and the political economy of resource dependence. I used findings from 
research on the policy preferences of donors to develop the proposition that the stance 
of central bank policy in countries more dependent on aid is more oriented towards 
stability. Based on findings from research on the policy preferences of governments of 
resource dependent countries, I developed the proposition that the stance of central bank 
policy in countries more dependent on natural resource rents is more oriented towards 
financial deepening. 
Third, while most research on structural power has used qualitative case study 
methodologies, this thesis has presented evidence based on a mixed-methods design 
combining three detailed country case studies and various types of cross-national 
statistical analysis. Case study evidence has allowed constructing historical narratives 
showing that variations in the sources of finance on which a country relies may induce 
changes in the stance of central bank policy over time and the mechanisms through 
which this may occur. The cross-national statistical analysis consists of three parts: 
logistic regression analysis of policies to promote financial deepening; logistic and OLS 
regression analyses of prudential regulation; and TSCS analysis of monetary policy. 
These analyses have been able to provide some evidence to suggest that cross-national 
variation in aid or resource dependence accounts for cross-national variation in central 
bank policy stances. Moreover, the statistical analyses have helped to shed light on the 
types of populations to which the structuralist propositions may apply and facilitated a 
comparative assessment of the explanatory power of different variables to measure aid 
and resource dependence. 
Fourth, I have developed quantitative measures of the stance of central bank policy. 
While the stance of central bank policy is a key concept in this thesis and is important to 
measure for cross-country comparisons, it is difficult to operationalise. Moreover, there 
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was a lack of off-the-shelf quantitative measures of central bank policy which were 
adequate for the context of developing countries. Thus, the measures of policy stances I 
developed were original, while I made considerable effort to balance conceptual 
considerations and considerations of data availability because data on central bank 
policy stances in developing countries that is comparable across countries is very 
limited. 
7.3 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research 
Looking to the future, it is important to highlight the limitations of this thesis, in order 
to point out potentially fruitful directions for further research, and the implications for 
the debate on the mandates of central banks in developing countries. First, the 
limitations. Although I opted for a broad and exploratory research design, I had to focus 
on some research questions and exclude others to keep the scope of the research 
manageable. I will highlight three of the limitations this creates. 
First, although the objective of this thesis was to examine the general orientation of 
central bank policy, the analysis has not covered all areas of central bank policy. In 
particular, I focused on monetary policy to evaluate the policy stance in relation to price 
stability and on financial policy to evaluate the policy stance in relation to financial 
deepening and financial stability. I excluded the analysis of exchange rate policy 
although achieving low and stable exchange rates is an important goal of central banks 
in many developing countries. Given the trade-offs between exchange rate stability and 
other central bank policy goals, and the importance of low and stable exchange rates for 
export sectors, an analysis of central bank policy that includes exchange rate policy 
would be a fruitful area for future research on the structural power of capital. 
Second, due to the breadth of the research agenda, the case studies have focused on the 
power of relatively broad categories of providers of investible resources such as 
domestic and foreign investors. The case studies have not focused on the subtle 
differences in the power of different categories of private investors (e.g. portfolio 
investors, foreign direct investors, international banks and domestic banks) or of donors. 
Similarly, the case studies have not examined what differences regarding the mobility of 
capital imply for the structural power of different suppliers of investment funds; for 
instance Maxfield (1997) examined the implications of such differences in her analysis 
of the determinants of central bank independence. Focusing on the differences in the 
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structural power of private investors and of donors, and on the role of mobility in 
shaping these differences, would improve our understanding of the challenges central 
banks face in promoting access to long-term capital. 
Third, I have focused on capturing only a small number of relatively observable causal 
mechanisms that link the control over investible resources to the stance of central bank 
policy, notably exit, voice and encouragement of social learning. Thus, the analysis 
probably excluded other causal mechanisms at work. For instance, I have not examined 
how path dependence links the control over investible funds to the stance of central 
bank policy although previous research suggests that central bank policy has elements 
of path dependence (Maxfield, 1994). In addition, I also did not discuss in greater detail 
how structural power may shape policy through an alignment of interests between the 
government and non-state actors. Moreover, the result of the statistical analysis that 
suggests that aid dependence is associated with a weaker orientation of central bank 
policy towards price stability raises questions related to the mechanisms through which 
donors may exert influence. Specifically, through which mechanisms may donors 
impose constraints on expansionary policy and through which may they encourage 
expansionary policy? Much remains to be done in capturing the ways through which 
structural power may translate into policy. 
7.4 Rethinking Central Bank Mandates in Developing Countries 
The findings presented in this thesis raise some important questions for the debate on 
the appropriate mandate for central banks in developing countries I referred to in the 
introduction of the thesis. I will conclude by raising two of these questions.  
First, how feasible is it to adapt central bank policy stances? Often discussions on 
central bank mandates in developing countries reflect the assumption that central bank 
roles and goals can be adapted quickly by changing legislation. Although in these 
discussions, there appears to be an awareness that central bank policy in developing 
countries often follows some political logic, discussions hardly ever acknowledge the 
role power relations play in shaping central bank policy, and that this power is often 
rooted in structural features of the economy. The findings presented in this thesis 
suggest that central banking may not be amenable to fundamental policy shifts in the 
short-term owing to the structural sources of central bank policy.  
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Second, what are the costs and benefits of different central bank policy stances? 
Arguments related to the advantages and disadvantages of different central bank 
mandates often reflect ideology. There is very limited empirical evidence that allows 
comparing the economic and political costs of central bank policy stances oriented 
towards stability, financial deepening or both. While the case studies make no effort to 
fill this research gap, they do suggest that a policy stance that emphasises one goal and 
neglects the other may be costly for developing countries. The evidence presented in the 
case study of Nigeria suggests that societies may pay a high price if a central bank 
policy stance oriented towards financial deepening is pursued at the expense of stability. 
For instance, the costs of cleaning up the balance sheets and recapitalising the banks 
which failed in the banking crisis of 2009 is estimated by the Nigerian authorities at 
about 7.5% of GDP (IMF, 2011). The evidence presented in the case study of Uganda 
suggests that focusing entirely on stability may also come at a price. Many 
policymakers and donors assumed that with economic stability firmly in place, financial 
deepening and access to finance would follow in Uganda. Yet the Ugandan story 
suggests they will not follow necessarily and that more systematic policies to promote 
financial deepening are important for increasing access to finance. What emerges is thus 
that there may be benefits to assigning central banks a mandate to promote both stability 
and financial deepening and to pursuing a balanced approach to stability and financial 
deepening in countries where central banks have such a dual mandate. 
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7.5 Appendix 
 
Figure 7.A1: Net ODA Received, 1960-2011 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c). 
 
Figure 7.A2: Resource Rents, 1970-2011 
 
Source: Data drawn from the World Bank (2013c). Note: Data for resource rents only available from 
1970. 
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Table 7.A1: Central Bank Policy Stances in Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda 
 
 
  
Indicator Kenya Nigeria Uganda 25
th
 
percentile Median 
75th 
percentile Observations 
HCapital (binary 
variable) 0 0 1 0 0 0 115 
Capital (continuous 
variable) 8 8 12 8 8 10 115 
CIStr (Index of 
regulatory 
stringency) 
0.5 0.5 1 0.375 0.5 0.75 115 
Team (binary 
variable) 1 1 0 0 0 1 119 
Reform (binary 
variable) 1 1 1 0 1 1 119 
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List of Key Interviews194 
Kenya 
 
Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund  
Association of Microfinance Institutions  
CBK, former governors  
CBK, Monetary Policy Committee 
CBK, Research Department 
Equity Bank 
Family Bank 
Fina Bank 
Financial Sector Deepening Trust Kenya 
GIZ, Macroeconomic Policy Advisor 
GIZ, Private Sector Development Programme 
IFAD 
IMF 
Institute of Development Studies, University of Nairobi 
Kenya Association of Manufacturers 
Kenya Bankers’ Association 
Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis  
Kenya Private Sector Alliance 
Kenya School of Monetary Studies 
Micro Enterprises Support Programme Trust  
Ministry of Finance, Economic and Financial Policy Division 
Ministry of Planning 
Price Waterhouse Coopers 
Tax Justice Network 
World Bank, various programmes 
 
Nigeria 
 
Access Bank 
Africa Finance Corporation 
African Institute for Applied Economics 
Bank of Industry 
Budget Office of the Federation 
Bulwark Investments and Trusts Limited 
CBN, Advisor to the Governor 
CBN, Development Finance Department 
CBN, Financial Policy and Regulation Department 
CBN, Financial Sector Strategy 2020 
CBN, Monetary Policy Department 
CBN, Monetary Policy Department, International Economic Relations Unit 
CBN, Monetary Policy Committee  
Centre for Policy and Economic Research 
Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa  
Citibank Nigeria 
Consumer Protection Council 
                                               
194
 The data has been anonymised to ensure confidentiality. Therefore, I only list institutions here.  
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Covenant University, Department of Economics and Development Studies 
Credit Awareness 
DFID 
Ecobank 
Enhancing Financial Innovation & Access (EFInA)  
Enhancing Nigerian Advocacy for a Better Business Environment (ENABLE) 
Equipment Leasing Association of Nigeria  
GIZ, Financial and Private Sector Development Program 
IMF 
Lagos Business School  
Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Manufacturers Association of Nigeria 
Mortgage Banking Association of Nigeria 
Nigerian Association of Small and Medium Enterprises 
NOI Polls 
Oceanic Bank 
People and Passion Consulting 
Roland Berger Strategy Consultants 
Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria  
United Nations Development Program, Financial and Private Sector Development 
University of Lagos, Department of Economics  
West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management, CBN Learning Centre 
World Bank, various programmes 
 
Uganda 
 
Association of Microfinance Institutions of Uganda 
BoU, Accounting 
BoU, Advisor to the Governor 
BoU, Banking Supervision 
BoU, Commercial Banking Department 
BoU, Financial Stability Department 
BoU, former governor 
BoU, Governor’s Office 
BoU, Human Resources 
BoU, Research Department 
BoU, Statistic Division 
BRAC Uganda 
Citibank 
Compuscan, Credit Reference Bureau 
DFCU Bank 
DFID 
Economic Policy Research Centre 
Fina Bank 
Genesis Analytics Consulting 
GIZ, Financial Sector Development Program 
IMF 
Makerere University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, 
Faculty of Social Sciences  
Microfinance Supervision Institute (MSI) 
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Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Economic Development 
Policy and Research Department 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Microfinance Division 
Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture in Uganda 
Pride Microfinance Limited (MDI) 
Stanbic Bank 
The Microfinance Support Centre Ltd. 
UGAFODE 
Uganda Cooperative Alliance 
Uganda Development Bank 
Uganda Investment Authority 
Uganda Private Sector Foundation 
Uganda Revenue Authority 
Uganda Small Scale Industries Association (USSIA) 
USAID 
World Bank, various programmes 
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